There is increasing computational complexity within the connected car, and with the advent of autonomous vehicles, how do manufacturers test for cyber-security assurance? The fuzz test is a successful black box testing method that hackers have used to find security weaknesses in various domains. Therefore, should the fuzz test, mentioned (without any details) in SAE J3061, be applied more widely into the vehicle systems development process to help reduce vulnerabilities? To investigate this question a custom fuzzer was developed to allow for experimentation against a target vehicle's CAN bus (used as the data interconnect for the vehicle's ECUs). The results demonstrate that the fuzz test has a part to play as one of the many security tests that a vehicle's systems need to undergo before being made ready for series production. However, previous problems raised when cyber testing a vehicle were confirmed. Thus, in adding the fuzz test to the automotive engineering tool box some issues are raised that need addressing in future research.
An external disruptor to a manufacturing process (e.g., a supply chain failure, or a cyber‐attack) can affect more than a factory's output; it can have wider societal concerns, raising the issue of industrial resilience at different levels. In this work, manufacturing resilience is revisited, reviewing the applicability of the resilience concept to the industrial domain, particularly the smart factories enabled by newer digital technologies. The meaning of resilience within manufacturing is shown to be composed of several factors that operate at three levels (macro, meso, and micro). The factors have been united from a variety of sources to unify the traits within manufacturing resilience. Furthermore, a summary of the advanced digital technologies that can aid (or detract) from resilience is discussed, along with some of their challenges around digital complexity, legacy equipment support, high‐performance wireless communications, and cybersecurity. Although it is seen that digital manufacturing systems can aid resilience within the industrial sector and contribute to wider societal goals, the biggest impact is likely to be at the lowest (micro) level. Opportunities exist to quantify resilience factors and their use within manufacturing systems support software, and how to influence the resilience requirements of the wider stakeholders.
Modern automotive platforms are cyber-physical in nature and increasingly connected. Cybersecurity testing of such platforms is expensive and carries safety concerns, making it challenging to perform tests for vulnerabilities and refine test methodologies. We propose a testbed, built over a Controller Area Network (CAN) simulator, and validate it against a real-world demonstration of a weakness in a test vehicle using aftermarket On Board Diagnostic (OBD) scanners (dongles).
There is a need for new tools and techniques to aid automotive engineers performing cybersecurity testing on connected car systems. This is in order to support the principle of secure-by-design. Our research has produced a method to construct useful automotive security tooling and tests. It has been used to implement Controller Area Network (CAN) fuzz testing (a dynamic security test) via a prototype CAN fuzzer. The black-box fuzz testing of a laboratory vehicle's display ECU demonstrates the value of a fuzzer in the automotive field, revealing bugs in the ECU software, and weaknesses in the vehicle's systems design.
6 April 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Millimeter-wave (mmWave) carriers are an essential building block of fifth-generation (5G) systems. Satisfactory performance of the communications over the mmWave spectrum requires an alignment between the signal beam of the transmitter and receiver, achieved via beam training protocols. Nevertheless, beam training is vulnerable to jamming attacks, where the attacker intends to send jamming signals over different spatial directions to confuse legitimate nodes. This paper focuses on defending against this attack in smart factories where a moving Automated Guided Vehicle (AGV) communicates with a base station via a mmWave carrier. We introduce a defensive strategy to cope with jamming attacks, including two stages: jamming detection and jamming mitigation. Developed based on autoencoders, both algorithms can learn the characteristics/features of the received signals at the AGV. They can be employed consecutively before performing the downlink data transmission. In particular, once a jamming attack is identified, the jamming mitigation can be utilized to retrieve the corrupted received signal strength vector, allowing a better decision during the beam training operation. In addition, the proposed algorithm is straightforward and fully compliant with the existing beam training protocols in 5G New Radio. The numerical results show that not only the proposed defensive strategy can capture more than 80% of attack events, but it also improves the average signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio significantly, i.e., up to 15 dB.
The evolution of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) promises improvements in our travel experience and the potential to enhance road safety and reduce environmental impact. This will be utilising highly diverse traffic environments that enable several advanced mobility applications. A secure, efficient, reliable, and resilient communications infrastructure is required to support developments in these CAV systems. Next generation of telecommunication networks will seamlessly integrate terrestrial, satellite, and airborne networks into a single wireless system satisfying the requirements of trustworthy future transport systems. Given the increasing importance of CAVs, coupled with their attractiveness as a cyber‐attack for threat agents (e.g., disruption of transportation systems by nation states), security is paramount. Future communications systems offer an opportunity to integrate Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) into vehicular environments, protecting against advances in quantum computation that render many of the classical algorithms that underpin Public Key Infrastructure obsolete. This paper proposes a method for the integration of QKD in V2I networks to enable secure data communication. Quantum Key Distribution is used in the end‐to‐end path of vehicle‐to‐infrastructure (V2I) networks. Furthermore, an overarching Software‐Defined Network, with integrated QKD, is introduced. We have investigated the security performance of QKD in a V2I network over an urban environment.