This paper compares the environmental performance of family and nonfamily public corporations between 1998 and 2002, using a sample of 194 U.S. firms required to report their emissions. We found that family-controlled public firms protect their socioemotional wealth by having a better environmental performance than their nonfamily counterparts, particularly at the local level, and that for the nonfamily firms, stock ownership by the chief executive officer (CEO) has a negative environmental impact. We also found that the positive effect of family ownership on environmental performance persists independently of whether the CEO is a family member or serves both as CEO and board chair.
Our paper seeks to further understand the influence of gender board diversity on firms’ corporate social performance (CPS) in the context of publicly held family firms. Grounded on corporate governance and family firm literature, we argue that the influence of women directors on CSP will be contingent on their relative power and legitimacy within the board, and that such dynamics are particularly important in family firm boardrooms. Our empirical results show that increases in CSP associated with the presence of women in the boards of family firms are due mainly to the presence of outsider nonfamily and insider family women directors. Implications for the theory of family firms are discussed.
9 August 2014 in International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal