Based on the characteristics of small-scale enterprises, the improvement of occupational health and safety management systems (OHS MS) needs an effective intervention. This study proposed a structural equation model and examined the relationships of perceived organization support for safety (POSS), person–organization safety fit (POSF) and proactivity safety behaviors with safety management, safety procedures and safety hazards identification. Data were collected from 503 employees of 105 Chinese high-risk small-scale enterprises over 6 months. The results showed that both POSS and POSF were positively related to improvement in safety management, safety procedures and safety hazards identification through proactivity safety behaviors. Our findings provide a new perspective on organizational safety for improving OHS MS for small-scale enterprises and extend the application of proactivity safety behaviors.

Purpose: This study aims to delineate the operating system of a strategic game model involving three core financial actors—government, banks, and guarantee institutions, with a focus on their collective impact on system evolution towards sustainable SME financing. Methodology: Utilizing numerical simulations informed by dynamic equation constraints and optimal equilibrium states, this paper abstracts the strategic behaviors of system constituents, constructing a game model to predict and analyze system evolution within various operational contexts. Results: The simulation experiments reveal the critical role of quality risk information and responsible actor behavior in maintaining low default rates and fostering a sustainable financial system. System trajectories under various scenarios highlight the fragility of the equilibrium and the necessity of concerted, strategic cooperation among all stakeholders. Conclusions: Findings underscore the importance of a cooperative, conscientious approach by government, banks, and guarantee institutions to ensure a robust and sustainable SME financing environment. The study advocates for strategic policy guidance, emphasizing the interconnectedness of institutional roles and their cumulative effect on system stability.

The implementation of occupational health and safety management in the supply chain by core enterprises is a significant step towards improving the working conditions of their suppliers. To guide core enterprises to adopt active and effective management modes, it is crucial to identify the characteristics of different management modes and classify them accordingly. This paper employs the grounded theory method to conduct an in-depth analysis of occupational health and safety management modes within the supply chain of core enterprises. This research mainly adopts semi-structured interview method. A total of 16 person-times are interviewed, and 210,000 words of in-depth interview scripts are obtained. After three coding process of the grounded theory，the evolution model of occupational health and safety management modes in supply chain by core enterprises was established. The research results indicate that core enterprises currently employ three modes of occupational health and safety management for their suppliers: defensive mode, passive mode, and strategic mode. Different modes have distinct characteristics in four dimensions of cognition, motivation, strategy and result. This research may provide strategic guidelines for core enterprises to evolve from the defensive mode to the strategic mode.

Due to information asymmetry and a prevailing focus on production that ignores safety among small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises (SMMEs), it is difficult for core enterprises in the supply chain (SC) to establish partnerships with SMMEs that have a high safe production level (SPL). We found that SMMEs would conceal their real SPL when being selected as core enterprise suppliers. This is known as adverse selection. According to the principal-agent theory, we built a signaling model to analyze the conditions of the pooling equilibrium and the separate equilibrium of the signaling game between core enterprises and SMMEs. The equilibrium results showed that adjusting the signal cost parameters of the SMMEs can guide the market to separate equilibrium and stop SMMEs from concealing or exaggerating their SPL. We also discuss corresponding suggestions. This research can reduce SC risks and promote the establishment of sustainable cooperative relationships between core enterprises and SMMEs with high SPLs. This study is applicable globally.

Purpose: This study aims to analyze the interactions within the intellectual property pledge financing framework involving SMBMEs, banks, and third-party intermediaries, focusing on factors that promote sustainable cooperation. Methods: The research employs an evolutionary game model to simulate and analyze strategic interactions among the stakeholders, considering bounded rationality and asymmetric information. Results: Key findings include the positive correlation between SMBMEs’ reputation and timely repayment, the adverse effects of patent devaluation on cooperation, and the reasonable loan interest rates for facilitating GPPFG cooperation. The study also highlights the need for a transparent information platform and reasonable breach of contract compensation. Conclusions: The paper concludes that an efficient GPPFG mechanism is crucial for SMBMEs’ financial support and green transformation. It suggests that third-party intermediaries play a significant role in risk reduction and innovation facilitation. The study acknowledges limitations and calls for future research to explore technological innovations and improve intermediary service systems for SMBMEs’ sustainable development.