Although agile methods gained popularity and became globally widespread, developing secure software with agile methods remains a challenge. Method elements (i.e., roles, activities, and artifacts) that aim to increase software security on one hand can reduce the characteristic agility of agile methods on the other. The overall aim of this paper is to provide small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with the means to improve the sustainability of their software development process in terms of software security despite their limitations, such as low capacity and/or financial resources. Although software engineering literature offers various security elements, there is one key research gap that hinders the ability to provide such means. It remains unclear not only how much individual security elements contribute to software security but also how they impact the agility and costs of software development. To address the gap, we identified security elements found in the literature and evaluated them for their impact on software security, agility, and costs in an international study among practitioners. Finally, we developed a novel lightweight approach for evaluating agile methods from a security perspective. The developed approach can help SMEs to adapt their software development to their needs.

Cybercrime is one of the most significant security challenges of the 21st century. However, official statistics do not provide insights into its prevalence and nature. Representative cross-sectional field studies may help fill this gap, focusing on differences between urban and rural technology users. We (a) investigated the association between the purpose of computers and other electronic device usage and perceived vulnerability, (b) compared the differences in the purpose of computers or other electronic device use and perceived vulnerability, and (c) compared the perceived cyber victimization between residents of rural and urban areas. We conducted a field study that resulted in a representative sample of the Republic of Slovenia in Europe. We found several significant differences in the purpose of technology use and perceived cyber victimization. Furthermore, the results indicate that the purpose of technology use is somehow associated with perceived vulnerability in cyberspace; however, such associations are different in cyberspace than in the material world.

Introduction: Despite the increasing use of domestic social robots by older adults, there remains a significant knowledge gap regarding attitudes, concerns, and potential adoption behavior in this population. This study aims to categorize older adults into distinct technology adoption groups based on their attitudes toward domestic social robots and their behavior in using the existing technology.Methods: An exploratory qualitative research design was used, involving semi-structured interviews with 24 retired Slovenian older adults aged 65 years or older, conducted between 26 June and 14 September 2023.Results: Four distinct groups of older adults were identified: (1) Cautious Optimists, (2) Skeptical Traditionalists, (3) Positive Optimists, and (4) Technophiles based on eight characteristics.Discussion: These groups can be aligned with the categories of the Diffusion of Innovation Theory. Privacy and security concerns, influenced by varying levels of familiarity with the technology, pose barriers to adoption. Perceived utility and ease of use vary considerably between groups, highlighting the importance of taking into account the different older adults. The role of social influence in the adoption process is complex, with some groups being more receptive to external opinions, while others exhibit more autonomous decision-making.

The emergence of a pandemic is usually accompanied by different measures–economic, social, preventive, and (self)protective. In the case of the COVID-19, several preventive measures were formally enforced by state authorities in the majority of countries worldwide. Thus, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the intertwining of formal and informal social control could be observed. Hence, in this study a cross-sectional design was chosen to explore the issue in Slovenia. To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first in the current literature to empirically test the general deterrence theory in pandemic circumstances (as external factors predicting individuals’ compliance with the COVID-19 preventive measures). The results suggest an important role of informal punishment, with perceived informal severity being the only statistically significant factor from the general deterrence theory. In contrast to external factors, internal factors play a significantly greater role in promoting people’s self-protective behavior in pandemic circumstances. During the unknown, the uncertain and delicate situations with which people have no previous experience, both personal beliefs about the effectiveness of measures and perceived self-efficacy are more important than fear of formal sanctions.

Different activities, artifacts, and roles can be found in the literature on the agile engineering of secure software (AESS). The purpose of this paper is to consolidate them and thus identify key activities, artifacts, and roles that can be employed in AESS. To gain initial sets of activities, artifacts, and roles, the literature was first extensively reviewed. Activities, artifacts, and roles were then cross-evaluated with similarity matrices. Finally, similarity matrices were converted into distance matrices, enabling the use of Ward’s hierarchical clustering method for consolidating activities, artifacts, and roles into clusters. Clusters of activities, artifacts, and roles were then named as key activities, artifacts, and roles. We identified seven key activities (i.e., security auditing, security analysis and testing, security training, security prioritization and monitoring, risk management, security planning and threat modeling; and security requirements engineering), five key artifacts (i.e., security requirement artifacts, security repositories, security reports, security tags, and security policies), and four key roles (i.e., security guru, security developer, penetration tester, and security team) in AESS. The identified key activities, artifacts, and roles can be used by software development teams to improve their software engineering processes in terms of software security.