In recent years, with sustainable development strategies, the conflict between economic development and natural resources has become increasingly severe. Meanwhile, green finance’s emergence is due to the rethinking of human economic activities under global warming conditions and the energy crisis. Thus, this study aims to analyze the relationship between green finance and enterprise green performance using a meta-analytic approach. This study has used Comprehensive Meta-Analysis Software (CMA) 2.0 for meta-analysis and applied the Hunter and Schmidt model for statistical analysis to test the proposed hypotheses. This study finds a significant positive correlation between green finance and enterprise green performance and proves that firm type and region play a moderating role in the relationship between green finance and enterprise green performance. However, profitability does not significantly moderate the relationship between green finance and enterprise green performance.

Purpose: This study aims to delineate the operating system of a strategic game model involving three core financial actors—government, banks, and guarantee institutions, with a focus on their collective impact on system evolution towards sustainable SME financing. Methodology: Utilizing numerical simulations informed by dynamic equation constraints and optimal equilibrium states, this paper abstracts the strategic behaviors of system constituents, constructing a game model to predict and analyze system evolution within various operational contexts. Results: The simulation experiments reveal the critical role of quality risk information and responsible actor behavior in maintaining low default rates and fostering a sustainable financial system. System trajectories under various scenarios highlight the fragility of the equilibrium and the necessity of concerted, strategic cooperation among all stakeholders. Conclusions: Findings underscore the importance of a cooperative, conscientious approach by government, banks, and guarantee institutions to ensure a robust and sustainable SME financing environment. The study advocates for strategic policy guidance, emphasizing the interconnectedness of institutional roles and their cumulative effect on system stability.

The implementation of occupational health and safety management in the supply chain by core enterprises is a significant step towards improving the working conditions of their suppliers. To guide core enterprises to adopt active and effective management modes, it is crucial to identify the characteristics of different management modes and classify them accordingly. This paper employs the grounded theory method to conduct an in-depth analysis of occupational health and safety management modes within the supply chain of core enterprises. This research mainly adopts semi-structured interview method. A total of 16 person-times are interviewed, and 210,000 words of in-depth interview scripts are obtained. After three coding process of the grounded theory，the evolution model of occupational health and safety management modes in supply chain by core enterprises was established. The research results indicate that core enterprises currently employ three modes of occupational health and safety management for their suppliers: defensive mode, passive mode, and strategic mode. Different modes have distinct characteristics in four dimensions of cognition, motivation, strategy and result. This research may provide strategic guidelines for core enterprises to evolve from the defensive mode to the strategic mode.

The disclosure of work safety information of listed companies in high-risk industries is an important aspect of their social responsibility, and it is also an inevitable requirement to meet the right of stakeholders to know, which has a far-reaching impact on the development of enterprises. In order to clarify the impact mechanism of work safety information disclosure on enterprise performance of listed companies in high-risk industries. 222 listed companies in high-risk industries were taken as the research object, and the multiple regression analysis method was used to analyze the relationship between the level of work safety information disclosure of enterprises and their financial performance, safety performance and social reputation. The results show that the work safety information disclosure of listed companies in high-risk industries has a positive impact on corporate financial performance, safety performance and social reputation; unabsorbed slack resources have a positive U-shaped regulatory effect on work safety information disclosure and enterprise social reputation; The shareholding ratio of institutional investors has an inverted U-shaped regulatory effect on the positive relationship between work safety information disclosure and enterprise social reputation. This study has enriched the theoretical and practical exploration of research on work safety information disclosure. It can help improve the level of work safety information disclosure and safety management in enterprises, while guiding the sustainable development of occupational health and safety within these organizations.

Guiding core enterprises to participate in supply chain work safety governance is an innovative mode of work safety control, which has an important impact on improving the work safety level of small and medium-sized enterprises in the supply chain. Through in-depth interviews, the grounded theory is adopted to explore the driving factors of work safety management behaviors of core enterprise. It is found that the work safety management behavior of the core enterprise is driven by both internal and external factors. External driving factors are the main category of institutional pressure composed of regulatory pressure, normative pressure, and cognitive pressure. Internal driving factors are divided into the main category of behavioral awareness and the behavioral capability of the core enterprises. The behavioral awareness is composed of responsibility sense, problem cognition and behavioral effect perception. The behavioral capability is composed of safety management strength and safety coordination capability. Institutional pressure, behavioral awareness, and behavioral capability all influence the work safety management behavior of core enterprise in supply chain significantly, but with different ways and paths. On this basis, the driving mechanism model of the above three main categories on the work safety management behavior in core enterprise supply chain is explored. The research can provide targeted policy ideas and implementation paths for the government to formulate effective guiding policies to promote the work safety management behavior of core enterprise.

“Government, bank, and guarantee institution” cooperative financing guarantee (hereinafter referred to as the cooperation mechanism) is an important way to alleviate the financing difficulties of China’s new agricultural entities and raise the credit line of bank financing. In order to find an effective way for the improvement of low-level equilibrium in the actual operation of the cooperation mechanism, this study builds a three-party evolutionary game model using the local government, banks, and agricultural guarantee institutions, with incomplete information on all partners of the cooperation mechanism as the study object. This model focuses on the weak activeness, strong dependence, poor cooperation effect, lower credit line of guarantee, and other specific problems. Moreover, this study analyzes the equilibrium solution of this model and extracts the significant factors affecting the positive cooperation behaviors of the three parties (government, banks, and guarantee institutions) in the view of interest realization. Analog simulation is performed to explore the key conditions for truly alleviating the financing risks of new agricultural entities, thus helping improve the operation quality of the cooperation mechanism. According to the study results, the focus of “government, bank, and guarantee institution” cooperation should be shifted from post risk sharing to prior risk identification. Specifically, the government should further share high-quality information affiliated with farmland management rights and reflecting the status of risks; guide banks and agricultural guarantee institutions should share the cost of risk identification, accelerate the acquisition of higher information transformation value, and prevent the “free rider problem.” In the last part, policies are recommended in four aspects, including risk information sharing, risk identification quality improvement, risk identification cost sharing, and risk information value transformation, which have practical guiding significance for the sustainable development of “government, bank, and guarantee institution” financing guarantee for China’s new agricultural entities.