This paper studies the optimal insurance design from the perspective of an insured when there is possibility for the insurer to default on its promised indemnity. Default of the insurer leads to limited liability, and the promised indemnity is only partially recovered in case of a default. To alleviate the potential ex post moral hazard, an incentive compatibility condition is added to restrict the permissible indemnity function. Assuming that the premium is determined as a function of the expected coverage and under the mean–variance preference of the insured, we derive the explicit structure of the optimal indemnity function through the marginal indemnity function formulation of the problem. It is shown that the optimal indemnity function depends on the first and second order expectations of the random recovery rate conditioned on the realized insurable loss. The methodology and results in this article complement the literature regarding the optimal insurance subject to the default risk and provide new insights on problems of similar types.
Optimal forms of reinsurance policies have been studied for a long time in the actuarial literature. Most existing results are from the insurer’s point of view, aiming at maximizing the expected utility or minimizing the risk of the insurer. However, as pointed out by Borch (1969), it is understandable that a reinsurance arrangement that might be very attractive to one party (e.g., the insurer) can be quite unacceptable to the other party (e.g., the reinsurer). In this paper, we follow this point of view and study forms of Pareto-optimal reinsurance policies whereby one party’s risk, measured by its value-at-risk (VaR), cannot be reduced without increasing the of the counter-party in the reinsurance transaction. We show that the Pareto-optimal policies can be determined by minimizing linear combinations of the s of the two parties in the reinsurance transaction. Consequently, we succeed in deriving user-friendly, closed-form, optimal reinsurance policies and their parameter values.
This paper presents analytical representations for an optimal insurance contract under distortion risk measure and in the presence of model uncertainty. We incorporate ambiguity aversion and distortion risk measure through the model of Robert and Therond [(2014) ASTIN Bulletin: The Journal of the IAA, 44(2), 277–302.] as per the framework of Klibanoff et al. [(2005) A smooth model of decision making under ambiguity. Econometrica, 73(6), 1849–1892.]. Explicit optimal insurance indemnity functions are derived when the decision maker (DM) applies Value-at-Risk as risk measure and is ambiguous about the loss distribution. Our results show that: (1) under model uncertainty, ambiguity aversion results in a distorted probability distribution over the set of possible models with a bias in favor of the model which yields a larger risk; (2) a more ambiguity-averse DM would demand more insurance coverage; (3) for a given budget, uncertainties about the loss distribution result in higher risk level for the DM.
In this paper, we propose a clustering procedure of financial time series according to the coefficient of weak lower-tail maximal dependence (WLTMD). Due to the potential asymmetry of the matrix of WLTMD coefficients, the clustering procedure is based on a generalized weighted cuts method instead of the dissimilarity-based methods. The performance of the new clustering procedure is evaluated by simulation studies. Finally, we illustrate that the optimal mean-variance portfolio constructed based on the resulting clusters manages to reduce the risk of simultaneous large losses effectively.