11 February 2024 in Journal of the ACM
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981, but more than 40 years later, a full analytical understanding of the optimal design still remains elusive for settings with two or more items. In this work, we initiate the exploration of the use of tools from deep learning for the automated design of optimal auctions. We model an auction as a multi-layer neural network, frame optimal auction design as a constrained learning problem, and show how it can be solved using standard machine learning pipelines. In addition to providing generalization bounds, we present extensive experimental results, recovering essentially all known solutions that come from the theoretical analysis of optimal auction design problems and obtaining novel mechanisms for settings in which the optimal mechanism is unknown.
31 December 2024 in Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science
A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A key challenge addressed by contracts—known in economics as moral hazard—is that, absent a properly set up contract, agents might engage in actions that are not in the principal's best interest. Another common feature of contracts is limited liability, which means that payments can go only from the principal—who has the deep pocket —to the agents. With classic applications of contract theory moving online, growing in scale, and becoming more data-driven, tools from contract theory become increasingly important for incentiveaware algorithm design. At the same time, algorithm design offers a whole new toolbox for reasoning about contracts, ranging from additional tools for studying the tradeoff between simple and optimal contracts, through a language for discussing the computational complexity of contracts in combinatorial settings, to a formalism for analyzing data-driven contracts. This survey aims to provide a computer science-friendly introduction to the basic concepts of contract theory.We give an overview of the emerging field of “algorithmic contract theory” and highlight work that showcases the potential for interaction between the two areas. We also discuss avenues for future research.
1 January 2024 in Econometrica
We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity‐averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minimum utility, the principal can strictly gain from using an ambiguous contract, and this gain can be arbitrarily high. We characterize the structure of optimal ambiguous contracts, showing that ambiguity drives optimal contracts toward simplicity. We also provide a characterization of ambiguity‐proof classes of contracts, where the principal cannot gain by infusing ambiguity. Finally, we show that when the agent can engage in mixed actions, the advantages of ambiguous contracts disappear.
1 May 2022 in Mathematics of Operations Research
A central object of study in optimal stopping theory is the single-choice prophet inequality for independent and identically distributed random variables: given a sequence of random variables [ ] drawn independently from the same distribution, the goal is to choose a stopping time τ such that for the maximum value of α and for all distributions, [ ]. What makes this problem challenging is that the decision whether [ ] may only depend on the values of the random variables [ ] and on the distribution F. For a long time, the best known bound for the problem had been [ ], but recently a tight bound of [ ] was obtained. The case where F is unknown, such that the decision whether [ ] may depend only on the values of the random variables [ ], is equally well motivated but has received much less attention. A straightforward guarantee for this case of [ ] can be derived from the well-known optimal solution to the secretary problem, where an arbitrary set of values arrive in random order and the goal is to maximize the probability of selecting the largest value. We show that this bound is in fact tight. We then investigate the case where the stopping time may additionally depend on a limited number of samples from F, and we show that, even with o(n) samples, [ ]. On the other hand, n samples allow for a significant improvement, whereas [ ] samples are equivalent to knowledge of the distribution: specifically, with n samples, [ ] and [ ], and with [ ] samples, [ ] for any [ ].