The Paris Climate Agreement (PA) provides an overall target which limits global warming to “well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels” and “pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels” (Art. 2 para. 1 PA). This article assesses the extent to which new insights can be derived from recent IPCC reports for the interpretation of Art. 2 para. 1 PA from a legal perspective. To this end, the article analyses the contributions of Working Groups I and III of the sixth assessment report. Methodologically, we compare the findings with previously published IPCC reports, namely the 1.5 °C report and the fifth assessment report. A legal interpretation of the Paris Agreement and of core concepts of human rights follows. Several empirical indications show that current global greenhouse gas budget calculations are quite generous. We provide five empirical arguments that clearly point in that direction. These empirical arguments, combined with legal arguments, demonstrate that the budgets must be smaller than those estimated by the IPCC. The legal arguments are based on Art. 2 of the Paris Agreement, as well as on human rights and the precautionary principle. These norms contain an obligation to minimise the risk of significant damage, i.e., to take rapid and drastic climate protection measures. This implies: 1.5 °C is the legally binding temperature target; adherence requires a very high probability of achieving the target; temperature overshoot and geoengineering tend to be prohibited, and budget calculations must be based on sceptical factual assumptions. These findings have also been confirmed by recent rulings of supreme courts, such as the ground-breaking climate decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court. The Paris Agreement and human rights underline a legally binding obligation for smaller global greenhouse gas budgets as those estimated in the greenhouse gas budgets of the IPCC—even compared to the 83 percent scenario in the latest assessment. Thus, climate policy will have to raise its ambitions towards zero fossil fuels and a drastic reduction of livestock farming in times of the Ukraine war.
In addition to climate change, the current war in Ukraine has highlighted the urgency of a rapid transformation to post-fossility. This paper analyses the much-lamented negative climate policy and energy transition impacts of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) in international law, a treaty that serves as a basis for the compensation claims of fossil fuel companies in response to losses incurred because of climate policy measures. Methodologically, a legal interpretation is conducted, i.e., the ECT is interpreted grammatically and systematically. It is shown that, with a revised legal interpretation of the ECT, such claims usually cannot be upheld at all, except in the case of direct expropriations. This is further underlined by a legal interpretation of the ECT based on the Paris Agreement and on international human rights law. The arbitral ECT tribunals would therefore have to dismiss claims and if they do not do so then, for example, EU member states could take action against such verdicts of the arbitral tribunals before the ECJ. Even if all of this was to be disputed, there are also considerable possibilities for the contracting states to subsequently exclude claims for compensation. Nevertheless, there are a lot of arguments in favour of a comprehensive reform of the treaty. However, to do so as currently planned, with transitional periods, is not sufficient.
The German Constitutional Court’s climate verdict provides a re-interpretation of liberal- democratic core concepts and is highly relevant for liberal constitutional law in general – including EU and international law. The verdict accepts human rights as intertemporal and globally applicable; it applies the precautionary principle to these rights and frees them from the misleading causality debate. However, the court fails to address the most important violations of human rights, and it categorised climate policy as a greater threat to freedom than climate change. And the court does not make it clear that the Paris 1.5-degree limit implies a radically smaller carbon budget. Furthermore, little attention has so far been paid to the fact that the ruling implies an obligation for more EU climate protection, especially since most emissions are regulated supranationally. To be effective, the EU emissions trading system demands a reform, which should go well beyond the existing EU proposals to enable societal transformation to sustainability.