According to Luck egalitarians, fairness requires us to bring it about that nobody is worse off than others where this results from brute bad luck, but not where they choose or deserve to be so. In this paper, I consider one type of brute bad luck that appears paradigmatic of what a Luck Egalitarian ought to be most concerned about, namely that suffered by people who are born to badly off parents and are less well off as a result. However, when we consider what is supposedly unfair about this kind of unequal brute luck, luck egalitarians face a dilemma. According to the standard account of luck egalitarianism, differential brute luck is unfair because of its effects on the distribution of goods. Yet, where some parents are worse off because they have chosen to be imprudent, it may be impossible to neutralize these effects without creating a distribution that seems at least as unfair. This, I argue, is problematic for luck egalitarianism. I, therefore, explore two alternative views that can avoid this problem. On the first of these, proposed by Shlomi Segall, the distributional effects of unequal brute luck are unfair only when they make a situation more unequal, but not when they make it more equal. On the second, it is the unequal brute luck itself, rather than its distributional effects, that is unfair. I conclude with some considerations in favour of this second view, while accepting that both are valid responses to the problem I describe.
We report the results of a structured expert elicitation to identify the most likely types of potential food system disruption scenarios for the UK, focusing on routes to civil unrest. We take a backcasting approach by defining as an end-point a societal event in which 1 in 2000 people have been injured in the UK, which 40% of experts rated as “Possible (20–50%)”, “More likely than not (50–80%)” or “Very likely (>80%)” over the coming decade. Over a timeframe of 50 years, this increased to 80% of experts. The experts considered two food system scenarios and ranked their plausibility of contributing to the given societal scenario. For a timescale of 10 years, the majority identified a food distribution problem as the most likely. Over a timescale of 50 years, the experts were more evenly split between the two scenarios, but over half thought the most likely route to civil unrest would be a lack of total food in the UK. However, the experts stressed that the various causes of food system disruption are interconnected and can create cascading risks, highlighting the importance of a systems approach. We encourage food system stakeholders to use these results in their risk planning and recommend future work to support prevention, preparedness, response and recovery planning.
This chapter explores the history of Existential Risk Studies through the stories of people who have sought to understand and avert threats like nuclear weapons, environmental breakdown, and disruptive technologies over the last seventy-five years. It offers new perspectives to people working on reducing existential risks today, from politicians to activists or academics, so that we can “turn back the hands of the Doomsday Clock”.
Evaluators’ main encounter with views of the future is in the form of theories of change, about how a programme will work to achieve a desired end, in a given context. These are typically focussed on specific relatively short-term futures, which are both desired and expected. But even in the short term, reality often involves unpredictable events which must be responded to. Other ways of thinking about the future may be helpful and complementary, notably those developed by foresight practitioners working in the field of futures studies. These pay more attention to a range of possible futures, rather than a single perspective. One way of exploring such futures is by using ParEvo.org, an online process that enables the participatory exploration of alternative futures. This article explains how the ParEvo process works, the theory informing its design, and its usage to date. Attention is given to three evaluation challenges, and methods to address them: (a) optimising exercise design, (b) analysis of immediate results and (c) identifying longer-term impacts. Two exercises undertaken by the Cambridge-based Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER) in 2021–2022 are used as illustrative examples.