Andreas Stephens

Mr. Andreas Stephens

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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13 December 2017 in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
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PGPeter Gärdenfors
Peter Gärdenfors
ASAndreas Stephens
Andreas Stephens
Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that it cannot be reduced to knowledge-that. We support the partition of knowledge by mapping it onto the long-term memory systems: procedural, semantic and episodic memory. The second thesis is that the role of inductive reasoning is to generate knowledge-what. We use conceptual spaces to model knowledge-what and the relations between properties and categories involved in induction.

19 November 2020 in Philosophies
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TTTrond Arild Tjøstheim
Trond Arild Tjøstheim
ASAndreas Stephens
Andreas Stephens
AAAndrey Anikin
Andrey Anikin
ASArthur Schwaninger
Arthur Schwaninger
Numerous species use different forms of communication in order to successfully interact in their respective environment. This article seeks to elucidate limitations of the classical conduit metaphor by investigating communication from the perspectives of biology and artificial neural networks. First, communication is a biological natural phenomenon, found to be fruitfully grounded in an organism’s embodied structures and memory system, where specific abilities are tied to procedural, semantic, and episodic long-term memory as well as to working memory. Second, the account explicates differences between non-verbal and verbal communication and shows how artificial neural networks can communicate by means of ontologically non-committal modelling. This approach enables new perspectives of communication to emerge regarding both sender and receiver. It is further shown that communication features gradient properties that are plausibly divided into a reflexive and a reflective form, parallel to knowledge and reflection.

16 March 2021 in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
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TTTrond Arild Tjøstheim
Trond Arild Tjøstheim
ASAndreas Stephens
Andreas Stephens
This paper argues that intelligence can be approximated by the ability to produce accurate predictions. It is further argued that general intelligence can be approximated by context dependent predictive abilities combined with the ability to use working memory to abstract away contextual information. The flexibility associated with general intelligence can be understood as the ability to use selective attention to focus on specific aspects of sensory impressions to identify patterns, which can then be used to predict events in novel situations and environments. The argumentation synthesizes Godfrey-Smith’s environmental complexity theory, adding the notion of niche broadness as well as changes concerning the view of cognition and control, and Hohwy’s predictive mind theory, making explicit the significance of accuracy as a composite of trueness and precision where the nervous system acts as a distributed controller motivating actions that keep the body in homeostasis.

12 September 2020 in Erkenntnis
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ASAndreas Stephens
Andreas Stephens
TTTrond A. Tjøstheim
Trond A. Tjøstheim
Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form remains a plausible, and possibly fruitful, option.

6 May 2025 in Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
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NPNina Poth
Nina Poth
TTTrond Arild Tjøstheim
Trond Arild Tjøstheim
ASAndreas Stephens
Andreas Stephens
While recent cognitive science research shows a renewed interest in understanding intelligence, there is still little consensus on what constitutes intelligent behaviour and how it should be assessed. Here we propose a refined approach to biological intelligence as accurate prediction, according to which intelligent behaviour should be understood as adaptive control driven by the minimisation of uncertainty in dynamic environments with limited information. Central to this view is the concept of accuracy, which we argue is key to determining the success of predictions. We identify tensions in applying this framework to contemporary artificial systems such as large-language models, which, despite their impressive capacities for abstract prediction, show deficits in terms of context-sensitive knowledge transfer.

5 September 2020 in Philosophies
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ASAndreas Stephens
Andreas Stephens
CFCathrine Victoria Felix
Cathrine Victoria Felix
We defend two theses: (1) Knowledge how and knowledge that are two distinct forms of knowledge, and; (2) Stanley-style intellectualism is neuro-psychologically implausible. Our naturalistic argument for the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that is based on a consideration of the nature of slips and basic activities. We further argue that Stanley’s brand of intellectualism has certain ontological consequences that go against modern cognitive neuroscience and psychology. We tie up our line of thought by showing that input from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, on multiple levels of analysis, cohere in supporting the distinction between two separate forms of knowledge. The upshot is a neuro-psychologically plausible understanding of knowledge.