Karthikeyan Nagarajan

Karthikeyan Nagarajan


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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3 November 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SESina Sayyah Ensan
Sina Sayyah Ensan
KNKarthikeyan Nagarajan
Karthikeyan Nagarajan
MKMohammad Nasim Imtiaz Khan
Mohammad Nasim Imtiaz Khan
SGSwaroop Ghosh
Swaroop Ghosh
In-memory computing (IMC) architectures provide a much needed solution to energy-efficiency barriers posed by Von-Neumann computing. The functions implemented in such in-memory architectures are often proprietary and constitute confidential intellectual property (IP). Our studies indicate that IMC architectures implemented using resistive RAM (RRAM) are susceptible to side channel attack (SCA). Unlike the conventional SCAs that are aimed to leak private keys from cryptographic implementations, SCA on IMC for reverse engineering (SCARE) can reveal the sensitive IP implemented within the memory through power/timing side channels. Therefore, the adversary does not need to perform invasive reverse engineering (RE) to unlock the functionality. We demonstrate SCARE by taking recent IMC architectures, such as dynamic computing in memory (DCIM) and memristor-aided logic (MAGIC) as test cases. Simulation results indicate that AND, OR, and NOR gates (which are the building blocks of complex functions) yield distinct power and timing signatures based on the number of inputs, making them vulnerable to SCA. We show that adversary can use templates (using foundry-calibrated simulations or fabricating known functions in test chips) and analysis to identify the structure of the implemented function by testing a limited number of patterns. We also propose countermeasures, such as redundant inputs and expansion of literals. Redundant inputs can mask the IP with 25% area and 20% power overhead. However, functions can be found at higher RE effort. Expansion of literals incurs 36% power overhead. However, it imposes a brute force search increasing the adversarial RE effort by $3.04\times $ .

27 March 2023 in Cryptography
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KNKarthikeyan Nagarajan
Karthikeyan Nagarajan
RRRupshali Roy
Rupshali Roy
RTRasit Onur Topaloglu
Rasit Onur Topaloglu
SKSachhidh Kannan
Sachhidh Kannan
SGSwaroop Ghosh
Swaroop Ghosh
Spiking neural networks (SNNs) are quickly gaining traction as a viable alternative to deep neural networks (DNNs). Compared to DNNs, SNNs are computationally more powerful and energy efficient. The design metrics (synaptic weights, membrane threshold, etc.) chosen for such SNN architectures are often proprietary and constitute confidential intellectual property (IP). Our study indicates that SNN architectures implemented using conventional analog neurons are susceptible to side channel attack (SCA). Unlike the conventional SCAs that are aimed to leak private keys from cryptographic implementations, SCANN (SCA̲ of spiking n̲eural n̲etworks) can reveal the sensitive IP implemented within the SNN through the power side channel. We demonstrate eight unique SCANN attacks by taking a common analog neuron (axon hillock neuron) as the test case. We chose this particular model since it is biologically plausible and is hence a good fit for SNNs. Simulation results indicate that different synaptic weights, neurons/layer, neuron membrane thresholds, and neuron capacitor sizes (which are the building blocks of SNN) yield distinct power and spike timing signatures, making them vulnerable to SCA. We show that an adversary can use templates (using foundry-calibrated simulations or fabricating known design parameters in test chips) and analysis to identify the specifications of the implemented SNN.

11 January 2022 in Frontiers in Nanotechnology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KNKarthikeyan Nagarajan
Karthikeyan Nagarajan
JLJunde Li
Junde Li
SESina Sayyah Ensan
Sina Sayyah Ensan
SKSachhidh Kannan
Sachhidh Kannan
SGSwaroop Ghosh
Swaroop Ghosh
Spiking Neural Networks (SNN) are fast emerging as an alternative option to Deep Neural Networks (DNN). They are computationally more powerful and provide higher energy-efficiency than DNNs. While exciting at first glance, SNNs contain security-sensitive assets (e.g., neuron threshold voltage) and vulnerabilities (e.g., sensitivity of classification accuracy to neuron threshold voltage change) that can be exploited by the adversaries. We explore global fault injection attacks using external power supply and laser-induced local power glitches on SNN designed using common analog neurons to corrupt critical training parameters such as spike amplitude and neuron’s membrane threshold potential. We also analyze the impact of power-based attacks on the SNN for digit classification task and observe a worst-case classification accuracy degradation of −85.65%. We explore the impact of various design parameters of SNN (e.g., learning rate, spike trace decay constant, and number of neurons) and identify design choices for robust implementation of SNN. We recover classification accuracy degradation by 30–47% for a subset of power-based attacks by modifying SNN training parameters such as learning rate, trace decay constant, and neurons per layer. We also propose hardware-level defenses, e.g., a robust current driver design that is immune to power-oriented attacks, improved circuit sizing of neuron components to reduce/recover the adversarial accuracy degradation at the cost of negligible area, and 25% power overhead. We also propose a dummy neuron-based detection of voltage fault injection at ∼1% power and area overhead each.

18 June 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KNKarthikeyan Nagarajan
Karthikeyan Nagarajan
FAFarid Uddin Ahmed
Farid Uddin Ahmed
MKMohammad Nasim Imtiaz Khan
Mohammad Nasim Imtiaz Khan
ADAsmit De
Asmit De
MCMasud H. Chowdhury
Masud H. Chowdhury
SGSwaroop Ghosh
Swaroop Ghosh
Emerging nonvolatile memories (NVMs), such as resistive RAM (RRAM) and spin-transfer-torque RAM (STTRAM), present exciting opportunities for data storage applications and offer improved access speeds, retention times, power consumption, and scalability. However, these technologies leak the Hamming weight of data through power side-channel during read and write operations. We propose a technique leveraging on-chip capacitor and voltage regulator (VR) that powers the NVM read/write operations. The side-channel leakage is eliminated due to the isolation of memory array from the external power supply during read/write operations. The residual charge on capacitor bank is discarded safely to prevent information leakage during capacitor recharging. The VR ensures a steady voltage during the entire read/write operations even though the capacitor discharges. The design presents a performance (instructions per cycle) degradation of 0.53%-1.2% under parsec and splash-2 benchmarks and incurs an area overhead of ~ 3.54×10 -5 % and an energy overhead of ~ 3.05 ×10 -5 % for a 4-Mb RRAM memory array. For a 64-bit word, the design improves security by 2.7 × 10 19 × to 2 64 ×. SecNVM should be used in small security-critical memory macros to limit the overhead. SecNVM is generic and could protect any security module such as encryption engines, against power side-channel attacks.

1 March 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
VSV. M. Shobana
V. M. Shobana
RSR. Srinivasan
R. Srinivasan
VVV. Vaithianathan
V. Vaithianathan
KNKarthikeyan Nagarajan
Karthikeyan Nagarajan
Semiconductor industry has explored various novel device structures to extend CMOS scaling. Circular geometry devices have been recently proposed to improve immunity to short channel effects without compromising planarity. In this work, one such circular geometry device called RingFET is considered and its performance enhancement through Lightly Doped Drain (LDD) implantation is sought using 3D TCAD simulations. RingFET has a circular gate geometry, which has better short channel immunity compared to conventional MOSFET structure mainly because of the elimination of side interface regions, that gives rise to trap induced leakages. This reduces the OFF current consequently, making RingFET better in the short channel regime. RingFET structure has a planar geometry but differs only lithographically with respect to MOSFET. This makes RingFET an interesting device to explore. The impact of LDD and its variants are studied with respect to DC and AC analysis using 3D TCAD simulations. The parameters under consideration are ON current, OFF current, Ion/Ioff ratio, sub-threshold swing (SS), transconductance (gm) and unity gain frequency (fT).

8 September 2020
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
PDF file
ADAsmit De
Asmit De
MKMohammad Nasim Imtiaz Khan
Mohammad Nasim Imtiaz Khan
KNKarthikeyan Nagarajan
Karthikeyan Nagarajan
ASAbdullah Ash Saki
Abdullah Ash Saki
MAMahabubul Alam
Mahabubul Alam
AWAnnmarie Ward
Annmarie Ward