Coronavirus disease-19 (COVID-19) emerged in late 2019 in China and rapidly became pandemic. As with other coronaviruses, a preponderance of evidence suggests the virus originated in horseshoe bats (Rhinolophus spp.) and may have infected an intermediate host prior to spillover into humans. A significant concern is that SARS-CoV-2 could become established in secondary reservoir hosts outside of Asia. To assess this potential, we challenged deer mice (Peromyscus maniculatus) with SARS-CoV-2 and found robust virus replication in the upper respiratory tract, lungs and intestines, with detectable viral RNA for up to 21 days in oral swabs and 6 days in lungs. Virus entry into the brain also occurred, likely via gustatory-olfactory-trigeminal pathway with eventual compromise to the blood-brain barrier. Despite this, no conspicuous signs of disease were observed, and no deer mice succumbed to infection. Expression of several innate immune response genes were elevated in the lungs, including IFNα, IFNβ, Cxcl10, Oas2, Tbk1 and Pycard. Elevated CD4 and CD8β expression in the lungs was concomitant with Tbx21, IFNγ and IL-21 expression, suggesting a type I inflammatory immune response. Contact transmission occurred from infected to naive deer mice through two passages, showing sustained natural transmission and localization into the olfactory bulb, recapitulating human neuropathology. In the second deer mouse passage, an insertion of 4 amino acids occurred to fixation in the N-terminal domain of the spike protein that is predicted to form a solvent-accessible loop. Subsequent examination of the source virus from BEI Resources determined the mutation was present at very low levels, demonstrating potent purifying selection for the insert during in vivo passage. Collectively, this work has determined that deer mice are a suitable animal model for the study of SARS-CoV-2 respiratory disease and neuropathogenesis, and that they have the potential to serve as secondary reservoir hosts in North America.

In the light of the urgency raised by the COVID-19 pandemic, global investment in wildlife virology is likely to increase, and new surveillance programmes will identify hundreds of novel viruses that might someday pose a threat to humans. To support the extensive task of laboratory characterization, scientists may increasingly rely on data-driven rubrics or machine learning models that learn from known zoonoses to identify which animal pathogens could someday pose a threat to global health. We synthesize the findings of an interdisciplinary workshop on zoonotic risk technologies to answer the following questions. What are the prerequisites, in terms of open data, equity and interdisciplinary collaboration, to the development and application of those tools? What effect could the technology have on global health? Who would control that technology, who would have access to it and who would benefit from it? Would it improve pandemic prevention? Could it create new challenges? This article is part of the theme issue ‘Infectious disease macroecology: parasite diversity and dynamics across the globe’.

The SARS‐CoV‐2 pandemic has led to increased concern over transmission of pathogens from humans to animals, and its potential to threaten conservation and public health. To assess this threat, we reviewed published evidence of human‐to‐wildlife transmission events, with a focus on how such events could threaten animal and human health. We identified 97 verified examples, involving a wide range of pathogens; however, reported hosts were mostly non‐human primates or large, long‐lived captive animals. Relatively few documented examples resulted in morbidity and mortality, and very few led to maintenance of a human pathogen in a new reservoir or subsequent “secondary spillover” back into humans. We discuss limitations in the literature surrounding these phenomena, including strong evidence of sampling bias towards non‐human primates and human‐proximate mammals and the possibility of systematic bias against reporting human parasites in wildlife, both of which limit our ability to assess the risk of human‐to‐wildlife pathogen transmission. We outline how researchers can collect experimental and observational evidence that will expand our capacity for risk assessment for human‐to‐wildlife pathogen transmission.

Bats are known to harbor and transmit many emerging and re-emerging viruses, many of which are extremely pathogenic in humans but do not cause overt pathology in their bat reservoir hosts: henipaviruses (Nipah and Hendra), filoviruses (Ebola and Marburg), and coronaviruses (SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV). Direct transmission cycles are often implicated in these outbreaks, with virus shed in bat feces, urine, and saliva. An additional mode of virus transmission between bats and humans requiring further exploration is the spread of disease via arthropod vectors. Despite the shared ecological niches that bats fill with many hematophagous arthropods (e.g., mosquitoes, ticks, biting midges, etc.) known to play a role in the transmission of medically important arboviruses, knowledge surrounding the potential for bats to act as reservoirs for arboviruses is limited. To this end, a comprehensive literature review was undertaken examining the current understanding and potential for bats to act as reservoirs for viruses transmitted by blood-feeding arthropods. Serosurveillance and viral isolation from either free-ranging or captive bats are described in relation to four arboviral groups (Bunyavirales, Flaviviridae, Reoviridae, Togaviridae). Further, ecological associations between bats and hematophagous viral vectors are characterized (e.g., bat bloodmeals in mosquitoes, ingestion of mosquitoes by bats, etc). Lastly, knowledge gaps related to hematophagous ectoparasites (bat bugs and bed bugs (Cimicidae) and bat flies (Nycteribiidae and Streblidae)), in addition to future directions for characterization of bat-vector-virus relationships are described.