The institutional setting of regional and local government in Italy appears to be characterised by an ongoing process of reform and adjustment ever since Regions were created in 1970. More recently, provinces and Municipalities gained wide autonomy in 1990, and the constitution itself was revised in 2001 to set up what is sometimes referred to as a ‘quasi-federal’ system of intergovernmental relations. In this context, inter-municipal cooperation also has witnessed several phases and dynamics, ranging from (very rare) fusions, through single-purpose cooperation, to integrated service management (Public-public partnership, and consortia for the management and/or regulation of public utilities). More recently, and most notably over the past decade, inter-municipal cooperation has taken on a new form, consisting in the shared ownership in joint-stock companies. The so-called ‘corporatisation’ of public bodies, i.e. the creation of public-owned (or mixed public-private), private-law companies and corporations for the fulfilment of public-interest activities, has come to constitute a network of inter-municipal cooperation that appears to represent a shift from an institutional intergovernmental structure of cooperation, to one that is pre-eminently played out in the arenas of public-private forms of governance. The article analyses the literature and overarching trends in inter-municipal cooperation in Italy, and draws on very rich original data on the companies owned by Municipalities in six Italian regions to show how these companies represent the locus of inter-municipal (and multi-level) relations that go well beyond the formal boundaries of local administrations, and are often brokered by powerful private partners.
OBOn Behalf Of The Other Researchers Of The Obvious Board
On Behalf Of The Other Researchers Of The Obvious Board
+9
Background: Vaccine hesitancy was defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2019 as a major threat to global health. In Italy, reluctance to receive vaccines is a widespread phenomenon that was amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic by fear and mistrust in government. This study aims to depict different profiles and characteristics of people reluctant to vaccinate, focusing on the drivers of those who are in favor of and those who are opposed to receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. Methods: A sample of 10,000 Italian residents was collected. A survey on COVID-19 vaccination behavior and possible determinants of vaccine uptake, delay, and refusal was administered to participants through a computer-assisted web interviewing method. Results: In our sample, 83.2% stated that they were vaccinated as soon as possible (“vaccinators”), 8.0% delayed vaccination (“delayers”), and 6.7% refused to be vaccinated (“no-vaccinators”). In general, the results show that being female, aged between 25 and 64, with an education level less than a high school diploma or above a master’s degree, and coming from a rural area were characteristics significantly associated with delaying or refusing COVID-19 vaccination. In addition, it was found that having minimal trust in science and/or government (i.e., 1 or 2 points on a scale from 1 to 10), using alternative medicine as the main source of treatment, and intention to vote for certain parties were characteristics associated with profiles of “delayers” or “no-vaccinators”. Finally, the main reported motivation for delaying or not accepting vaccination was fear of vaccine side effects (55.0% among delayers, 55.6% among no-vaccinators). Conclusion: In this study, three main profiles of those who chose to be vaccinated are described. Since those who are in favor of vaccines and those who are not usually cluster in similar sociodemographic categories, we argue that findings from this study might be useful to policy makers when shaping vaccine strategies and choosing policy instruments.
The article analyses the reform of water and sanitation services in Italy, which was introduced in 1994 and is still not fully implemented in many important respects. The introduction of a purchaser–provider split as envisaged in the national reform has had to come to terms with local power relationships and industrial and managerial status quo. In particular, network structures, leadership, and stakeholders' trade off along the top–down process from the policy design to final impacts prove to be relevant not only in reducing, but also in radically redefining objectives and outcomes of the policy. Thus, the concepts of governance and regulation at the local level are critically assessed in view of their dependence on the interplay of actors in local arenas, where power remains a prominent factor in determining processes and outcomes.
26 March 2014 in European Political Science Review
The literature on Public Utilities has increasingly shown that the adoption of corporate governance tools for the management of public services in local policy-making has given rise to a considerable reshaping of political strategies and practices. Corporatisation should be understood as not merely a policy instrument, but also as a new opportunity for local politicians to adjust their preferences, to deal with various interests, and to build unusual coalitions. Corporatisation may (and does) influence the concrete operation of local political systems. Today, the boards of municipal enterprises, as well as the public–private partnerships stemming from this emerging tendency towards corporatisation, can be conceived as both actors of local policy-making and arenas in which a number of functions traditionally associated with the mechanisms of electoral representation are performed: inter- and intra-party bargaining, recruitment of élites, and negotiation with local and ‘external’ stakeholders. The paper illustrates the impact of corporatisation on local representation mechanisms in Italy, considering its opaque side with specific reference to the problem of democratic accountability and control, and the creation of new local oligarchies. Empirical evidence is provided from research on municipal enterprises in six different Italian regions. Statistical data on companies (amount of social capital, fields of activity, private and public shareholders, etc.), as well as qualitative data, are analysed in order to show how corporatisation has provided local actors with unusual (and often non-transparent) channels of political representation and public–private bargaining.
In all Western countries, the vaccination campaign against COVID-19 encountered some resistance. To overcome vaccine inertia and hesitancy, governments have used a variety of strategies and policy instruments. These instruments can be placed on a 'ladder of intrusiveness', starting from voluntary tools based on simple information and persuasion, through material incentives and disincentives of varying nature and magnitude, to highly coercive tools, such as lockdown for the unvaccinated and the introduction of the vaccination mandate. Italy's experience during the vaccination campaign against Covid provides an ideal observational point for starting to investigate this issue: not only was Italy among the top countries with the highest percentage of people vaccinated at the beginning of 2022, but—at least compared to other European countries—it was also one of the countries that had gradually introduced the most intrusive measures to increase vaccination compliance. In the article the different steps of the ‘intrusiveness ladder’ are presented, providing examples from various countries, and then tested on the Italian Covid-19 vaccination campaign between 2021 and the first months of 2022. For each phase of the campaign, the instrument mixes adopted by the Italian government are described, as well as the contextual conditions that led to their adoption. In the final section, an assessment of the composition and evolution of the Italian vaccination strategy is provided, based on the following criteria: legitimacy, feasibility, effectiveness, internal consistency and strategic coherence. Conclusions highlight the pragmatic approach adopted by the Italian government and underline the effects—both positive and negative—of scaling up the intrusiveness ladder.