This paper harmonizes the business group literature in international business and across relevant fields within a unified theoretical framework. Business groups (firms under common control but with different, if overlapping, owners) are economically important in much of the world. Business groups’ economic significance co-evolves with their economies' institutions and market environments, patterns of particular interest to international business scholars. The vast literature on business groups raises discordant perspectives. This paper first proposes a unifying definition and provides a list of stylized historical observations on business groups across different parts of the world. It then develops a Coasean framework to harmonize seemingly disparate views from the literature by building on recent surveys and the stylized historical patterns of business groups. We enlist two concepts – fallacies of composition/decomposition and time inconsistency – to harmonize these perspectives. This yields a theoretical framework for understanding business groups that mobilizes concepts long-used to understand multinational enterprises: the economy's market and hierarchical transaction costs, openness, and their dynamic interactions. We then apply this framework to globalization and business group internationalization. This work leads to an overarching research agenda encompassing seemingly inconsistent prior work.
Disequilibrating macro shocks affect different firms' prospects differently, increasing idiosyncratic variation in forward-looking stock returns before affecting economic growth. Consistent with most such shocks from 1947 to 2020 enhancing productivity, increased idiosyncratic stock return variation forecasts next-quarter real GDP growth, industrial production growth, and consumption growth both in-sample and out-of-sample. These effects persist after controlling for other leading economic indicators.
Control over a bank’s lending decisions can be separated from exposure to its lending losses. A controlling borrower may then benefit privately from having the bank prop up her firm even though the firm’s liquidation value exceeds its going concern value. We call such a bank an organ bank and such a firm a zombie firm. We present exploratory cross-economy correlational evidence associating zombie firm prevalence with the prevalence of business family-controlled banks. A simple model shows how this separation can induce the continued financing of firms an independent lender would liquidate. The distortion is larger when the controlling borrower controls the bank with a smaller cash-flow ownership stake. The model and discussion show how bank governance, related lending, and anticipated government support may contribute to the preservation of zombie firms, inefficient capital allocation, and systemic risk.