The focus of this work is the on-demand resource provisioning in cloud computing, which is commonly referredto as cloud elasticity. Although a lot of effort has been invested in developing systems and mechanisms that enable elasticity, the elasticity decision policies tend to be designed without quantifying or guaranteeing the quality of their operation. We present an approach towards the development of more formalized and dependable elasticity policies. We make two distinct contributions. First, we propose an extensible approach to enforcing elasticity through the dynamic instantiation and online quantitative verification of Markov Decision Processes(MDP) using probabilistic model checking. Second, various concrete elasticity models and elasticity policies are studied. We evaluate the decision policies using traces from a realNoSQL database cluster under constantly evolving externalload. We reason about the behaviour of different modelling and elasticity policy options and we show that our proposal can improve upon the state-of-the-art in significantly decreasing under-provisioning while avoiding over-provisioning.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are key components for the implementation of autonomy in systems that operate in highly complex and unpredictable environments (self-driving cars, smart traffic systems, smart manufacturing, etc.). It is well known that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e. minimal and usually imperceptible perturbations, applied to their inputs, leading to false predictions. This threat poses critical challenges, especially when DNNs are deployed in safety or security-critical systems, and renders as urgent the need for defences that can improve the trustworthiness of DNN functions. Adversarial training has proven effective in improving the robustness of DNNs against a wide range of adversarial perturbations. However, a general framework for adversarial defences is needed that will extend beyond a single-dimensional assessment of robustness improvement; it is essential to consider simultaneously several distance metrics and adversarial attack strategies. Using such an approach we report the results from extensive experimentation on adversarial defence methods that could improve DNNs resilience to adversarial threats. We wrap up by introducing a general adversarial training methodology, which, according to our experimental results, opens prospects for an holistic defence against a range of diverse types of adversarial perturbations.