Luis R Gomez

Prof. Luis R Gomez

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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14 January 2010 in Journal of Management Studies
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LGLuis R Gomez
Luis R Gomez
MMMarianna Makri
Marianna Makri
MKMartin Larraza Kintana
Martin Larraza Kintana

18 August 2017 in Journal of Management
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LGLuis R Gomez
Luis R Gomez
INIonela Neacsu
Ionela Neacsu
GMGeoffrey Martin
Geoffrey Martin
We combine behavioral agency and family business literature to analyze the role of dominant firm principals in constraining the managerial agent’s (CEO’s) response to equity-based pay. Behavioral agency research has made progress in understanding CEO risk behavior in response to equity-based incentives and family firm risk behavior driven by concentrated socioemotional and financial firm-specific risk bearing. However, both literatures have evolved independently, which has limited our understanding of how the risk bearing of agent and principal influences the predictions of the behavioral agency model (BAM). We combine these literatures in order to enhance BAM’s predictive validity with regard to firm risk-taking as a function of both agent and principal risk preferences. Our findings suggest that family principals are more likely than nonfamily principals to constrain CEO risk behavior that is perceived as immoderate (excessively risk averse or excessively risk seeking). We also offer evidence that CEO ties to the family influence the CEO’s response to equity-based incentives. In doing so, we offer refinements to BAM’s formulation and advance our understanding of the unique nature of agency problems within family firms.

24 September 2020 in Journal of International Business Studies
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PBPascual Berrone
Pascual Berrone
PDPatricio Duran
Patricio Duran
LGLuis R Gomez
Luis R Gomez
PHPursey P M A R Heugens
Pursey P M A R Heugens
TKTatiana Kostova
Tatiana Kostova
MEMarc van Essen
Marc van Essen

20 December 2008 in Journal of Business Ethics
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CCCarmelo Cennamo
Carmelo Cennamo
PBPascual Berrone
Pascual Berrone
LGLuis R Gomez
Luis R Gomez

4 March 2005 in Strategic Management Journal
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SWSteve Werner
Steve Werner
HTHenry L. Tosi
Henry L. Tosi
LGLuis R Gomez
Luis R Gomez

26 February 2022 in Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
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LGLuis R Gomez
Luis R Gomez
FCFrancesco Chirico
Francesco Chirico
GMGeoffrey Martin
Geoffrey Martin
MBMassimo Baù
Massimo Baù
A firm’s proactive engagement in risk, which has been deeply intertwined with the entrepreneurship literature, is essential to sustaining a firm’s long-term competitive advantage. Drawing on BAM’s mixed gamble logic in a family firm context, the present study offers a theoretical framework examining how firm risk returns differ in the contexts of distressed (the worst) and nondistressed (the best) family and nonfamily firms. We predict that family control moderates the risk taking-performance relationship. That is, compared with nonfamily firms, a mixed gamble featuring the prospect of socioemotional and financial losses leads family firms to extract higher financial returns from risk taking when in financial distress, but lower financial returns when they are not in financial distress. Our theoretical expectations are supported using a matched sample of Swedish firms.