The COVID-19 health crisis and the invasion of Ukraine have placed disinformation in the focus of European policies. Our aim is to analyze the emerging European policy on counter-disinformation practices and regulations. To do this, we examine developing European Union (EU) strategy, against different forms of fake news, from a multidisciplinary approach that combines Journalism and Geopolitics. Our methodology is based on the critical analysis of documents generated by the EU on disinformation from 2018 to 2022, including reports, communications, statements and other legislative texts. Our findings suggest that the EU’s policy against disinformation is based on two opposing logics that coexist and compete. The first is securitization, which understands this problem as a threat to democracy that legitimizes ‘exceptional decision-making’ from a hard power perspective. The second is based on the self-regulation and voluntarism of digital platforms with a clear orientation towards soft law and minimal intervention. The recent adoption of the Digital Services Act and the stronger regulation of online platforms do not replace this logic, since this legislation adopts a “co-regulatory framework”. The coexistence of these two logics generates internal contradictions and dissonance that can determine the future of European policies on this important topic and its chances of success.

The Brexit referendum is a good example of the particular vulnerability of the European project when fighting disinformation. Therefore, EU institutions have developed a series of initiatives throughout 2018 to define a European strategy to counter disinformation that emphasizes the responsibility of social networks in reporting false content. In addition, given the weakness of the European public sphere, the European institutions support the creation of European networks of fact checkers. This strategy implies the denunciation of lies, rather than the promotion of alternative interpretive frames, which authors like Lakoff (2004) consider an error from a framing point of view. Empirically, we demonstrate through an analysis of the main networks of actors on this matter (academics, foundations, think tanks, media, social network platforms and fact checkers) that there is a dispute to define the best way to combat disinformation at the European level.

Recently, Europe has been embroiled in serious disinformation crises. In 2020, the WHO declared the term “infodemic” due to the massive increase in hoaxes about the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was dubbed the first digital world war. In this context, this research aims to establish similarities and differences between disinformation disseminated in Europe related to the pandemic during 2020–2021 and the war between Russia and Ukraine throughout 2022–2023. The methodology is based on triangulation, combining quantitative content analysis of fact-checking publications (N = 812) from eight fact-checkers representing four European countries (Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Poland) and qualitative interviews with specialized agents (N = 8). Regarding the main findings, the frequency and nature of verified hoaxes during critical events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine conflict, are closely intertwined with peaks in current events. Initially, both crises saw a surge in hoax verifications, but this trend gradually declined, particularly in the case of the Ukraine conflict. Hoaxes related to the pandemic were primarily disseminated in written form, whereas the complexities of the Russian-Ukraine war hindered widespread hoax dissemination in an audiovisual way. The typology of hoaxes correlated with their format, with fabricated content predominant in pandemic hoaxes and out-of-context images prevalent in those related to the conflict. Social media, notably Facebook and X (Twitter), emerged as the primary platforms for hoax dissemination, overshadowing traditional media channels. In both events, disinformation aimed to provoke emotional responses and polarize audiences, emphasizing the role of social networks in amplifying disinformation during crises.

Revista sobre bibliotecas, archivos y centros de documentación

En las últimas décadas, la desinformación se ha visto multiplicada exponencialmente dentro del panorama informativo. Sin embargo, la pandemia de la COVID-19 ha dado un vuelco a la situación, volviéndola crítica. Las noticias falsas se han tornado un verdadero problema para la salud pública, diseminándose más rápido incluso que la información verdadera. En este sentido, para luchar contra la desinformación, se han consolidado diversas iniciativas de fact-checking por todo el mundo, en particular, tras la crisis sanitaria. Por su parte, la Unión Europea es una de las organizaciones más expuestas a las noticias falsas. Es por ello por lo que cuenta con diversos actores para hacerle frente. Igualmente, España también presenta varias experiencias de verificación de noticias. Por otra parte, las empresas tecnológicas juegan también un papel clave y algunas de ellas ya han comenzado a implementar mecanismos contra la pandemia de bulos. No obstante, la verificación de datos se encuentra bajo debate ante la posibilidad de que esta produzca un efecto inverso (backfire effect). Ante ello, se ha llevado a cabo un estudio documental bibliográfico de investigaciones precedentes, combinado con un análisis cualitativo no experimental de los resultados obtenidos. El objetivo del mismo ha sido comprender el fenómeno del fact-checking, su evolución y características con el fin de analizarlo como potencial solución final a la desinformación. A partir de esta investigación, se busca la retroalimentación desde la academia científica/universitaria con el objetivo de ampliar su conocimiento sobre el fenómeno desinformativo. Por tanto, los resultados de esta investigación cuentan con una clara vocación de servicio público (europeo).

Desde las elecciones europeas de 2014, las organizaciones políticas de corte populista venían acrecentando las cuotas de poder que sus masas refrendaron en los comicios europeos de 2019. En Francia, el auge del Rassemblement National es en parte consecuencia de un cambio en la estrategia de comunicación de la organización. En el marco de su estrategia online pensada para las elecciones europeas, se analizaron los 1.256 tweets emitidos en su perfil oficial de Twitter durante los quince días de campaña electoral de 2014 y de 2019. Los resultados confirman la remodelación de su plan comunicativo online, lo que permitió a la formación crear un vínculo más estrecho con su audiencia para aumentar y fidelizar así el número de usuarios que podrían llegar a convertirse en sus potenciales votantes.