This study introduces an evolutionary game model to investigate the strategic interaction among government regulatory agencies, shopping center investors, and tenants in the global energy-saving renovation market. The focus is on three innovative aspects. Firstly, the model reveals that positive tenant behavior can stimulate investors’ participation in energy-saving renovation projects by triggering potential market demand, thereby establishing a dynamic balance between supply and demand. This viewpoint has been previously overlooked in energy renovation research. Secondly, the model demonstrates the dynamic transformation of government regulatory strategies. In the early stages of market development, direct intervention through subsidies and penalties is crucial, and investors’ decisions are constrained by both returns and costs. When returns exceed the cost premium, investors actively participate, and policy incentives lower early cost barriers to promote market expansion. As the market matures, a transition toward policy guidance optimizes sustainable outcomes. Thirdly, extensive numerical simulations have confirmed the existence of multiple stable equilibrium states under different incentive and cost conditions, providing new evidence for the stability and adaptability of the energy-saving renovation market. These findings significantly advance the theoretical understanding of multi-stakeholder interactions in green building transformation and provide practical guidance for developing adaptive and effective policy frameworks.

Green design emphasizes the environmental attributes of the product life cycle, which can prevent environmental pollution at the source and reduce resource consumption. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a tripartite game model between “government-electrical and electronic manufacturing companies-consumers”, explores the influence of participants’ strategic choices and parameters on the evolutionary behavior of the three parties in different situations, and uses Matlab software to conduct numerical simulation analysis. Simulation analysis is the process of simulating real-world events and system behavior through computer models to assess, validate, and predict their performance and response. The research results show that the strategic choices of the three parties influence each other and government supervision and green consumption are conducive to incentivizing manufacturing companies to carry out green design. Consumer green preferences, environmental tax rates, corporate recycling revenue, and increases in consumer recycling revenue are all conducive to product design. Compared to environmental taxes, corporate subsidy policies have a greater impact on the behavior of the government, manufacturing companies, and consumers. Compared to consumer subsidies, corporate subsidy policies have a more significant effect on the behavior of governments and manufacturing companies, while for consumers, the opposite is true.

The proliferation of counterfeit products poses a substantial threat to numerous industries. Blockchain technology (BCT) offers an effective solution for product traceability, providing a means to combat counterfeiting. However, BCT can verify the authenticity of the information but cannot confirm the veracity of the product itself, a problem known as counterfeiting at the source. To our knowledge, this issue has yet to be studied. The security level of BCT traceability is used to indicate its ability to combat counterfeiting. We establish game-theoretical models to investigate BCT adoption strategies for a typically authentic firm and a premium firm to fight counterfeiting in a vertically differentiated competition. This study demonstrates that BCT reduces deceptive counterfeiters’ incentive to pool with the branded firm and mitigates the negative impact of asymmetric information on the prices, market share, and profits of authentic products in a monopoly. In instances where the proportion of counterfeits is substantial, premium products will lose market share, a phenomenon often referred to as “bad money driving out good money.” In a vertically differentiated competition, if the quality of the premium product is below a certain threshold, it is recommended that the premium firm be the first to adopt BCT, while the typically authentic firm should not follow (Scenario NB). That is, Scenario NB is a win-win situation for both firms in the competition. The premium firm that has adopted BCT can offer a “free ride” to the typically authentic firm.