Nina Poth

Dr. Nina Poth

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 January 2023 in Philosophical Psychology
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NPNina Poth
Nina Poth
KDKrzysztof Dolega
Krzysztof Dolega
Several philosophers and psychologists have characterized belief in conspiracy theories as a product of irrational reasoning. Proponents of conspiracy theories apparently resist revising their beliefs given disconfirming evidence and tend to believe in more than one conspiracy, even when the relevant beliefs are mutually inconsistent. In this paper, we bring leading views on conspiracy theoretic beliefs closer together by exploring their rationality under a probabilistic framework. We question the claim that the irrationality of conspiracy theoretic beliefs stems from an inadequate response to disconfirming evidence and internal incoherence. Drawing analogies to Lakatosian research programs, we argue that maintaining a core conspiracy belief can be Bayes-rational when it is embedded in a network of auxiliary beliefs, which can be revised to protect the more central belief from disconfirmation. We propose that the (ir)rationality associated with conspiracy belief lies not in a flawed updating method, but in their failure to converge toward well-confirmed, stable belief networks in the long run. This approach not only reconciles previously disjointed views, but also points toward more specific hypotheses explaining why some agents may be prone to adopting beliefs in conspiracy theories.

8 June 2023 in Erkenntnis
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NPNina Poth
Nina Poth
The feature-matching approach pioneered by Amos Tversky remains a groundwork for psychological models of similarity and categorization but is rarely explicitly justified considering recent advances in thinking about cognition. While psychologists often view similarity as an unproblematic foundational concept that explains generalization and conceptual thought, long-standing philosophical problems challenging this assumption suggest that similarity derives from processes of higher-level cognition, including inference and conceptual thought. This paper addresses three specific challenges to Tversky’s approach: (i) the feature-selection problem, (ii) the problem of cognitive implausibility, and (iii) the problem of unprincipled tweaking. It subsequently supports key insights from Tversky’s account based on recent developments in Bayesian modeling of cognition. A novel computational view of similarity as inference is proposed that addresses each challenge by considering the contrast class as constitutive of similarity and selecting for highly informative features. In so doing, this view illustrates the ongoing promise of the feature-matching approach in explaining perception, generalization and conceptual thought by grounding them in principles of probabilistic inference.

18 February 2022 in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
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NPNina Poth
Nina Poth
Tenenbaum and Griffiths (Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24(4):629–640, 2001) have proposed that their Bayesian model of generalisation unifies Shepard’s (Science 237(4820): 1317–1323, 1987) and Tversky’s (Psychological Review 84(4): 327–352, 1977) similarity-based explanations of two distinct patterns of generalisation behaviours by reconciling them under a single coherent task analysis. I argue that this proposal needs refinement: instead of unifying the heterogeneous notion of psychological similarity, the Bayesian approach unifies generalisation by rendering the distinct patterns of behaviours informationally relevant. I suggest that generalisation as a Bayesian inference should be seen as a complement to, instead of a replacement of, similarity-based explanations. Furthermore, I show that the unificatory powers of the Bayesian model of generalisation can contribute to the selection of one of these models of psychological similarity.

6 May 2025 in Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
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NPNina Poth
Nina Poth
TTTrond Arild Tjøstheim
Trond Arild Tjøstheim
ASAndreas Stephens
Andreas Stephens
While recent cognitive science research shows a renewed interest in understanding intelligence, there is still little consensus on what constitutes intelligent behaviour and how it should be assessed. Here we propose a refined approach to biological intelligence as accurate prediction, according to which intelligent behaviour should be understood as adaptive control driven by the minimisation of uncertainty in dynamic environments with limited information. Central to this view is the concept of accuracy, which we argue is key to determining the success of predictions. We identify tensions in applying this framework to contemporary artificial systems such as large-language models, which, despite their impressive capacities for abstract prediction, show deficits in terms of context-sensitive knowledge transfer.

30 September 2023 in Entropy
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NPNina Poth
Nina Poth
The notions of psychological similarity and probabilistic learning are key posits in cognitive, computational, and developmental psychology and in machine learning. However, their explanatory relationship is rarely made explicit within and across these research fields. This opinionated review critically evaluates how these notions can mutually inform each other within computational cognitive science. Using probabilistic models of concept learning as a case study, I argue that two notions of psychological similarity offer important normative constraints to guide modelers’ interpretations of representational primitives. In particular, the two notions furnish probabilistic models of cognition with meaningful interpretations of what the associated subjective probabilities in the model represent and how they attach to experiences from which the agent learns. Similarity representations thereby provide probabilistic models with cognitive, as opposed to purely mathematical, content.

1 October 2024 in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
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MBMatteo De Benedetto
Matteo De Benedetto
NPNina Poth
Nina Poth
Carey’s (2009) account of bootstrapping in developmental psychology has been criticized out of a lack of theoretical precision and because of its alleged circularity (Rips et al. 2013, Cognition 128 (3): 320–330; Fodor 2010, Times Literary Supplement, 7–8; Rey 2014, Mind & Language 29 (2): 109–132). In this paper, we respond to these criticisms by connecting the debate on bootstrapping with recent accounts of conceptual creativity in philosophy of science. Specifically, we build on Nersessian’s (2010) hybrid-models-based theory of scientific conceptual change to develop a refined model of bootstrapping. The key explanatory feature of this model, which we will call hybrid bootstrapping, is the iterated hybridization of different representational domains. We show how hybrid bootstrapping can answer two major critiques that have been leveled against Carey’s account: the circularity challenge and the specification challenge.