Recent incidents have shown that Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are becoming increasingly susceptible to sophisticated and targeted attacks initiated by adversaries with high motivation, domain knowledge, and resources. Although traditional security mechanisms can be implemented at the IT-infrastructure level of such cyber-physical systems, the community has acknowledged that it is imperative to also monitor the process-level activity, as attacks on ICS may very well influence the physical process. In this paper, we present pasad, a novel stealthy-attack detection mechanism that monitors time series of sensor measurements in real time for structural changes in the process behavior. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through simulations and experiments on data from real systems. Experimental results show that pasad is capable of detecting not only significant deviations in the process behavior, but also subtle attack-indicating changes, significantly raising the bar for strategic adversaries who may attempt to maintain their malicious manipulation within the noise level.
2 February 2021 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
With a growing number of embedded devices that create, transform, and send data autonomously at its core, the Internet of Things (IoT) is a reality in different sectors, such as manufacturing, healthcare, or transportation. With this expansion, the IoT is becoming more present in critical environments, where security is paramount. Infamous attacks, such as Mirai, have shown the insecurity of the devices that power the IoT, as well as the potential of such large-scale attacks. Therefore, it is important to secure these embedded systems that form the backbone of the IoT. However, the particular nature of these devices and their resource constraints mean that the most cost-effective manner of securing these devices is to secure them before they are deployed, by minimizing the number of vulnerabilities they ship. To this end, fuzzing has proved itself as a valuable technique for automated vulnerability finding, where specially crafted inputs are fed to programs in order to trigger vulnerabilities and crash the system. In this survey, we link the world of embedded IoT devices and fuzzing. For this end, we list the particularities of the embedded world as far as security is concerned, we perform a literature review on fuzzing techniques and proposals, studying their applicability to embedded IoT devices and, finally, we present future research directions by pointing out the gaps identified in the review.
Industrial Control Systems are used in a wide variety of industrial facilities, including critical infrastructures, becoming the main target of multiple security attacks. A malicious and successful attack against these infrastructures could cause serious economic and environmental consequences, including the loss of human lives. Static networks configurations and topologies, which characterize Industrial Control Systems, represent an advantage for attackers, allowing them to scan for vulnerable devices or services before carrying out the attack. Identifying active devices and services is often the first step for many attacks. This paper presents a proactive network reconnaissance defense mechanism based on the temporal randomization of network IP addresses, MAC addresses and port numbers. The obtained information distortion minimizes the knowledge acquired by the attackers, hindering any attack that relies on network addressing. The temporal randomization of network attributes is performed in an adaptive way, minimizing the overhead introduced in the network and avoiding any error and latency in communications. The implementation as well as the tests have been carried out in a laboratory with real industrial equipment, demonstrating the effectiveness of the presented solution.
22 November 2017 in Security and Communication Networks
Industrial Networks (INs) are widespread environments where heterogeneous devices collaborate to control and monitor physical processes. Some of the controlled processes belong to Critical Infrastructures (CIs), and, as such, IN protection is an active research field. Among different types of security solutions, IN Anomaly Detection Systems (ADSs) have received wide attention from the scientific community. While INs have grown in size and in complexity, requiring the development of novel, Big Data solutions for data processing, IN ADSs have not evolved at the same pace. In parallel, the development of Big Data frameworks such as Hadoop or Spark has led the way for applying Big Data Analytics to the field of cyber-security, mainly focusing on the Information Technology (IT) domain. However, due to the particularities of INs, it is not feasible to directly apply IT security mechanisms in INs, as IN ADSs face unique characteristics. In this work we introduce three main contributions. First, we survey the area of Big Data ADSs that could be applicable to INs and compare the surveyed works. Second, we develop a novel taxonomy to classify existing IN-based ADSs. And, finally, we present a discussion of open problems in the field of Big Data ADSs for INs that can lead to further development.
The widespread use of the Internet of Things (IoT) has led to a surge in interconnected, resource-constrained embedded systems, which are inherently vulnerable due to limited security mechanisms. This paper presents CARNYX, a framework leveraging power consumption analysis, rooted in Side-Channel Analysis (SCA), to detect vulnerabilities in embedded systems with high accuracy. Designed for pre-deployment vulnerability detection, it offers three key advantages over existing SCA solutions: (1) detailed categorisation of specific vulnerability types beyond binary detection, (2) a methodology validated on the STM32F4 architecture and ARM Cortex-A8 with potential applicability to similar low- and medium-end systems, and (3) reliable detection in resource-constrained devices where power monitoring is practical. We evaluate CARNYX on three platforms: two low-end STM32F4-based platforms (Riscure Piñata and STM NUCLEO-144) and the medium-end ARM Cortex-A8-based BeagleBone Black, analysing 16 arithmetic and memory-related software flaws. Results demonstrate recall rates of 99.69% (Piñata), 86.88% (NUCLEO-144 with serial interface), 51.25% (NUCLEO-144 with Ethernet), and 53.67% (BeagleBone Black)-all with high precision-while measuring the effect of communication peripherals on side-channel leakage, an aspect underexplored in prior vulnerability detection studies. These results highlight CARNYX’s potential to enhance security in constrained IoT devices, even in noisy environments where binary detection methods offer limited value. While validated on STM32F4 and ARM Cortex-A8, its principles may extend to other low- and medium-end systems, subject to further validation.