The evaluation of urban sustainability plays a crucial role in the process of the sustainable development of cities. To decrease subjectivity and attain a comprehensive evaluation, this paper develops an evaluation method using the technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS). First, an evaluation index system including 39 indices and three categories (economic, social, and ecological development) is established; second, based on the index system, a modified TOPSIS, in which the entropy method is used to assign weights to each index according to its evaluation score and grey relation analysis is used to reduce the uncertainty existing in the process of evaluation, is presented to rank the sustainability level of cities. Finally, an example with the sustainability evaluation of 16 cities in the Anhui province of China is introduced to verify the effectiveness of the model.

Carbon tax regulation and consumers’ low-carbon preference act as incentives for firms to abate emissions. Manufacturers can improve product sustainability and retailers can strengthen the promotion of low-carbon products as part of such abatement. Current incomplete rationality also affects product sustainability and low-carbon promotion level. In this context, we consider a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer and investigate the impacts of the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s fairness concerns on their production sustainability level, low-carbon promotion level and profitability. We also explore the coordination contract. The results show that the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s fairness concerns decrease their product sustainability and low-carbon promotion level, together with the profits of the system and the manufacturer. With regard to the retailer’s fairness concern, the product sustainability level and the manufacturer’s profit are lower; moreover, the low-carbon promotion level and the profits of the supply chain and the retailer are higher. A revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain perfectly; however, members’ fairness concerns increase the difficulty of coordination. Finally, the numerical results reveal that carbon tax regulation can encourage the manufacturer to enhance the product sustainability level. Further, the impacts on the low-carbon promotion level and firms’ profitability are related to the cost coefficients of product sustainability.

Purpose: Under the carbon regulation mechanism, managing operational strategies is a challenging task. Green innovation is introduced into a hybrid system of manufacturing and remanufacturing to handle the carbon emission constraints in a dynamic market environment. This paper aims to investigate the joint dynamic green innovation policy and pricing strategies in a hybrid manufacturing and remanufacturing system.Design/methodology/approach: This paper first considers a monopolistic manufacturer who offers brand-new products and remanufactured items at the same price to consumers. Subsequently, the authors extend their analyses to distinct pricing strategies for both newly manufactured products and refurnished ones in such a hybrid system. Two different cases are considered: a loose carbon emission constraint and a binding carbon emission constraint. By solving the dynamic optimization problem, the differential game and Pontryagin’s maximum principle are used to obtain the joint green innovation and pricing strategies.Findings: The retail price first increases then declines over a single period. The green innovation diminishes in the same pricing decision model, while it first increases then declines in a distinct pricing decision model over a single planning horizon. The green innovation investment as well as the retail price are discouraged by an emission cap and recycling fraction. The distinct retail price fluctuates violently, and they are, in descending order of the highest peak price as follows: the newly manufactured product, the same pricing product and the repaired product. Carbon emission caps that are either too high or too low decrease the revenue of the manufacturer. A small emission constraint margin benefits the manufacturer. The recycling policy, as well as other parameters, affects whether the hybrid system attains the carbon emission constraint or not, which suggests that the recycling policy is complementary to the carbon emission constraint mechanism in the hybrid system.Practical implications: These results offer managerial implications to the hybrid system in terms of green innovation, pricing strategies and recycling policy.Originality/value: This paper is among the first papers to research the joint dynamic green innovation policy and pricing strategies with/without a carbon emission constraint in a hybrid manufacturing and remanufacturing system with a differential game. Moreover, this paper presents a potential way of investigating other common resource constraints by a differential game in a manufacturing/remanufacturing system or closed loop supply chain.

Remanufacturing of returned products has been increasingly recognized in industries as an effective approach to face environmental responsibility, government regulations, and increased awareness of consumers. In this paper, we address a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) in which the manufacturer produces the brand-new products, as well as the remanufactured goods while the retailer sells these products to customers. We consider several different scenarios: the manufacturer and the retailer adopt a steady-state price or a dynamic price with reference quality effects in a centralized case; either, neither or both the manufacturer and the retailer price dynamically with reference quality effects, respectively, in a decentralized model. We solve the problem with the retailer recycling the sold copies and deduce the optimal pricing strategies while the manufacturer in charge of recovering the used items in such a CLSC. The result shows that dynamic pricing strategies are much more profitable for the supply chain and its members when compared with pricing statically; the dynamic pricing strategies with time-varying quality characterized by reference quality are more suited to a long-term and cooperative closed-loop supply chain. Moreover, the optimal recycling fraction relies on the recovery cost coefficient and proves to be uniform despite adopting a dynamic price and quality in all distinct cases.