Location information is one of the most vital information required to achieve intelligence and context-awareness for Internet of Things (IoT) applications such as driverless cars. However, related security and privacy threats are a major holdback. With increasing focus on the use Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for autonomous navigation and related applications, it is important to provide robust navigation solutions. Radio frequency interference, either intentional or unintentional, has a direct impact on GNSS navigation performance related to observability and accuracy. In terms of security, spoofing is the major issue of concern. This paper focuses on multi-antenna GNSS and Inertial Navigation System (INS)-odometer integration to improve robustness, security and privacy of navigation solutions. Multi-antenna GNSS provides robustness against different interference sources and integration with INS provides continuous navigation solutions during short-term signal outages. Performance of the proposed architecture is evaluated using different user scenarios in the presence of spoofing and interference signals in real vehicular environments.
As the peak of solar cycle 25 approaches, increased ionospheric and scintillation activity is being observed, which is negatively impacting the quality of GNSS measurements and presenting challenges in the positioning domain. Ionospheric refraction and diffraction introduce delays and distortions to GNSS carrier phase measurements, leading to positioning errors that exceed the anticipated accuracies. These position errors can be a significant concern for users across the world who depend on precise GNSS positioning, such as in agriculture, offshore marine positioning and autonomous automotive positioning. To understand the direct impact on NovAtel receivers and its positioning engines, a comprehensive analysis was conducted. A closer look was taken at what happened in 2023–2024 by characterizing scintillation using the amplitude scintillation index (S4) values in an equatorial region. Additionally, the scintillation effect on the receivers was characterized through the analysis of C/N0, lock breaks, double differences and other indicators. With a substantial amount of data collected at 20° latitude, where high solar activity occurs due to the proximity to the equator, the positioning performance of Real-Time Kinematic (RTK) and Precise Point Positioning (PPP) was analyzed.
This research investigates various measurement monitoring techniques to mitigate the effect of GNSS code multipath. After a comprehensive review of different monitoring approaches, the paper focuses on methods that detect and exclude faulty measurements from the position solution. Detection metrics are investigated for single and dual-frequency cases and a new Geometry-Free (GF) detection metric is presented for reliable multipath mitigation. Given the capability of the proposed metric to be combined with a preceding Code-Minus-Carrier (CMC)-based error correction, a detection procedure is performed based on a combination of time-averaging of monitoring metrics and M of N detection strategy. The analytical results are tested by using Galileo E1/E5 data collected in a real multipath environment.
GNSS receivers are highly vulnerable to structural interference signals such as spoofing and meaconing. A spoofing attack based on a set of synthesized GNSS signals, is an effective means of providing bogus position estimates to a victim receiver. Several spoofing countermeasure techniques to address different attack types using single or multiple antenna have been proposed. Both single and multiple antenna techniques focus on specific features of spoofing signals that can separate them from the authentic ones. Multiple antenna techniques can observe spoofing signals in ways that a single antenna cannot, and as a result they strengthen detection capabilities. Single antenna based spoofing detection metrics are implemented in the pre-despreading or post-despreading layers of a GNSS receiver and are most effective when both spoofing and authentic signals are present. Pre-despreading and intermediate frequency signal monitoring metrics have been used to detect the presence of excessive amount of power in GNSS bands. These metrics rely on the assumption that spoofing signals are more powerful than the authentic ones and that a successful spoofing attack transmits several GNSS-like signals. Post-despreading methods are used to detect an abnormal behavior in acquisition and tracking levels which is caused by the presence of both spoofing and authentic signals. In many practical scenarios, a spoofer generates multiple GNSS signals and transmits them using a single antenna. As such, spoofed PRNs are spatially correlated since they all experience the same propagation channel. This feature can be used to discriminate them from the spatially distributed authentic signals. More specifically, the counterfeit signals sourced from a single transmit antenna have the same spatial signature, which means that all the signals experience the same channel variation in the spatial domain. This can be used as a metric to detect a spoofing attack. A key advantage of multiple antenna over a single antenna spoofing detection is that it can detect a spoofing attack in the absence of authentic signals (e.g. covered antenna case). Additionally, when both authentic and spoofed signals are present, a multiple antenna based detection method can identify which particular PRNs are spoofed. This paper demonstrates a spoofing detection module implemented on a dual-antenna variant of NovAtel’s OEM7 generation of GNSS receivers. The proposed architecture enables the receiver to detect a spoofing attack, as well as discriminate and classify spoofed PRNs from the authentic ones. The detector utilizes pre-despreading and post-despreading methods using a multi-layer detection strategy. The spatial processing detection metric uses two spatially separated antenna and is based on single and double-difference carrier phase observations. The operation of the proposed receiver structure will be tested in a real-world spoofing scenario. A hardware simulator is used as a spoofing generator, combined with the authentic signals collected from two spatially separated outdoor antennas. The test results show that the proposed technique can successfully detect and classify the spoofing and authentic PRNs. The advantage of a dual-antenna spoofing detection method will be compared to that of a single antenna in various spoofing attack scenarios. The detection performance of the dual-antenna spoofing detection methodology as a function of the antenna spacing will be characterized. The mean time to detect and probability of false detection in absence of spoofing attack will be evaluated in various GNSS operation environments.
NovAtel has recently leveraged its expertise in both receiver design and anti-jam technology to develop solutions for space- and weight-constrained applications in challenged GNSS environments. Robust Dual-Antenna Receiver (RoDAR), is based on a commercial dual-antenna receiver, originally designed for attitude determination, and employs special firmware to mitigate jammers and spoofers without an increase in size or power consumption. With RoDAR, the multi-frequency, multi-constellation dual-antenna receiver is capable of null-steering at two different frequency bands (e.g., L1 and L5). In September 2022, the Norwegian Public Roads Administration hosted JammerTest, a live, over-the-air broadcast jamming and spoofing test. This paper presents the jamming and spoofing detection and mitigation performance of RoDAR during this live broadcast test. The interference detection provides spectrum monitoring and jamming characterization on all GNSS bands. The mitigation is carried out by steering a null formed on-board the receiver towards a jamming/spoofing source at GPS L1 and L5 bands. The null steering performance is characterized as a function of signal and position availability compared to a non-protected NovAtel receiver. The effectiveness of the anti-jam and anti-spoofing technology is demonstrated using representative complex spoofing and jamming test cases during this event.
Civilian Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) play a crucial role in critical infrastructure and safety-critical applications, where their low signal power and open descriptions make them vulnerable to threats such as jamming and spoofing. To address these major challenges and growing concerns, NovAtel’s OEM7 receivers are equipped with an advanced GNSS Resilience and Integrity Technology (GRIT) to identify and respond to GNSS threats effectively. This includes Interference Toolkit (ITK), Spoofing Detection Toolkit (SK) and Robust Dual-Antenna Receiver (RoDAR), which employ a range of countermeasures, from jamming detection and characterization to spoofing detection and mitigation, ensuring solution integrity and reliability. The newly developed Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) module also offers an additional layer of protection by checking for the authenticity of the navigation message for Galileo E1 signals. This paper evaluates the performance of NovAtel’s OEM7 receivers in detecting and mitigating jamming and spoofing using real event data. Effective jamming detection was achieved through spectrum monitoring across all GNSS bands. The effectiveness of GRIT’s anti-jamming and anti-spoofing technologies was demonstrated in advanced test cases. OSNMA results are discussed, highlighting its role as a complementary protection layer for enhanced GNSS security.