This paper investigates whether a firm’s managerial ability affects the link between a firm’s cost of equity capital and corporate sustainability. We test our predictions by using a large U.S. sample of 17,389 firm-year observations. Our findings show that only when managerial ability is high, corporate sustainability significantly reduces a firm’s implied cost of equity capital. An important implication of our findings is that firms with high managerial abilities and limited sustainability commitment are encouraged to pursue or initiate more sustainability activities owing to their negative effect on a firm’s cost of equity capital.
In response to pressures placed on a firm by its stakeholders, managers may initiate various corporate sustainability activities. In such cases, they need to make decisions not only about the level of sustainability commitment, but also about the way to structure it. There are numerous ways to structure corporate sustainability activities with different financial consequences. In this paper, we investigate the separate and joint effects of the corporate sustainability level and the corporate sustainability structure on a firm’s bank borrowing cost. We test our predictions by conducting multivariate regression analysis on a sample of 1417 US bank loan facilities over the period 2006–2011. We find evidence that high-quality borrowers with a high level or diversified structure of sustainability activities benefit from lower loan interest rates. Also, our analysis of the joint effects shows that only high-quality borrowers with a high level and diversified sustainability activities enjoy lower bank loan costs. Overall, these results reveal that lenders value how firms structure their sustainability activities. Therefore, they have important implications for managers and bankers.
This paper investigates whether firm-level (idiosyncratic) political risk (PR) affects the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm value using a sample of 16,518 firm-year observations which correspond to 2055 unique firms belonging to the Russell 3000 Index over the sample period 2010–2020. Our main findings are as follows: First, firm-level PR does not affect firm value. Second, CSR is positively related to firm value, which is mainly driven by the social component of CSR. Finally, PR has no effect on the CSR–firm value relationship, regardless of the PR type. Our evidence suggests that firm-level PR is not priced in the financial market and as such it does not affect the CSR–firm value relationship. This is consistent with portfolio theory which suggests that only systematic risk is priced.
1 February 2024 in Turkish Journal of Islamic Economics
Households’ over-indebtedness has various social and economic consequences. With an increasing number of over-indebted households and rising individual bankruptcies, especially in the post-COVID-19 pandemic era, the efficiency of the solutions available to target this issue is becoming questionable. The purpose of this study is to propose an innovative Shariah-compliant mechanism based on crowd-buying, aiming at alleviating households’ over-indebtedness. The present study adopts a qualitative research design based on an extensive review of the existing literature and a case study of the Real Estate Crowdbuying (REC) model. The study also presents a Shariah assessment of the REC model. The study found that the REC model has five contradictions with the guidelines of Shariah and proposes an enhanced version based on Shariah compliant contracts. As per the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that provides a Shariah assessment to the REC model and proposes an enhanced Shariah-compliant version. The main limitation of this research is the limited focus on the Shariah compliance of the model. Further studies might explore the regulatory challenges of the application of this model in Malaysia and other Muslim countries. The proposition made by this paper contributes to broadening the range of Shariah-compliant instruments aiming at alleviating households’ over-indebtedness and curbing individual bankruptcy rates.