At present, the high complexity of the environment, the uncertainty of income, and the choice of strategies have attracted extensive attention from all walks of life who are committed to studying the game of collaborative innovation between government and industry–university–research. Based on this, first of all, with the help of stochastic evolutionary game theory and fuzzy theory, this paper constructs a multi-party stochastic evolutionary game model of green technology innovation about the government guidelines and the joint promotion of industry, universities, and research institutes. Secondly, it discusses the evolution law of behavior strategies of each game subject and the main factors to maintain the alliance’s stability under fuzzy income. The numerical simulation results show the following: (1) Reputation gains have a significant positive correlation with the evolution stability of alliance behavior, and the incorporation of reputation gains or losses will effectively maintain the cooperation stability of the alliance. (2) Under the influence of product greenness, government subsidies, and long-term benefits, it will promote the pace consistency of cooperative decision-making between industry, universities, and research institutes, and accelerate the evolution of alliances. (3) The enterprise’s ability and the research party’s ability will restrict each other. When one party’s ability is low, its willingness to choose a cooperation strategy may be slightly low due to technology spillover and other reasons. When the two parties’ abilities match, their behavior strategies will increase their willingness to cooperate with their abilities. Compared with the traditional evolutionary game, this study fully considers the uncertainty of the environment and provides theoretical support and practical guidance for the high-quality development strategy of the industry–university–research green technology innovation alliance.

In the new media era, the green technology alliance with multi-participation has emerged as a powerful contributor to achieving the strategic goal of a green economy. Therefore, this paper constructs a stochastic evolutionary game model of green technology innovation led by the government under an uncertain environment and jointly promoted by enterprises, universities, and research institutes. Then, this study firstly explores the influence of different factors on evolutionary equilibrium and secondly discusses the role of main factors on the behavior strategies of each game subject. Furthermore, numerical simulation analysis using Matlab R2019a 9.6 will be used to prove the model’s validity. The research has shown (1) that media monitoring positively impacts the stability of the alliance and that product greenness can further accelerate alliance evolution when media monitoring is in place. When this factor is small, it will lead to the transformation of Industry-University-Research’s (IUR) optimal strategy into non-cooperation in the early stage. (2) The green degree of products positively affects the decision-making choice of the IUR, but it is not the case for the government. And the role of media supervision will further coordinate its influence and accelerate the evolution of alliances. (3) The enhancement of media monitoring capacity can encourage game subjects to evolve in a more beneficial way. In addition, the implementation of media supervision will help reduce the cost of government supervision and provide reputation benefits. The research fully accounts for the complexity and variability of the environment, and the results provide theoretical support and practical advice for the high-quality development of the green technology innovation alliance.