The purpose of the dual-credit policy is to promote the healthy and sustainable development of China’s new energy vehicle industry. This study took the dual-credit policy as the background, took the new energy vehicle listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China as the research object, and used the difference-in-difference model to verify the impact of the dual-credit policy on the performance of new energy vehicle companies and identify the mechanism behind its role. The study found the following: (1) the dual-credit policy significantly improves the performance of listed new energy vehicle companies, but the marginal utility of the policy will diminish; (2) the impact of the dual-credit policy on the performance of domestic listed new energy vehicle companies is better than that of joint venture listed new energy vehicle companies; (3) the dual-credit policy mainly enhances the competitiveness of listed new energy vehicle companies through the market expectation of enterprises and market competition mechanism; (4) there is heterogeneity in the mechanism of the dual-credit policy for domestic and joint venture new energy vehicles. The research in this paper is helpful for evaluating the economic effect of the dual-credit policy, and it has implications for the healthy and orderly development of the new energy vehicle industry.

The aim in mind in the construction of a zero-waste city is to recycle municipal solid waste in a more reasonable way in order to achieve the sustainable development of the urban environment. This goal is widely used internationally as a green development concept in urban management. However, when only the government takes the lead in the construction process, neglecting to engage and guide the participation of the public and of enterprises, the realization of a zero-waste city becomes challenging. Therefore, effective collaboration among all stakeholders would be a more effective approach to dealing with solid waste and creating an eco-friendly and livable urban environment. In this study, we adopted an evolutionary game model and selected three typical stakeholders—the government, the public, and enterprises—in order to examine the choice of tripartite strategies and their primary influencing factors based on prospect theory. This study found the following: (1) the selection of tripartite strategies at different stages of a zero-waste city’s construction is influenced by the expected benefits and costs; (2) the government’s leading role and related subsidies can promote the enthusiasm of enterprises and the public to participate in the construction of a zero-waste city; (3) tripartite participation in a zero-waste city’s construction can maximize benefits, and after a sustainable development model has been established, each stakeholder can choose to participate actively, even without government intervention; and (4) the construction of a zero-waste city requires long-term exploration and practice, and China is currently in a transition period from government-led to government-directed planning. Establishing a perfect reward and punishment mechanism is beneficial in promoting the active participation of the public and of enterprises. The authors of this paper studied the game process of stakeholders at each stage of a zero-waste city’s construction through prospect theory and explored the influences of important parameters on the strategic choice of each subject at the current stage by conducting numerical simulations, which has implications for the construction and sustainable development of a zero-waste city.

As China’s urbanization process continues to accelerate and the price of traditional commercial property continues to rise, a number of small property rights houses without construction permits and approvals have appeared on rural land. Although small property rights housing does not have the validity of property rights or the legal attributes of ordinary commercial housing, and the Chinese government has repeatedly introduced corresponding laws and regulations to regulate its purchase and sale, small property right housing is still purchased by many consumers because of its price advantage, and the number of disputes arising from its purchase and sale is on the rise every year. In addition, the phenomenon of developers building on rural land in violation of the law and real estate agents guaranteeing property without authorization has led to a waste of judicial resources and the infringement of property rights. This paper analyzes the actual situation and the main problems surrounding the governance of small property rights housing and constructs a quadrilateral evolutionary game model with the government, consumers, developers, and real estate agents as the main players. By analyzing various equilibrium points corresponding to different stages of small property rights housing governance, a simulation analysis is conducted using Matlab2016a software to examine the strategic choices of each stakeholder. By adjusting and simulating various parameters, this study investigates the key factors influencing the governance of small property rights housing. This study revealed the following points: (1) at different stages in the governance of small property rights housing, the choice of a strategy by each subject is affected by the expected benefits and costs; (2) the relevant government fines will regulate the strategic choices of developers and real estate agents; (3) consumers’ purchasing tendency is affected by the price of small property rights housing and the risk estimation; (4) the governance of small property rights housing needs a long-term standardization of practice, and the government not only needs to improve the reward and punishment mechanism but also needs to provide positive guidance to the consumers. Through numerical simulation, we explore the impact of the main parameters of the current small property rights housing governance process on the strategic selections made by the game players, which is of great significance for the current policy and future governance of small property rights housing. This paper contributes additional insights to the existing body of theoretical literature through quantitative analysis. Nonetheless, there is a need for the further refinement of the parameter settings used in the study. Additionally, while the simulation analysis provides valuable perspectives, it is somewhat subjective and possesses certain limitations.

Amid mounting environmental pressures and tightening resource constraints in China’s cities, advancing zero-waste city initiatives has become a critical avenue for sustainable urban governance. Zero-waste cities not only improve environmental quality but also enhance resource recycling and foster innovative urban governance models. This study develops an evolutionary game model that incorporates prospect theory to examine the strategic interactions between provincial and local governments. The results show that: (1) each side’s subjective perception of gains and losses significantly shapes its willingness to cooperate; (2) incentives and penalties exert asymmetric effects over the course of policy evolution: subsidies matter most during initiation, penalties are pivotal for overcoming resistance in the transition phase, and non-material incentives become increasingly important as the governance system matures; (3) zero-waste city development follows a three-stage evolutionary trajectory, moving from pilot programs to self-sustaining local governance. Using numerical simulations, this research further assesses how key parameters affect the strategic choices of both levels of government, generating policy-relevant insights for municipal solid waste management and intergovernmental cooperation in zero-waste city governance.

Toxic metal pollution in farmland soils has become a critical environmental issue threatening land security and agricultural sustainability. This study develops an evolutionary game model involving the government, enterprises, the public, and environmental public-interest organizations to analyze the dynamic interactions underlying multi-actor governance. By combining equilibrium analysis with numerical simulations, the study examines the conditions for collaborative governance and the effects of key parameters on the system’s evolution. The results reveal a stage-based trajectory: weak regulation and limited participation in the early stage lead to persistent illegal discharge; strengthened government intervention and rising social participation in the transitional stage promote more coordinated supervision, although enterprises may still behave non-compliantly; in the mature stage, favorable cost–benefit conditions induce enterprises to adopt compliant treatment, reducing reliance on continuous external oversight. Further analysis shows that effective incentive and deterrence mechanisms are essential for activating multi-actor responses, while enterprises’ strategies are mainly driven by pollution-control costs, expected returns, and potential losses, and social participation depends on monitoring costs, expected benefits, and government support. Initial strategy distributions have limited influence on long-term outcomes. These findings provide policy-relevant insights for improving institutional design and strengthening collaborative governance in the management of toxic metal pollution in China’s farmland soils.