Jia Zhen Huo

Prof. Dr. Jia Zhen Huo


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2019 in Waste Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZWZhen Wang
Zhen Wang
JHJia Zhen Huo
Jia Zhen Huo
YDYongrui Duan
Yongrui Duan

19 January 2020 in Frontiers of Environmental Science & Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ZWZhen Wang
Zhen Wang
JHJia Zhen Huo
Jia Zhen Huo
YDYongrui Duan
Yongrui Duan

18 May 2023 in Journal of Environmental Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZWZhen Wang
Zhen Wang
JHJia Zhen Huo
Jia Zhen Huo

24 July 2020 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ZWZhen Wang
Zhen Wang
YDYongrui Duan
Yongrui Duan
JHJia Zhen Huo
Jia Zhen Huo
To develop more competitive strategies for different types of remanufacturing companies under the trade-in remanufacturing policy, this paper investigates the impact of the trade-in remanufacturing policy and consumer choice behavior on decisions of a traditional brand remanufacturer and a third-party brand remanufacturer by using a consumer utility model. The results suggest that the trade-in remanufacturing policy increases demand for the third-party brand, but does not increase demand for the traditional brand. Further, although trade-in remanufacturing policy increases both brand prices, it also increases consumer surplus and corporate profits. Neither the traditional brand remanufacturer nor the third-party brand remanufacturer can completely monopolize the remanufacturing market. In this situation, the traditional brand remanufacturer should strive to increase consumer loyalty, and the third-party brand remanufacturer should strive for consumer recognition of third-party remanufactured products.

YCYini Cheng
Yini Cheng
JHJia Zhen Huo
Jia Zhen Huo
Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) is a rapidly growing fintech tool, which is particularly popular among young consumers, with the potential to support more sustainable retail consumption. While firms increasingly adopt BNPL, its impact on time-inconsistent consumers remains underexplored. We address this gap using two game-theoretic models: one with traditional payment and one with BNPL. In both models, time-inconsistent consumers decide whether to purchase and then whether to return a product after learning about their fitness. In the traditional model, greater time inconsistency reduces optimal price, demand, and profit. In contrast, these outcomes remain unaffected by time inconsistency under BNPL. Comparing the equilibrium results of the two models, we find that the firm always benefits more from offering BNPL than traditional payment when consumers are time-inconsistent. By deferring payment, BNPL increases consumers’ present willingness to buy, enabling firms to charge higher prices without reducing demand, and thereby achieve higher profits. Although BNPL can improve firm revenue and overall welfare, it may reduce consumer surplus by encouraging over-consumption. We also consider the presence of the BNPL provider and default of payments to make our results more robust. These findings highlight the need for caution and potential regulation to protect consumers with self-control problems.

13 July 2023 in Mathematics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JZJun Yi Zhong
Jun Yi Zhong
JHJia Zhen Huo
Jia Zhen Huo
With the rising awareness of environmental protection and concern for sustainable development, green products have been highly favored by consumers, enterprises, and the government. As a matter of fact, not only do manufacturers produce green products, but retailers would also like to introduce their green store brands. However, the costly green investment hinders the improvement of the products’ green degree. Therefore, the government may provide financial support to motivate enterprises to increase their products’ green degree. This study investigates how the presence of green store brands and government subsidies affect green supply chain performance. Four models are discussed using the Stackelberg game theoretic approach, and then, the optimal solutions in different cases are compared. The results show that (1) regardless of the government subsidy, the green store brand introduction always reduces the manufacturer’s profit and improves the retailer’s profit and environmental benefit; (2) In most cases, the implementation of a government subsidy can effectively improve the products’ green degree and benefit the supply chain members. However, it is surprising to find that the government subsidy may be detrimental to the manufacturer once the green store brand is introduced; (3) Interestingly, the introduction of green store brand may have an expansion effect, a shrinkage effect or even an inverse effect on the effects of government subsidies on supply chain performance, and these effects become more significant with the increasing green preference of consumers, product substitute, and subsidy rate. The new findings also provide some implications for supply chain members and the government in green supply chain management (GSCM) and green innovation.