Yu Wang

Prof. Yu Wang


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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11 January 2018 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LYLong Yong
Long Yong
YWYu Wang
Yu Wang
PCPan Chengrong
Pan Chengrong
Due to the issue of cost and benefit, the investment demand and consumption demand of micro-grids are insufficient in the early stages, which makes all parties lack motivation to participate in the development of micro-grid projects and leads to the slow development of micro-grids. In order to promote the development of micro-grids, the corresponding incentive mechanism should be designed to motivate the development of micro-grid projects. Therefore, this paper builds a multi-stage incentive model of micro-grid project development involving government, grid corporation, energy supplier, equipment supplier, and the user in order to study the incentive problems of micro-grid project development. Through the solution and analysis of the model, this paper deduces the optimal subsidy of government and the optimal cooperation incentive of the energy supplier, and calculates the optimal pricing strategy of grid corporation and the energy supplier, and analyzes the influence of relevant factors on optimal subsidy and incentive. The study reveals that the cost and social benefit of micro-grid development have a positive impact on micro-grid subsidy, technical level and equipment quality of equipment supplier as well as the fact that government subsidies positively adjust the level of cooperation incentives and price incentives. In the end, the validity of the model is verified by numerical analysis, and the incentive strategy of each participant is analyzed. The research of this paper is of great significance to encourage project development of micro-grids and to promote the sustainable development of micro-grids.

2 June 2022 in Energies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MSMin Song
Min Song
YWYu Wang
Yu Wang
YLyong long
yong long
In order to study the impact of a renewable energy quota and green power certificate system on the strategies of energy suppliers, this paper constructs a multi-stage game model of renewable energy power investment and production from the renewable energy interest chain and its stakeholders. Through the calculation and solution of the model, the optimal renewable energy utilization level, pricing and production strategies of renewable energy power of energy suppliers are calculated under the scenarios of direct sale of power and purchase and sale by power grids. The results show that the quota ratio, green certificate price and investment cost are the key influencing factors of energy suppliers’ strategies, and changes in the values of the three factors will completely change the renewable energy investment, pricing and production levels of energy suppliers in equilibrium. In addition, the study found that the impact of the renewable energy quota on renewable energy utilization levels of energy suppliers depends on the relative size of investment cost and green power certificate price. At the same time, it was also found that with a change in investment cost, green power certificate price and user preference, the market share and renewable energy utilization level of traditional energy suppliers and new energy suppliers also change.

10 May 2018 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LYLong Yong
Long Yong
PCPan Chengrong
Pan Chengrong
YWYu Wang
Yu Wang
Government subsidy is a powerful tool to motivate the development of a new energy industry. At the early stage of microgrid development, for the sake of the cost and benefit issue, it is necessary for the government to subsidize so as to support and promote the development of microgrids. However, a big challenge in practice is how to optimize the operational efficiency of the microgrid industry chain with varying targets and methods of subsidy. In order to explore this problem, we construct a subsidy model based on the microgrid industry chain, involving government, investor, operator, equipment supplier, and user. Through calculation and solution of this model, we obtain price and return indicators of each microgrid industry chain participant when the subsidy target differs. Based on that, we contrast and compare the optimal subsidy strategy and influencing factors when operational efficiency indicators vary. Finally, we validate and analyze this model with numerical analysis and discuss the impact of development stage, technological level, and change in subsidy amount on the operational efficiency of the microgrid industry chain and on the returns of each participant. This result is of great significance to subsidy practice for microgrids and the development of microgrids.

20 October 2017 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LYLong Yong
Long Yong
YWYu Wang
Yu Wang
PCPan Chengrong
Pan Chengrong
Micro-grid project transfer is the primary issue of micro-grid development. The efficiency and quality of the micro-grid project transfer directly affect the quality of micro-grid project construction and development, which is very important for the sustainable development of micro-grid. This paper constructs a multi-attribute auction model of micro-grid project transfer, which reflects the characteristics of micro-grid system and the interests of stakeholders, calculates the optimal bidding strategy and analyzes the influence of relevant factors on auction equilibrium by multi-stage dynamic game with complete information, and makes a numerical simulation analysis. Results indicate that the optimal strategy of auction mechanism is positively related to power quality, energy storage quality, and carbon emissions. Different from the previous lowest price winning mechanism, the auction mechanism formed in this paper emphasizes that the energy suppliers which provide the comprehensive optimization of power quality, energy storage quality, carbon emissions, and price will win the auction, when both the project owners and energy suppliers maximize their benefits under this auction mechanism. The auction mechanism is effective because it is in line with the principle of individual rationality and incentive compatibility. In addition, the number of energy suppliers participating in the auction and the cost of the previous auction are positively related to the auction equilibrium, both of which are adjusting the equilibrium results of the auction. At the same time, the utilization rate of renewable energy and the comprehensive utilization of energy also have a positive impact on the auction equilibrium. In the end, this paper puts forward a series of policy suggestions about micro-grid project auction. The research in this paper is of great significance to improve the auction quality of micro-grid projects and promote the sustainable development of micro-grid.