Long Yong

Prof. Long Yong


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 February 2020 in International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DXDeng Xu
Deng Xu
LYLong Yong
Long Yong
Food manufacturers are increasingly desirous of enhancing their competitive advantage by transforming themselves from being product providers to becoming product-service solution providers. Understanding the impact mechanism of supply chain integration (SCI) on food manufacturers’ transformation performance is crucial to achieve servitization transformation. This study develops a theoretical understanding of how food manufacturers in the hotpot industry facilitate transformation using SCI. It offers a conceptual definition of transformation performance, which involves financial performance, market space, and value creation. Based on case studies, a theoretical framework is proposed to explain the key internal and external drivers of SCI and the impact mechanism of SCI on transformation performance. The framework suggests that SCI contributes to transformation performance through five channels: standardisation, operational risk, product modularisation, knowledge sharing, and added value. It also offers preliminary insights on how transformation performance can offer feedback on SCI at different enterprise life cycle stages.

11 January 2018 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LYLong Yong
Long Yong
YWYu Wang
Yu Wang
PCPan Chengrong
Pan Chengrong
Due to the issue of cost and benefit, the investment demand and consumption demand of micro-grids are insufficient in the early stages, which makes all parties lack motivation to participate in the development of micro-grid projects and leads to the slow development of micro-grids. In order to promote the development of micro-grids, the corresponding incentive mechanism should be designed to motivate the development of micro-grid projects. Therefore, this paper builds a multi-stage incentive model of micro-grid project development involving government, grid corporation, energy supplier, equipment supplier, and the user in order to study the incentive problems of micro-grid project development. Through the solution and analysis of the model, this paper deduces the optimal subsidy of government and the optimal cooperation incentive of the energy supplier, and calculates the optimal pricing strategy of grid corporation and the energy supplier, and analyzes the influence of relevant factors on optimal subsidy and incentive. The study reveals that the cost and social benefit of micro-grid development have a positive impact on micro-grid subsidy, technical level and equipment quality of equipment supplier as well as the fact that government subsidies positively adjust the level of cooperation incentives and price incentives. In the end, the validity of the model is verified by numerical analysis, and the incentive strategy of each participant is analyzed. The research of this paper is of great significance to encourage project development of micro-grids and to promote the sustainable development of micro-grids.

5 June 2019 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DXDeng Xu
Deng Xu
LYLong Yong
Long Yong
Since microgrids require public support to make economic sense, governments regularly subsidize renewable microgrids to increase their renewable energy market penetration. In this study, we investigated the optimal subsidy level for governments to correct the market failure of microgrids and analyzed the impacts of regulation on the interaction between a microgrid and a distribution network operator (DNO). Specifically, we proposed economic rationales for government subsidies for microgrids regarding public interest benefits in relation to double externalities (learning spillover effect and environmental externality). We incorporated the double externalities into a three-echelon game model in an electricity supply chain with one regulator, one microgrid, and one DNO, in which the regulator decides the subsidy level to achieve maximal social welfare. We found that the double externalities and double marginalization caused underinvestment in microgrid capacity in the scenario without government intervention. The government could choose the appropriate subsidy level to achieve the system optimum, which led to a triple win for the microgrid, the DNO, and the social planner. Our analytical results also showed that the microgrid gained more benefits from regulation than the DNO. The microgrid may offer a negative wholesale price to the DNO in exchange for more opportunities to import electricity into the grid, especially when the investment cost is sufficiently low. Our study suggests that supporting microgrids requires a subsidy phase-out mechanism and alternative market-oriented policies with the development of the microgrid industry.

1 January 2015 in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CPChengrong Pan
Chengrong Pan
LYLong Yong
Long Yong
This paper employs the evolutionary game theory to analyze the cooperation between microgrid and conventional grid, with the discussion focusing on the factors that influence the game players’ selection of strategies, and additionally makes a numerical simulation analysis. The results of analysis based on the evolutionary game model suggest that the two parties’ undertaking of cooperative strategies and uncooperative strategies during the game is the stable point of their evolution and that the probability of their unanimous choice of cooperative strategies positively correlates with the direct benefits and indirect benefits of their cooperation as well as the government subsidies but negatively correlates with the cooperation costs and spending on cooperation risks. Based on the findings, the paper puts forward a series of policy suggestions aiming to deepen the cooperation between microgrid and conventional grid.

10 May 2018 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LYLong Yong
Long Yong
PCPan Chengrong
Pan Chengrong
YWYu Wang
Yu Wang
Government subsidy is a powerful tool to motivate the development of a new energy industry. At the early stage of microgrid development, for the sake of the cost and benefit issue, it is necessary for the government to subsidize so as to support and promote the development of microgrids. However, a big challenge in practice is how to optimize the operational efficiency of the microgrid industry chain with varying targets and methods of subsidy. In order to explore this problem, we construct a subsidy model based on the microgrid industry chain, involving government, investor, operator, equipment supplier, and user. Through calculation and solution of this model, we obtain price and return indicators of each microgrid industry chain participant when the subsidy target differs. Based on that, we contrast and compare the optimal subsidy strategy and influencing factors when operational efficiency indicators vary. Finally, we validate and analyze this model with numerical analysis and discuss the impact of development stage, technological level, and change in subsidy amount on the operational efficiency of the microgrid industry chain and on the returns of each participant. This result is of great significance to subsidy practice for microgrids and the development of microgrids.

25 September 2018 in Soft Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
LYLong Yong
Long Yong
DXDeng Xu
Deng Xu
XLXiaoxiao Li
Xiaoxiao Li