Public cloud platforms might start with homogeneous hardware; nevertheless, because of inevitable hardware upgrades, or adding more capacity, the initial homogeneous platform will gradually evolve into heterogeneous as time passes by. The consequent performance heterogeneity is of concern to cloud users. In this paper, we evaluate performance variations from hardware heterogeneity and scheduling mechanisms of public clouds. Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) and Rackspace Cloud are used as the representatives because of their relatively long record and wide usage among small and medium enterprises (SMEs). A comprehensive set of microbenchmarks and application-level macrobenchmarks have been used to investigate performance variation. Several major contributions have been made. First, we find out that heterogeneous hardware is a commonality among the relatively long-lasting cloud platforms, although the level of heterogeneity varies. Second, we observe that heterogeneous hardware is the primary culprit of performance variation of cloud platforms. Third, we discover that varied CPU acquisition percentages and different virtual machine scheduling mechanisms exacerbate the performance variation problem, especially for network related operations. Finally, based on the observations, we propose cost-saving approaches and analyze Nash equilibrium from cloud user perspective. By using a simple "trial-and-better" approach, i.e., keep good-performing instances and discard bad-performing instances, cloud users can achieve up to 30 percent cost saving.
26 November 2021 in Dynamic Games and Applications
We consider the models of average-oriented opinion dynamics. An opinion about an event is distributed among the agents of a social network. There are an optimization problem and two game-theoretical models when players as centers of influence aim to make the opinions of the agents closer to the target ones in a finite time horizon minimizing their costs. The optimization problem and the games of competition for the agents’ opinion are linear-quadratic and solved using the Euler-equation approach. The optimal strategies for optimization problem and the Nash equilibria in the open-loop strategies for the games are found. Numerical simulations demonstrate theoretical results.
We consider a game-theoretic model of the influence of players on the dynamics of opinions and the consensus achieved in a social network. The control problem is to maintain the opinions of all participants in the vicinity of a predetermined value. If there are several players, then these target values may differ. The considered dynamic game belongs to the class of linear-quadratic games in discrete time. Optimal control and equilibrium are found using the Bellman equation. The solution is reached in closed form. It is shown that in the model with one player, a controlled consensus is achieved in the social network. In the model with two players, it is shown that although there is no consensus in the social network, the equilibrium is completely determined by the mean value of the opinions of all participants, which converges to a certain value. The results of numerical modeling for a social network with one and two players are presented.
The paper is devoted to game-theoretic methods for community detection in networks. The traditional methods for detecting community structure are based on selecting dense subgraphs inside the network. Here we propose to use the methods of cooperative game theory that highlight not only the link density but also the mechanisms of cluster formation. Specifically, we suggest two approaches from cooperative game theory: the first approach is based on the Myerson value, whereas the second approach is based on hedonic games. Both approaches allow to detect clusters with various resolutions. However, the tuning of the resolution parameter in the hedonic games approach is particularly intuitive. Furthermore, the modularity-based approach and its generalizations as well as ratio cut and normalized cut methods can be viewed as particular cases of the hedonic games. Finally, for approaches based on potential hedonic games we suggest a very efficient computational scheme using Gibbs sampling.