Consensus algorithms are the essential components of blockchain systems. They guarantee the blockchain’s fault tolerance and security. The Proof of Work (PoW) consensus algorithm is one of the most widely used consensus algorithms in blockchain systems, using computational puzzles to enable mining pools to compete for block rewards. However, this excessive competition for computational power will bring security threats to blockchain systems. A block withholding (BWH) attack is one of the most critical security threats blockchain systems face. A BWH attack obtains the reward of illegal block extraction by replacing full proof with partial mining proof. However, the current research on the BWH game could be more extensive, considering the problem from the perspective of a static game, and it needs an optimal strategy that dynamically reflects the mining pool for multiple games. Therefore, to solve the above problems, this paper uses the method of the evolutionary game to design a time-varying dynamic game model through the degree of system supervision and punishment. Based on establishing the game model, we use the method of replicating dynamic equations to analyze and find the optimal strategy for mining pool profits under different BWH attacks. The experimental results demonstrate that the mining pools will choose honest mining for the best profit over time under severe punishment and high supervision. On the contrary, if the blockchain system is supervised with a low penalty, the mining pools will eventually choose to launch BWH attacks against each other to obtain the optimal mining reward. These experimental results also prove the validity and correctness of our model and solution.
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a prevalent issue in the blockchain network layer, causing significant revenue loss for honest mining pools. This paper introduces a novel method, the Repeated Game-based DDoS attack mitigation (RGD), to address this problem. Unlike traditional methods such as game theory and machine learning-based detection, the RGD method can effectively reflect the changes in mining revenue and strategies under different network-strength environments. In particular, we abstract the problem of DDoS mining pool revenue loss into a game revenue model and propose the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) approach to solve the optimal payoffs and pool strategies in various network environments. Furthermore, we address the returns of mining pools in an infinitely repeated game environment using the Two-Stage Repeated Game (TSRG) method, where the strategy varies with different network environments. The Matlab experimental simulation results indicate that as the network environment improves, the optimal mining strategies of mining pools are gradually shifting from honest strategies to launching DDoS attacks against each other. The RGD method can effectively represent the impact of changes in the network environment on the mining pool’s strategy selection and optimal revenue. Consequently, with the changing network environment, the optimal revenue of the mining pool only increases by 10% of the revenue loss during a DDoS attack.
Proof of work (PoW) is one of the most widely used consensus algorithms in blockchain networks. It mainly uses the competition between mining nodes to obtain block rewards. However, this competition for computational power will allow malicious nodes to obtain illegal profits, bringing potential security threats to blockchain systems. A distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is a major threat to the PoW algorithm. It utilizes multiple nodes in the blockchain network to attack honest miners to obtain illegal rewards. To solve this problem, academia has proposed a DDoS attack detection mechanism based on reinforcement learning methods and static game modeling methods based on mining pools. However, these methods cannot effectively make miners choose the strategy with the best profit over time when facing DDoS attacks. Therefore, this paper proposes a dynamic evolutionary game model for miners facing DDoS attacks under blockchain networks to solve the above problems for the first time. We address the model by replicating the dynamic equation to obtain a stable solution. According to the theorem of the Lyapunov method, we also obtain the only stable strategy for miners facing DDoS attacks. The experimental results show that compared with the static method, the dynamic method can affect game playing and game evolution over time. Moreover, miners’ strategy to face DDoS attacks gradually shifts from honest mining to launching DDoS attacks against each other as the blockchain network improves.