Stealthy attacks in sensor and actuator loops are the research priorities in the security of cyber-physical systems. Existing attacks define the stealthiness conditions against the Chi-square or Kullback-Leibler divergence detectors and parameterize the attack model based on additive signals. Such conditions ignore the potential anomalies of the vulnerable outputs in the control layer, and the attack sequences need to be generated online, increasing the hardware and software costs. This paper investigates a type of multiplicative attack with essential stealthiness where the employed model is a novel form. The advantage is that the parameters can be designed in a constant form without having to be generated online. An essential stealthiness condition is proposed for the first time and complements the existing ones. Two sufficient conditions for the existence of constant attack matrices are given in the form of theorems, where two methods for decoupling the unknown variables are particularly considered. A quadruple-tank process, an experimental platform for attack and defense, is developed to verify the theoretical results. The experiments indicate that the proposed attack strategy can fulfill both the attack performance and stealthiness conditions.

A vector vortex beam (VVB) combines the phase singularity of a vortex beam (VB) with the anisotropic polarization of a vector beam, enabling the transmission of complex optical information and offering broad application prospects in optical sensing, high-capacity communication, and high-resolution imaging. In this work, we present a detailed theoretical analysis of the generation and detection of VVBs with Laguerre–Gaussian (LG) and Bessel–Gaussian (BG) forms. Particular emphasis is placed on the polarization characteristics of VVBs, the evolution of beam profiles after passing through polarizers with different orientations, and the interference features arising from the coaxial superposition of a VVB with a circularly polarized divergent spherical wave. To validate the theoretical analysis, LGVVBs were experimentally generated using a Mach–Zehnder interferometer by superposing two vortex beams with opposite topological charges and orthogonal circular polarizations. Furthermore, the introduction of an axicon enabled the direct conversion of LGVVBs into BGVVBs. The excellent agreement between theoretical predictions and experimental observations lays a solid foundation for beginners to systematically understand VVB characteristics and advance future research.

In this paper, a problem of detection method based on moving target defense is studied for two-channel partial FDI attacks in CPS. Firstly, a two-channel partial FDI attack strategy is designed and its stealthiness is analyzed. Then, the detection mechanism is designed by weighting the time before and after the control signal of the system. Secondly, the analysis and deduction show that there exists a difference between the system residual under attack and the normal residual, which proves that the residual detection index after attack is divergent. Unlike the existing physical watermarking methods, the moving target item introduced only need to utilize the control amount of the previous moment, and do not need additional calculation and injection of the watermarking signal. It will not affect the residual of the system in normal operation, and can reduce the performance loss of the system. The feasibility and validity of the proposed method are verified through numerical simulation.