Environmental sustainability is an important issue in supply chain management (SCM). New energy vehicles (NEVs) have significant environmental value when compared to traditional fuel vehicles (FVs). Currently, there is intense competition between fuel and new energy vehicles, owing to differentiated pricing strategies. This paper focuses on behavior-based pricing (BBP) strategies between energy vehicles and fuel vehicles in a two-echelon supply chain wherein consumers are environmentally conscious. A two-period game-theoretic model is built to examine the effect of consumers’ environmental concerns on competition between fuel and energy vehicles, behavior-based pricing strategies, supply chain efficiency, and social welfare. The analytical results indicate that consumers’ environmental concerns facilitate the market share competition by new energy vehicle firms in the second period. If consumers care more about the environment, supply chain efficiency is improved in cases of retail as well as wholesale-and-retail behavior-based pricing strategies. Wholesale-and-retail behavior-based pricing strategies benefit all members of the supply chain, but this is not the case for retail behavior-based pricing strategies. If consumers are sufficiently concerned about the environment and new energy vehicle firms are more efficient, a win–win–win scenario for firms, consumers, and social welfare occurs in the two behavior-based pricing strategies. Counterintuitively, green innovation improves new energy vehicle, fuel vehicle as well as overall supply chain efficiency, in three cases.

The proliferation of counterfeit products poses a substantial threat to numerous industries. Blockchain technology (BCT) offers an effective solution for product traceability, providing a means to combat counterfeiting. However, BCT can verify the authenticity of the information but cannot confirm the veracity of the product itself, a problem known as counterfeiting at the source. To our knowledge, this issue has yet to be studied. The security level of BCT traceability is used to indicate its ability to combat counterfeiting. We establish game-theoretical models to investigate BCT adoption strategies for a typically authentic firm and a premium firm to fight counterfeiting in a vertically differentiated competition. This study demonstrates that BCT reduces deceptive counterfeiters’ incentive to pool with the branded firm and mitigates the negative impact of asymmetric information on the prices, market share, and profits of authentic products in a monopoly. In instances where the proportion of counterfeits is substantial, premium products will lose market share, a phenomenon often referred to as “bad money driving out good money.” In a vertically differentiated competition, if the quality of the premium product is below a certain threshold, it is recommended that the premium firm be the first to adopt BCT, while the typically authentic firm should not follow (Scenario NB). That is, Scenario NB is a win-win situation for both firms in the competition. The premium firm that has adopted BCT can offer a “free ride” to the typically authentic firm.