Haifeng Xu

Dr. Haifeng Xu

Department of Computer Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 September 2022 in Games and Economic Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YBYakov Babichenko
Yakov Babichenko
ITInbal Talgam-Cohen
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
HXHaifeng Xu
Haifeng Xu
KZKonstantin Zabarnyi
Konstantin Zabarnyi

13 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDPaul Dütting
Paul Dütting
VMVahab Mirrokni
Vahab Mirrokni
RLRenato Paes Leme
Renato Paes Leme
HXHaifeng Xu
Haifeng Xu
SZSong Zuo
Song Zuo
We investigate auction mechanisms to support the emerging format of AI-generated content. We in particular study how to aggregate several LLMs in an incentive compatible manner. In this problem, the preferences of each agent over stochastically generated contents are described/encoded as an LLM. A key motivation is to design an auction format for AI-generated ad creatives to combine inputs from different advertisers. We argue that this problem, while generally falling under the umbrella of mechanism design, has several unique features. We propose a general formalism---the token auction model---for studying this problem. A key feature of this model is that it acts on a token-by-token basis and lets LLM agents influence generated contents through single dimensional bids. We first explore a robust auction design approach, in which all we assume is that agent preferences entail partial orders over outcome distributions. We formulate two natural incentive properties, and show that these are equivalent to a monotonicity condition on distribution aggregation. We also show that for such aggregation functions, it is possible to design a second-price auction, despite the absence of bidder valuation functions. We then move to designing concrete aggregation functions by focusing on specific valuation forms based on KL-divergence, a commonly used loss function in LLM. The welfare-maximizing aggregation rules turn out to be the weighted (log-space) convex combination of the target distributions from all participants. We conclude with experimental results in support of the token auction formulation.

24 August 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
FYFan Yao
Fan Yao
YLYiming Liao
Yiming Liao
MWMingzhe Wu
Mingzhe Wu
CLChuanhao Li
Chuanhao Li
YZYan Zhu
Yan Zhu
HWHongning Wang
Hongning Wang
Driven by the new economic opportunities created by the creator economy, an increasing number of content creators rely on and compete for revenue generated from online content recommendation platforms. This burgeoning competition reshapes the dynamics of content distribution and profoundly impacts long-term user welfare on the platform. However, the absence of a comprehensive picture of global user preference distribution often traps the competition, especially the creators, in states that yield sub-optimal user welfare. To encourage creators to best serve a broad user population with relevant content, it becomes the platform's responsibility to leverage its information advantage regarding user preference distribution to accurately signal creators. In this study, we perform system-side user welfare optimization under a competitive game setting among content creators. We propose an algorithmic solution for the platform, which dynamically computes a sequence of weights for each user based on their satisfaction of the recommended content. These weights are then utilized to design mechanisms that adjust the recommendation policy or the post-recommendation rewards, thereby influencing creators' content production strategies. To validate the effectiveness of our proposed method, we report our findings from a series of experiments, including: 1. a proof-of-concept negative example illustrating how creators' strategies converge towards sub-optimal states without platform intervention; 2. offline experiments employing our proposed intervention mechanisms on diverse datasets; and 3. results from a three-week online experiment conducted on Instagram Reels short-video recommendation platform.

21 June 2014 in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HXHaifeng Xu
Haifeng Xu
FFFei Fang
Fei Fang
AJAlbert Jiang
Albert Jiang
VCVincent Conitzer
Vincent Conitzer
SDShaddin Dughmi
Shaddin Dughmi
MTMilind Tambe
Milind Tambe
Among the many deployment areas of Stackelberg Security games, a major area involves games played out in space and time, which includes applications in multiple mobile defender resources protecting multiple mobile targets. Previous algorithms for such spatio-temporal security games fail to scale-up and little is known ofthe computational complexity properties of these problems.This paper provides a novel oracle-based algorithmic framework for a systematic study of different problem variants of computing optimal (minimax) strategies in spatio-temporal security games. Our framework enables efficient computation of a minimax strategy when the problem admits a polynomial-time oracle. Furthermore,for the cases in which efficient oracles are difficultto find, we propose approximations or prove hardness results.

24 March 2024 in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MHMinbiao Han
Minbiao Han
MAMichael Albert
Michael Albert
HXHaifeng Xu
Haifeng Xu
We study a ubiquitous learning challenge in online principal-agent problems during which the principal learns the agent's private information from the agent's revealed preferences in historical interactions. This paradigm includes important special cases such as pricing and contract design, which have been widely studied in recent literature. However, existing work considers the case where the principal can only choose a single strategy at every round to interact with the agent and then observe the agent's revealed preference through their actions. In this paper, we extend this line of study to allow the principal to offer a menu of strategies to the agent and learn additionally from observing the agent's selection from the menu. We provide a thorough investigation of several online principal-agent problem settings and characterize their sample complexities, accompanied by the corresponding algorithms we have developed. We instantiate this paradigm to several important design problems — including Stackelberg (security) games, contract design, and information design. Finally, we also explore the connection between our findings and existing results about online learning in Stackelberg games, and we offer a solution that can overcome a key hard instance of previous work.

2 July 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DBDirk Bergemann
Dirk Bergemann
MBMarek Bojko
Marek Bojko
PDPaul Duetting
Paul Duetting
RLRenato Paes Leme
Renato Paes Leme
HXHaifeng Xu
Haifeng Xu
SZSong Zuo
Song Zuo