Jing Zhang

Prof. Jing Zhang

Hebei University of Technology
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 December 2020 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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JZJing Zhang
Jing Zhang
DYDong Yang
Dong Yang
QLQiang Li
Qiang Li
Benjamin LevBenjamin Lev
Benjamin Lev
YMYanfang Ma
Yanfang Ma
In competitive global markets, sustainable suppliers are critical success factors for sustainable supply chain operations. Sustainable supplier selection must be based on a complex network of numerous indicators and experts’ fuzzy linguistic terms. Considering the correlation between the evaluation criteria and the ambiguity of the criteria values, this paper proposes combining the rough DEMATEL method and the fuzzy VIKOR (FVIKOR) method to solve sustainable supplier selection problem. We determine 15 sustainable supplier evaluation criteria from economic, environmental and social dimensions. We also apply the rough DEMATEL method to determine the weight of evaluation indicators that are interrelated or even conflicting and use the FVIKOR method to determine supplier rankings by converting the fuzzy linguistic terms into precise information. The practicability of the proposed method is verified by an example of sustainable supplier selection.

8 January 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KKKai Kang
Kai Kang
SGSiying Gao
Siying Gao
TGTie Gao
Tie Gao
JZJing Zhang
Jing Zhang
This study investigated a green supply chain comprising a single supplier with financial constraints and a single retailer, while also considering the supplier's degree of risk aversion. A supplier-retailer Stackelberg game model was established under different financing situations, namely, bank financing and retailer's advance payment, and optimal decisions were derived for both the supplier and the retailer. The analysis examined the influence of the degree of the supplier's risk aversion, pricing and financing strategies on optimal decisions. The results show that high supplier risk aversion is not conducive to the supply chain green development. When the supplier has less initial capital, the strategy of advance payment provided by the retailer will be prioritized within the supplier's financial constraints. When the supplier's initial capital is more, he should use the initial capital for production. The study's consideration of the supply chain green level as an endogenous variable, as well as of the supplier's risk aversion, contributes to its novelty.

31 July 2022 in Applied Mathematics and Computation
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XMXiuqing Mu
Xiuqing Mu
KKKang Kai
Kang Kai
JZJing Zhang
Jing Zhang

1 January 2022 in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
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Journal Article
Closed access
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KKKang Kai
Kang Kai
TLTaotao Lu
Taotao Lu
JZJing Zhang
Jing Zhang
By applying Stackelberg game theory, this paper investigates the supply chain with a risk-neutral retailer and a risk-averse supplier, measuring risk-averse behavior by using conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). The equilibrium solutions of the supplier's wholesale price and the retailer's order quantity are obtained under two financing strategies: supplier financing (SF) and supplier investment (SI). It is found that the supplier's risk aversion is a crucial factor affecting both parties' financing decisions, and the supplier should offer different financing strategies to the retailer based on his risk attitude and the profit-sharing coefficient. However, the retailer prefers SF regardless of the supplier's risk aversion. Taking bank credit financing as a basic model, the advantages of SF and SI have been investigated. A Pareto improvement region for the two finance strategies has been identified and some suggestions are provided for the supplier's optimal utility. Then we extend to the situation that both parties are risk-averse and use the financing cost-sharing mechanism to achieve centralized decision-making.

1 January 2025 in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JZJing Zhang
Jing Zhang
YZYuwei Zhang
Yuwei Zhang
SLShuqi Liu
Shuqi Liu
LZLiqiao Zou
Liqiao Zou
This paper investigates the pricing decisions among supply chain members in a capacity-sharing supply chain, under demand uncertainty and information asymmetry. A two-level supply chain game model is established, consisting of a capacity-sharing cloud platform and a manufacturer, to explore pricing decisions under different power structures using a signaling game approach. The findings reveal that when the cloud platform is the leader and its signal accuracy is low, its profit is higher under information symmetry, while the manufacturer's profit is higher under information asymmetry. Additionally, when the manufacturer is the leader, the effect of information asymmetry on pricing and profit depends solely on market demand. Numerical simulations are used to analyze the impact of signal accuracy and market position, showing that the cloud platform is more profitable as a leader with low signal accuracy, but more profitable as a follower with high signal accuracy.