Slurring is a kind of hate speech that has various effects. Notable among these is variable offence. Slurs vary in offence across words, uses, and the reactions of audience members. Patterns of offence aren’t adequately explained by current theories. We propose an explanation based on the unjust power imbalance that a slur seeks to achieve. Our starting observation is that in discourse participants take on discourse roles. These are typically inherited from social roles, but only exist during a discourse. A slurring act is a speech-act that alters the discourse roles of the target and speaker. By assigning discourse roles the speaker unjustly changes the power balance in the dialogue. This has a variety of effects on the target and audience. We show how these notions explain all three types of offence variation. We also briefly sketch how a role and power theory can help explain silencing and appropriation. Explanatory power lies in the fact that offence is correlated with the perceived unjustness of the power imbalance created.

Two rival accounts of irony claim, respectively, that pretence and echo are independently sufficient to explain central cases. After highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of these accounts, I argue that an account in which both pretence and echo play an essential role better explains these cases and serves to explain peripheral cases as well. I distinguish between “weak” and “strong” hybrid theories, and advocate an “integrated strong hybrid” account in which elements of both pretence and echo are seen as complementary in a unified mechanism. I argue that the allegedly mutually exclusive elements of pretence and echo are in fact complementary aspects enriching a core-structure as follows: by pretending to have a perspective/thought F, an ironic speaker U echoes a perspective/thought G. F is merely pretended, perhaps caricaturised or exaggerated, while G is real/possible.

Slurring is a type of hate speech meant to harm individuals simply because of their group membership. It not only offends but also causes oppression. Slurs have some strange properties. Target groups can reclaim slurs, so as to express solidarity and pride. Slurs are noted for their “offensive autonomy” (they offend regardless of speakers’ intentions, attitudes, and beliefs) and for their “offensive persistence,” as well as for their resistance to cancellation (they offend across a range of contexts and utterances). They are also noted for their “offense variation” (not all slurs offend equally) and for the complicity they may induce in listeners. Slurs signal identity affiliations; they cue and re-entrench ideologies. They subordinate and silence target members and are sometimes used non-derogatorily. Slurs raise interesting issues in the philosophy of language and linguistics, social and political philosophy, moral psychology, and social epistemology. The literature on slurs also connects to socio-psychological theory, critical race theory, and legal philosophy. There are two main types of questions: those of a social nature and those of a linguistic nature. In the first category are questions such as, “What social and psychological effects do slurs create and how do they create them?” In the second category we ask, “What sort of linguistic properties do slurs have and what do those properties tell us about theories of language, reference and meaning?” Researchers also try to accommodate the answers to these questions with a unified theory (i.e., to explain how the linguistic properties of slurs bring about harm). Others are concerned with the social significance of slurs, their relation to harm and discrimination, and how to remedy them. One related question is whether slurring utterances are constitutive of (or cause) harm. This underpins debates on free speech and specifically the legal question of whether slurs should be regulated speech. Other linguistic problems are definitional. How do slurs differ from pejoratives, insults, swear words, and offensive behavior? Within the realm of evaluative language, how do slurs compare to Fregean “coloring” and hybrid terms such as moral, “thick,” and evaluative terms?

Reclamation is the phenomenon of an oppressed group repurposing language to its own ends. A case study is reclamation of slur words. Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt (2018) argued that a slurring utterance is a speech act which performs a discourse role assignment. It assigns a subordinate role to the target, while the speaker assumes a dominant role. This pair of role assignments is used to oppress the target. Here the author focuses on how reclamation works and under what conditions its benefits can stabilise. She starts by reviewing the data and describing preconditions and motivations for reclamation. Can reclamation be explained in the same basic framework as regular slurring utterances? She argues that it can. The author also identifies some features that must be a prediction of any theory of reclamation. She concludes that reclamation is an instance of a much broader class of acts we do with words to change the distribution of power: it begets power, but it also requires it.

This paper argues that we need to re-think the semantics/pragmatics distinction in the light of new evidence from embedding of irony. This raises a new version of the old problem of ‘embedded implicatures’. I argue that embedded irony isn’t fully explained by solutions proposed for other embedded implicatures. I first consider two strategies: weak pragmatics and strong pragmatics. These explain embedded irony as truth-conditional content. However, by trying to shoehorn irony into said-content, they raise problems of their own. I conclude by considering how a modified Gricean model can explain that irony embeds qua implicature. This leads us to prefer a local implicature model. This has important consequences for how we draw the semantics/pragmatics distinction.

Our time is marked by a resurgence of hate that threatens to increase oppression. Social media has contributed to this by acting as a medium through which hate speech is spread. How should we model the spread of hate? This article considers two models. First, I consider a simple contagion model. In this model, hate spreads like a virus through a social network. This model, however, fails to capture the fact that people do not acquire hatred from a single infectious contact. Instead, it builds up in a person's beliefs and attitudes through time until the infection reaches a level where the subject themselves becomes a generator of hate speech. Second, to accommodate this, I consider an alternative model known ascomplex contagion. I argue that not only is a complex contagion model more explanatory and predictive, but it can be used to explain why certain features of social media cause it to be a promoter of hate. I conclude by sketching some mitigation strategies.