Concerns for the resilience of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)s in critical infrastructure are growing. CPS integrate sensing, computation, control, and networking into physical objects and mission-critical services, connecting traditional infrastructure to internet technologies. While this integration increases service efficiency, it has to face the possibility of new threats posed by the new functionalities. This leads to cyber-threats, such as denial-of-service, modification of data, information leakage, spreading of malware, and many others. Cyber-resilience refers to the ability of a CPS to prepare, absorb, recover, and adapt to the adverse effects associated with cyber-threats, e.g., physical degradation of the CPS performance resulting from a cyber-attack. Cyber-resilience aims at ensuring CPS survival by keeping the core functionalities of the CPS in case of extreme events. The literature on cyber-resilience is rapidly increasing, leading to a broad variety of research works addressing this new topic. In this article, we create a systematization of knowledge about existing scientific efforts of making CPSs cyber-resilient. We systematically survey recent literature addressing cyber-resilience with a focus on techniques that may be used on CPSs. We first provide preliminaries and background on CPSs and threats, and subsequently survey state-of-the-art approaches that have been proposed by recent research work applicable to CPSs. In particular, we aim at differentiating research work from traditional risk management approaches based on the general acceptance that it is unfeasible to prevent and mitigate all possible risks threatening a CPS. We also discuss questions and research challenges, with a focus on the practical aspects of cyber-resilience, such as the use of metrics and evaluation methods as well as testing and validation environments.
2 June 2017 in EURASIP Journal on Information Security
We address security issues in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We focus on the detection of attacks against cyber-physical systems. Attacks against these systems shall be handled both in terms of safety and security. Networked-control technologies imposed by industrial standards already cover the safety dimension. However, from a security standpoint, using only cyber information to analyze the security of a cyber-physical system is not enough, since the physical malicious actions that can threaten the correct behavior of the systems are ignored. For this reason, the systems have to be protected from threats to their cyber and physical layers. Some authors have handled replay and integrity attacks using, for example, physical attestation to validate the cyber process and to detect the attacks, or watermark-based detectors which uses also physical parameters to ensure the cyber layers.We reexamine the effectiveness of a stationary watermark-based detector. We show that this approach only detects adversaries that do not attempt to get any knowledge about the system dynamics. We analyze the detection ratio of the original design under the presence of new adversaries that are able to infer the system dynamics and are able to evade the detector with high frequency. We propose a new detection scheme which employs several non-stationary watermarks. We validate the detection efficiency of the new strategy via numeric simulations and via running experiments on a laboratory testbed. Results show that the proposed strategy is able to detect adversaries using non-parametric methods, but it is not equally effective against adversaries using parametric identification methods.
The aim of this paper was to propose a method to characterize the ability of a GNSS user to detect a spoofing attack from the behavior of the clock bias. Spoofing interference is not a new issue, especially in military GNSS, although it is a new challenge for civil GNSS, since it is currently implemented and used in many everyday applications. For this reason, it is still a topical issue, especially for receivers that only have access to high-level data (PVT,CN0). To address this important issue, after conducting a study of the receiver clock polarization calculation process, this led to the development of a very basic Matlab model that emulates a spoofing attack at the computational level. Using this model, we were able to observe that the clock bias is affected by the attack. However, the amplitude of this disturbance depends on two factors: the distance between the spoofer and the target and the synchronization between the clock that generates the spoofing signal and the reference clock of the constellation. To validate this observation, more or less synchronized spoofing attacks were carried out on a fixed commercial GNSS receiver with the use of GNSS signal simulators and also with a moving target. We propose then a method to characterize the capacity of detecting a spoofing attack with the clock bias behavior. We present the application of this method for two commercial receivers of the same manufacturer from different generations.
We address detection of attacks against cyber-physical systems. Cyber-physical systems are industrial control systems upgraded with novel computing, communication and interconnection capabilities. In this paper we reexamine the security of a detection scheme proposed by Mo and Sinopoli (2009) and Mo et al. (2015). The approach complements the use of Kalman filters and linear quadratic regulators, by adding an authentication watermark signal for the detection of integrity attacks. We show that the approach only detects cyber adversaries, i.e., attackers with the ability to eavesdrop information from the system, but that do not attempt to acquire any knowledge about the system model itself. The detector fails at covering cyber-physical adversaries, i.e., attackers that, in addition to the capabilities of the cyber adversary, are also able to infer the system model to evade the detection. We discuss an enhanced scheme, based on a multi-watermark authentication signal, that properly detects the two adversary models.
8 August 2017 in Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies