The aim in mind in the construction of a zero-waste city is to recycle municipal solid waste in a more reasonable way in order to achieve the sustainable development of the urban environment. This goal is widely used internationally as a green development concept in urban management. However, when only the government takes the lead in the construction process, neglecting to engage and guide the participation of the public and of enterprises, the realization of a zero-waste city becomes challenging. Therefore, effective collaboration among all stakeholders would be a more effective approach to dealing with solid waste and creating an eco-friendly and livable urban environment. In this study, we adopted an evolutionary game model and selected three typical stakeholders—the government, the public, and enterprises—in order to examine the choice of tripartite strategies and their primary influencing factors based on prospect theory. This study found the following: (1) the selection of tripartite strategies at different stages of a zero-waste city’s construction is influenced by the expected benefits and costs; (2) the government’s leading role and related subsidies can promote the enthusiasm of enterprises and the public to participate in the construction of a zero-waste city; (3) tripartite participation in a zero-waste city’s construction can maximize benefits, and after a sustainable development model has been established, each stakeholder can choose to participate actively, even without government intervention; and (4) the construction of a zero-waste city requires long-term exploration and practice, and China is currently in a transition period from government-led to government-directed planning. Establishing a perfect reward and punishment mechanism is beneficial in promoting the active participation of the public and of enterprises. The authors of this paper studied the game process of stakeholders at each stage of a zero-waste city’s construction through prospect theory and explored the influences of important parameters on the strategic choice of each subject at the current stage by conducting numerical simulations, which has implications for the construction and sustainable development of a zero-waste city.

As China’s urbanization process continues to accelerate and the price of traditional commercial property continues to rise, a number of small property rights houses without construction permits and approvals have appeared on rural land. Although small property rights housing does not have the validity of property rights or the legal attributes of ordinary commercial housing, and the Chinese government has repeatedly introduced corresponding laws and regulations to regulate its purchase and sale, small property right housing is still purchased by many consumers because of its price advantage, and the number of disputes arising from its purchase and sale is on the rise every year. In addition, the phenomenon of developers building on rural land in violation of the law and real estate agents guaranteeing property without authorization has led to a waste of judicial resources and the infringement of property rights. This paper analyzes the actual situation and the main problems surrounding the governance of small property rights housing and constructs a quadrilateral evolutionary game model with the government, consumers, developers, and real estate agents as the main players. By analyzing various equilibrium points corresponding to different stages of small property rights housing governance, a simulation analysis is conducted using Matlab2016a software to examine the strategic choices of each stakeholder. By adjusting and simulating various parameters, this study investigates the key factors influencing the governance of small property rights housing. This study revealed the following points: (1) at different stages in the governance of small property rights housing, the choice of a strategy by each subject is affected by the expected benefits and costs; (2) the relevant government fines will regulate the strategic choices of developers and real estate agents; (3) consumers’ purchasing tendency is affected by the price of small property rights housing and the risk estimation; (4) the governance of small property rights housing needs a long-term standardization of practice, and the government not only needs to improve the reward and punishment mechanism but also needs to provide positive guidance to the consumers. Through numerical simulation, we explore the impact of the main parameters of the current small property rights housing governance process on the strategic selections made by the game players, which is of great significance for the current policy and future governance of small property rights housing. This paper contributes additional insights to the existing body of theoretical literature through quantitative analysis. Nonetheless, there is a need for the further refinement of the parameter settings used in the study. Additionally, while the simulation analysis provides valuable perspectives, it is somewhat subjective and possesses certain limitations.