Green technological innovation in the prefabricated building supply chain (PBSC) is an important way to realize the sustainable development of the construction industry. However, the competitive environment and the green input costs reduce the willingness of PBSC firms to improve the green technology level. This paper constructs a PBSC consisting of a smart construction management platform (SCMP), a contractor, and prefabricated-component manufacturers (PCMs) to explore green cooperation strategies in the PBSC. Stackelberg game models are constructed and the green technology level and PBSC profit under different cooperation strategies are examined. The study shows that the optimal service commission of the SCMP increases with the cost parameter of green technology and the intensity of competition between PCMs. However, the green technology level decreases with the competition. The integration strategy does not necessarily achieve the highest level of green technology. The horizontal cooperation among competing PCMs is not conducive to improving the green technology level, but PCMs always have incentives to form horizontal cooperative alliances to achieve Pareto improvement under certain conditions. For the SCMP, the vertical cooperation strategy with PCMs is the most favorable, but for the PBSC, the system profit under the integration strategy is the most profitable. This study enriches the theoretical foundation of the PBSC and provides theoretical guidance for green cooperation strategies in PBSCs.
Purpose: The pursuit of sustainable development and the rapid progress of digital technologies have made artificial intelligence (AI) marketing an important business trend to promote products. Although applying AI marketing can significantly reduce operational costs, it may impact consumers’ perception of the value of green products. Its influence on e-commerce supply chain (eSC) operation decisions warrants further investigation. Design/methodology/approach: Considering the influences of sales models, this paper constructs decision-making models for scenarios with and without AI marketing under the resale model and agency model. Applying game theory, it analyzes optimal decisions across four cases, thereby investigating AI marketing’s impacts on optimal decisions. Furthermore, numerical simulation methods are employed to explore sales model selection within eSC when AI marketing is applied. Findings: The findings indicate that when AI marketing significantly enhances consumers' perceived value of green products, it becomes advantageous to promote green products. However, when AI marketing exerts a weak effect on consumers, AI marketing can only enhance the operational efficiency of eSC if the scale effect exceeds a critical threshold. When cost scale effects in AI marketing experience stochastic disturbances, the volatility differences in sales models outweigh those caused by power structure-based distribution disparities. In the eSC dominated by platform, manufacturer or hybrid sales models, the manufacturer consistently prefers the agency model, while the platform favors the resale model. However, when considering consumers’ resistance to excessive marketing, both manufacturers and platforms tend to opt for the agency model. Originality/value: This paper investigates the equilibrium between sales models and AI marketing strategies for green products in eSC, providing theoretical insights and managerial implications for the platform utilizing AI marketing to promote green products under different sales models.