Zoonotic monkeypox virus is maintained in a large number of rodent and, to a lesser extent, nonhuman primate species in West and central Africa. Although monkeypox virus was discovered in 1958, the prototypic human cases were not witnessed until the early 1970s. Before this time, it is assumed that infections were masked by smallpox, which was then widely endemic. Nevertheless, since the 1970s, reported monkeypox virus infections of humans have escalated, as have outbreaks with reported human-to-human transmission. This increase is likely due to numerous factors, such as enhanced surveillance efforts, environmental degradation and human urbanization of areas where monkeypox virus is maintained in its animal reservoir(s) and, consequently, serve as a nidus for human infection. Furthermore, viral genetic predispositions enable monkeypox virus to infect many animal species, represented in expansive geographic ranges. Monkeypox virus was once restricted to specific regions of Africa, but its environ has expanded, in one case intercontinentally--suggesting that human monkeypox infections could continue to intensify. As a zoonotic agent, monkeypox virus is far less sensitive to typical eradication measures since it is maintained in wild-animal populations. Moreover, human vaccination is becoming a less viable option to control poxvirus infections in today's increasingly immunocompromised population, particularly with the emergence of HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa. An increased frequency of human monkeypox virus infections, especially in immunocompromised individuals, may permit monkeypox virus to evolve and maintain itself independently in human populations.

Quarantine, case tracing and population vaccination facilitated the global eradication, in 1980, of variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox. The vaccines used during the eradication period, including Dryvax, the smallpox vaccine used in the USA, were live vaccinia and cowpoxvirus-based vaccines, which induced long-lasting and cross-protective immunity against variola and other related poxviruses. These vaccine viruses were produced by serial propagation in domesticated animals. The drawbacks to such serially propagated live viral vaccines include the level of postvaccination local and systemic reactions and contraindications to their use in immunocompromised individuals, individuals with certain skin and cardiac diseases, and pregnant women. In the latter stages of the population-based smallpox vaccination campaign, research began with ways to improve safety and modernizing the manufacture of vaccinia vaccines; however, with the eradication of variola this work stopped. Outbreaks of monkeypoxvirus in humans and the bioterrorist threat of monkeypox and variola virus renewed the need for improved vaccinia vaccines. ACAM2000 is one of the new generation of smallpox vaccines. It is produced in cell culture from a clonally purified master seed stock of vaccinia derived from the New York City Board of Health strain of vaccinia. The clonally purified master seed assures a more homogeneous vaccine without the inherent mutations associated with serial propagation and the cell culture limits adventitious and bacterial contamination in vaccine production. In preclinical and clinical trials, ACAM2000 demonstrated an immunogenicity and safety profile similar to that of Dryvax.

The absence of herd immunity to orthopoxviruses and the concern that variola or monkeypox viruses could be used for bioterroristic activities has stimulated the development of therapeutics and safer prophylactics. One major limitation in this process is the lack of accessible human orthopoxvirus infections for clinical efficacy trials; however, drug licensure can be based on orthopoxvirus animal challenge models as described in the “Animal Efficacy Rule”. One such challenge model uses ectromelia virus, an orthopoxvirus, whose natural host is the mouse and is the etiological agent of mousepox. The genetic similarity of ectromelia virus to variola and monkeypox viruses, the common features of the resulting disease, and the convenience of the mouse as a laboratory animal underscores its utility in the study of orthopoxvirus pathogenesis and in the development of therapeutics and prophylactics. In this review we outline how mousepox has been used as a model for smallpox. We also discuss mousepox in the context of mouse strain, route of infection, infectious dose, disease progression, and recovery from infection.

Smallpox (variola) virus is considered a Category A bioterrorism agent due to its ability to spread rapidly and the high morbidity and mortality rates associated with infection. Current recommendations recognize the importance of oral antivirals and call for having at least two smallpox antivirals with different mechanisms of action available in the event of a smallpox outbreak. Multiple antivirals are recommended due in large part to the propensity of viruses to become resistant to antiviral therapy, especially monotherapy. Advances in synthetic biology heighten concerns that a bioterror attack with variola would utilize engineered resistance to antivirals and potentially vaccines. Brincidofovir, an oral antiviral in late stage development, has proven effective against orthopoxviruses in vitro and in vivo, has a different mechanism of action from tecovirimat (the only oral smallpox antiviral currently in the US Strategic National Stockpile), and has a resistance profile that reduces concerns in the scenario of a bioterror attack using genetically engineered smallpox. Given the devastating potential of smallpox as a bioweapon, preparation of a multi-pronged defense that accounts for the most obvious bioengineering possibilities is strategically imperative.

Several tyrosine kinase inhibitors (TKIs) developed as anti-cancer drugs, also have anti-viral activity due to their ability to disrupt productive replication and dissemination in infected cells. Consequently, such drugs are attractive candidates for “repurposing” as anti-viral agents. However, clinical evaluation of therapeutics against infectious agents associated with high mortality, but low or infrequent incidence, is often unfeasible. The United States Food and Drug Administration formulated the “Animal Rule” to facilitate use of validated animal models for conducting anti-viral efficacy studies. To enable such efficacy studies of two clinically approved TKIs, nilotinib, and imatinib, we first conducted comprehensive pharmacokinetic (PK) studies in relevant rodent and non-rodent animal models. PK of these agents following intravenous and oral dosing were evaluated in C57BL/6 mice, prairie dogs, guinea pigs and Cynomolgus monkeys. Plasma samples were analyzed using an LC-MS/MS method. Secondarily, we evaluated the utility of allometry-based inter-species scaling derived from previously published data to predict the PK parameters, systemic clearance (CL) and the steady state volume of distribution (Vss) of these two drugs in prairie dogs, an animal model not tested thus far. Marked inter-species variability in PK parameters and resulting oral bioavailability was observed. In general, elimination half-lives of these agents in mice and guinea pigs were much shorter (1–3 h) relative to those in larger species such as prairie dogs and monkeys. The longer nilotinib elimination half-life in prairie dogs (i.v., 6.5 h and oral, 7.5 h), facilitated multiple dosing PK and safety assessment. The allometry-based predicted values of the Vss and CL were within 2.0 and 2.5-fold, respectively, of the observed values. Our results suggest that prairie dogs and monkeys may be suitable rodent and non-rodent species to perform further efficacy testing of these TKIs against orthopoxvirus infections. The use of rodent models such as C57BL/6 mice and guinea pigs for assessing pre-clinical anti-viral efficacy of these two TKIs may be limited due to short elimination and/or low oral bioavailability. Allometry-based correlations, derived from existing literature data, may provide initial estimates, which may serve as a useful guide for pre-clinical PK studies in untested animal models.