This paper considers the agency selling channel in a supply chain under platform service investment. We construct Stackelberg game models to study the impact of the manufacturer’s encroachment strategy on supply chain members. Research results indicate that the encroachment strategy always has a positive impact at the levels of the manufacturer and platform service, which should dynamically change in response to the manufacturer’s action; the platform may actively implement a service strategy without encroachment, while the platform should be cautious in providing services to avoid backlash when encroachment occurs; the high commission rate may prompt the platform to increase the service effort and hinder manufacturer encroachment; when the channel substitution rate is high, both the manufacturer and platform may suffer from it and hence they should slow down their strategy implementation and consider cooperation; when the elasticity coefficient is large and the service cost is high, it may hinder the platform from providing services and the manufacturer may take the opportunity to encroach and thus seize the market.

This paper examines the impact of the reference price effect on pricing decisions in a risk-averse supply chain with a dual-sourcing procurement strategy, particularly during single-sourcing supply disruption. To analyze supply chain pricing decisions under non-disrupted and disrupted scenarios, we innovatively use semivariance as a risk measure to effectively avoid the limitations of the traditional variance approach and integrate it into Stackelberg game models. Based on these models, we analyze the impact of the reference price effect, risk aversion, and single-sourcing supply disruption on supply chain members’ pricing decisions. The main findings include the following: the single-sourcing supply disruption degree may increase the price of non-disrupted products and then increase the non-disrupted supplier’s utility; the strength of the reference price effect positively influences retailer utility but negatively impacts product pricing for supply chain members; the pricing decisions and utility of supply chain members are influenced by their risk aversion, and supply chain members with higher risk aversion adopt more conservative pricing strategies and consequently obtain lower utility; and equilibrium decisions generally demonstrate a degree of robustness. These insights may help supply chain managers respond rationally to supply disruptions and properly develop pricing strategies by taking into account the reference price effect.