With the rising awareness of environmental protection and concern for sustainable development, green products have been highly favored by consumers, enterprises, and the government. As a matter of fact, not only do manufacturers produce green products, but retailers would also like to introduce their green store brands. However, the costly green investment hinders the improvement of the products’ green degree. Therefore, the government may provide financial support to motivate enterprises to increase their products’ green degree. This study investigates how the presence of green store brands and government subsidies affect green supply chain performance. Four models are discussed using the Stackelberg game theoretic approach, and then, the optimal solutions in different cases are compared. The results show that (1) regardless of the government subsidy, the green store brand introduction always reduces the manufacturer’s profit and improves the retailer’s profit and environmental benefit; (2) In most cases, the implementation of a government subsidy can effectively improve the products’ green degree and benefit the supply chain members. However, it is surprising to find that the government subsidy may be detrimental to the manufacturer once the green store brand is introduced; (3) Interestingly, the introduction of green store brand may have an expansion effect, a shrinkage effect or even an inverse effect on the effects of government subsidies on supply chain performance, and these effects become more significant with the increasing green preference of consumers, product substitute, and subsidy rate. The new findings also provide some implications for supply chain members and the government in green supply chain management (GSCM) and green innovation.
Over the past decades, the store brand has undergone a key change and achieved a remarkable improvement. Based on the industry observations, there is a wide belief that the retailers are more and more inclining to add values that cater to the consumers into their store brands. The green store brand, one kind of the burgeoning store brands, has been introduced by many retailers recently. In this paper, we investigate the conditions for retailer to introduce a green store brand and the impacts of supply chain power structure on the retailer’s product strategy. We built and solved six game models with respect to three supply chain power structures with and without the green store brand. The results show that: (i) the threshold to introduce the green store brand is lowest in RS power structure while highest in VN power structure, and the thresholds to only sell the green store brand under different power structures are the same; (ii) the green store brand may be introduced as a profitable product that has the real sale or just a threatening tool to compel the manufacturer to make a concession in wholesale price; (iii) once the green store brand is introduced, it is always detrimental to the manufacturer regardless of power structure; (iv) the green store brand can alleviate the double marginalization effect with respect to the national brand in most cases but aggravate it if the power structure is RS, and the ratio of potential margin is relatively low.