The aim of this paper was to propose a method to characterize the ability of a GNSS user to detect a spoofing attack from the behavior of the clock bias. Spoofing interference is not a new issue, especially in military GNSS, although it is a new challenge for civil GNSS, since it is currently implemented and used in many everyday applications. For this reason, it is still a topical issue, especially for receivers that only have access to high-level data (PVT,CN0). To address this important issue, after conducting a study of the receiver clock polarization calculation process, this led to the development of a very basic Matlab model that emulates a spoofing attack at the computational level. Using this model, we were able to observe that the clock bias is affected by the attack. However, the amplitude of this disturbance depends on two factors: the distance between the spoofer and the target and the synchronization between the clock that generates the spoofing signal and the reference clock of the constellation. To validate this observation, more or less synchronized spoofing attacks were carried out on a fixed commercial GNSS receiver with the use of GNSS signal simulators and also with a moving target. We propose then a method to characterize the capacity of detecting a spoofing attack with the clock bias behavior. We present the application of this method for two commercial receivers of the same manufacturer from different generations.
One of the main challenges for ticketing in Mobility as a Service is the integration of the public and individual transport modes into a unified ticketing service. To realize this concept, a trustworthy identification of transport modes that is resilient to possible attacks is required. In this work, we propose two smartphone-based methods to seamlessly identify the use of trams, buses, subways, walking and bicycles, which are able to detect GNSS-based attacks and continue to provide a trustworthy identification of transport modes. We have recorded real-world measurements with commercial smartphones using the transport network in Munich and Paris. Our results show that it is possible to provide trustworthy identification of transport modes even when the system is under attack. In conclusion, in this work we demonstrate the vulnerability of smartphone-based ticketing to GNSS-based attacks, propose two methods to overcome this vulnerability and demonstrate the validity of our methods with real-world measurements.
La thèse propose l’étude de systèmes de constellations locales permettant le positionnement dans des milieux difficiles. Dans ce contexte, il apparaît que les trajets indirects perturbent la mesure du temps de propagation entre l’antenne de l’émetteur et l’antenne du récepteur. L’éblouissement entre les signaux, phénomène d’interférence du CDMA, est exacerbé à cause des distances courtes et des variations de puissance de réception. La thèse apporte des réponses à ces deux problématiques. Pour les trajets indirects nous proposons d’utiliser les mesures de phase de la porteuse qui y sont moins sensibles. Il faut alors solutionner le problème de l’ambiguïté entière sur ces mesures. Une méthode le permet sans avoir recours à une technique différentielle en utilisant une boucle de poursuite insensible aux trajets indirects : la SMICL. Pour l’éblouissement, nous avons développé trois approches. L’une d’elle utilise les séquences de longueurs maximales et permet de réduire notablement son importance. Une deuxième méthode, baptisé Technique de la Double Emission (TDE), permet de supprimer intégralement ces interférences pour une paire d’émetteurs lorsque leurs Doppler respectifs sont égaux. Nous avons étudié le cas où les Doppler sont différents et mis au point une version améliorée de la TDE, la TDE étendue à la porteuse, qui permet de supprimer les influences du Doppler. Nous avons également montré que cette dernière peut s’appliquer à un émetteur fixe en présence d’une constellation de satellites. Une troisième méthode, appelée TDE maximale, utilise à nouveau une séquence de longueur maximale pour étendre la méthode TDE au cas de plusieurs émetteurs en présence.
4 May 2026 in IEEE Journal of Indoor and Seamless Positioning and Navigation
This study evaluates the performance of a collaborative, multi-criteria integrity control method in the presence of GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) jamming and spoofing. By simultaneously leveraging several sources of information, it enables the determination of whether the position of the receiver has been compromised by anattack. In particular, it combines PVT (Position, Velocity, Time) residuals with the carrier-to-noise density ratio (C/N0) to ensure a robust assessment of integrity across all available data. Its main strength lies in collaboration between receivers through comparison and information sharing. This approach is purely software-based, requiring no additional hardware, and is scalable to receiver populations of varying sizes, from small to large. This study uses real jamming data and simulated spoofing data. In both cases, the data used for PVT calculation, originating from different satellites, are real. The presented results based on data combining simulation and real data demonstrate that the method is promising.