Purpose: This study aims to investigate the external effect of the economic growth target pressure of local governments on establishment-level SO₂ emissions.Design/methodology/approach: Based on manually collected panel data of 74,058 China's industrial establishments and more than 330 thousand observations from CIED and ESR, the authors use a firm-fixed effect model, instrumental variables estimation and heterogeneity tests to identify the environmental externality of economic growth target pressure.Findings: The establishments in cities that meet or slightly exceed the economic growth target experience greater negative externality measured by SO₂ emission intensity. This external effect is more pronounced in regions: with a strict and overweighted target setting; with stronger officials' promotion incentives; with a low degree of marketization; and in firms with great economic importance. The authors identify the underlying mechanisms of dependence on dirty industry and the relaxation of environmental enforcement. And the environmental protection constraints in 2007 mitigate the negative externality.Practical implications: The paper sheds light on to what extent economic growth target pressure has a negative externality of pollution in China and how this pressure may conflict with environmental protection.Originality/value: This paper complements prior research on the economic effects of economic growth targets, expands the knowledge on the determinants of establishment-level pollution emission from the perspective of target pressure and provides insight into the environmental externality that results from political factors.

Purpose: Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) has huge impact and harm on real economy, so the economic logic and other economic effects behind this must be further studied. By constructing the “China Economic Policy Uncertainty Index” to capture the degree of EPU faced by Chinese companies, the authors empirically test whether and how EPU affects the level of executives' perquisite consumption.Design/methodology/approach: This study investigates the relationship between EPU and executive perquisite consumption based on a sample of 3,185 publicly listed firms in China. To examine the relationship between EPU and executives' perquisite consumption, a mixed least squares method was used for regression. To alleviate the problem of missing variables that do not change over time and control the influence of unobservable individual heterogeneity at the firm level, the firm fixed effects model is used for regression.Findings: The study finds that EPU is positively associated with executive perquisite consumption. This positive association is stronger for firms with smaller size, lower management shareholding and higher levels of separation of ownership and control. Effective external governance (i.e., analyst coverage, media coverage, auditor and market competition) can mitigate the relationship between EPU and executive perquisite consumption. Further analysis reveals that EPU increases executive perquisite consumption by holding more cash and decreasing firm risk taking. EPU hurts market value of firms by boosting executive perquisite consumption and tunneling.Practical implications: In an environment with high EPU, the board of directors should reduce managers' compensation performance sensitivity to ease the agency conflict caused by uncertainty. Firms should improve their governance mechanisms and standard and pay attention to their environmental changes. Policymakers should pay attention to maintaining the continuity and predictability of policies, stabilizing the economic policy expectations of market entities and avoiding frequent changes in policies that can harm economic and firm value. The regulatory authorities should actively guide listed companies to increase active information disclosure during periods of high policy uncertainty.Originality/value: This study contributes to the research on corporate governance by showing how EPU influences executives' behaviors. The authors advance relative studies by showing that this uncertainty embedded in a firm's external environments influences executive perquisite consumption. This study also contributes to the literature on how internal and external governances influence corporate behavior during uncertainty. These findings extend this line of research by suggesting that effective external governance is an attribute that can alleviate the effect of uncertainty on managers' opportunistic behaviors.

This paper investigates how local governments coordinate the relationship between economic growth targets (EGT) and environmental protection targets (EPT) and the impact of such coordination on firm’s environmental performance. Using the pollution emission data of China’s industrial firms covering 2003 to 2013, we show that firms in the cities where officials are setting overweighted economic growth targets have more sulfur dioxide intensity, while the central government’s hard constraints on EPT included in the official performance evaluation system could partially mitigate the environmental externality of the economic growth target. Further, we find that overweighted EGT significantly decreases firms’ desulfurization facilities, capacity, and ratio, while the hard constraint of EPT helps mitigate this negative relationship. We also find that the positive relationship between overweight EGT and firm emissions is more pronounced in the dirty industry, while the hard constraint of EPT helps to mitigate this relationship. The above results help to identify an underlying mechanism of environmental regulation. Finally, we show that converting the hard constraints of environmental protection targets to self-constraint by local government officials could reverse the environmental externality of the economic growth target.