There has recently been considerable discussion of those features of IFRS that are likely to help improve financial reporting in the European Union. However, certain issues may also have a negative impact on the quality of information. This paper focuses on the effect of IFRS on earnings management. Its main purpose is to examine whether the adoption of IFRS in the European Union has increased or decreased the scope for discretionary accounting practices by comparing discretionary accruals in the periods preceding and immediately after the regulatory change. Another objective is to determine which firms' features and country factors may explain the accounting discretion observed before and after IFRS. We consider a sample of non-financial firms listed on 11 EU stock markets. The results obtained show that earnings management has intensified since the adoption of IFRS in Europe, as discretionary accruals have increased in the period following implementation. The variables explaining accounting discretion are the same before and after IFRS (business size, leverage, investor protection and legal enforcement). These results suggest that variations in earnings management might be due to some room for manipulation under international standards when compared with local standards.
The study assesses and compares the value relevance (VR) of accounting numbers in entities that experienced high discretionary accruals intensity and so possible earnings management (EM) behaviours, testing whether and in what extent the quality of enforcement and governance mechanisms act as moderating factors on the relation EM-VR. Based on a sample of 2 667 European non-financial entities, the results show that while the VR of earnings is low in entities that experienced high discretionary accruals intensity, book value increases its VR. The study also shows that the quality of enforcement mechanisms and the ownership diffusion (that proxies the quality of corporate governance) are effectively able to obstruct the loss of VR of earnings. The value added of the paper consists in showing that both the quality of enforcement and the ownership diffusion contrast only in part and in different manner the loss of VR of earnings, due to the presence of EM behaviours, acting only in part as moderating factors.
The relationship between culture, earnings management and corporate governance has been studied in different ways, but the influence that culture has over the actual effectiveness of corporate governance to control earnings management has not, even though it should be a determinant factor to define successful governance schemes. Using Hofstede four organizational models as a framework, in this paper, we analyze a sample of companies listed in 16 different stock markets in terms of organizational culture, assessing their governance standards and performance in relation to earnings management, and measuring their actual effectiveness. The results confirm that earnings management is conditioned by organizational culture and that corporate governance acts as a brake on earnings management, regardless of the cultural field in which it is analyzed. However, its effectiveness depends on organizational culture, mostly on the uncertainty avoidance and the power distance. Therefore, modelling a country based on its organizational culture does limit the success of corporate governance policies and standards. This study brings in a new perspective for policy makers and practitioners to design and enforce their corporate governance policies targeting earnings management, according to the prevailing culture. The previous literature on the subject is complemented and enriched by this significant contribution, through which limitations in terms of the number of countries studied could be overcome by further studies addressing specific regions or sectors.
Una comparación internacional del incentivo para manipular el resultado con el objetivo de alcanzar los pronósticos de los analistas. Investigaciones previas han evidenciado que cuando los resultados alcanzan, o superan, los pronósticos de los analistas, el mercado reacciona positivamente, mientras que, cuando dichos pronósticos no son alcanzados, la reacción del mercado es la contraria. Por ello, los pronósticos se convierten en metas a batir y, tal como la literatura ya ha contrastado, surge un incentivo para la manipulación del resultado. En este contexto, el presente trabajo va más allá, evidenciando que la reacción positiva o negativa es de diferente magnitud según los mercados y que ello explica que la fuerza con la que las empresas perciben el incentivo a manipular los resultados para alcanzar dichos pronósticos también sea diferente según el mercado en el que cotiza. Comparando seis mercados, obtenemos que el incentivo es más potente cuanto mayor es el premio por cumplir los pronósticos, o la penalización por no hacerlo. Previous investigations have shown that when earnings meet analysts’ forecasts, the market reacts positively, and when these forecasts are not reached, the market reacts negatively. For this reason, forecasts become goals to beat, and as the literature has revealed, this creates an incentive for earnings management. The present paper extends prior research, providing evidence that the magnitude of the reward (penalty) for companies meeting (failing to meet) earnings forecasts differs depending on the market. In addition, it reveals that the strength of the incentive for companies to manage their earnings differs depending on the market in which they are listed. We compare six stock markets and find that the most powerful incentives arise when the reward for meeting the forecasts or the penalty for not doing so is greater.