The evaluation of urban sustainability plays a crucial role in the process of the sustainable development of cities. To decrease subjectivity and attain a comprehensive evaluation, this paper develops an evaluation method using the technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS). First, an evaluation index system including 39 indices and three categories (economic, social, and ecological development) is established; second, based on the index system, a modified TOPSIS, in which the entropy method is used to assign weights to each index according to its evaluation score and grey relation analysis is used to reduce the uncertainty existing in the process of evaluation, is presented to rank the sustainability level of cities. Finally, an example with the sustainability evaluation of 16 cities in the Anhui province of China is introduced to verify the effectiveness of the model.

Environmentally friendly handling and efficient recycling of waste electrical on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) have grown to be a global social problem. As holders of WEEE, consumers have a significant effect on the recycling process. A consideration of and attention to the influence of consumer behavior in the recycling process can help achieve more effective recycling of WEEE. In this paper, we built a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain model composed of manufacturers, retailers, and network recycling platforms. Based on the influence of customer bargaining behavior, we studied several different scenarios of centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, and contract coordination, using the Stackelberg game theory. The results show that retailers and network recycling platforms will reduce the direct recovery prices to maintain their own profit when considering the impact of consumer bargaining behavior, while remanufacturers will improve the transfer payment price for surrendering part of the profit under revenue and the expense sharing contract. Using this contract, we can achieve supply chain coordination and eliminate the effect of consumer bargaining behavior on supply chain performance. It can be viewed from the parameter sensitivity analysis that when we select the appropriate sharing coefficient, the closed-loop supply chain can achieve the same system performance under a centralized decision.

Purpose: Under the carbon regulation mechanism, managing operational strategies is a challenging task. Green innovation is introduced into a hybrid system of manufacturing and remanufacturing to handle the carbon emission constraints in a dynamic market environment. This paper aims to investigate the joint dynamic green innovation policy and pricing strategies in a hybrid manufacturing and remanufacturing system.Design/methodology/approach: This paper first considers a monopolistic manufacturer who offers brand-new products and remanufactured items at the same price to consumers. Subsequently, the authors extend their analyses to distinct pricing strategies for both newly manufactured products and refurnished ones in such a hybrid system. Two different cases are considered: a loose carbon emission constraint and a binding carbon emission constraint. By solving the dynamic optimization problem, the differential game and Pontryagin’s maximum principle are used to obtain the joint green innovation and pricing strategies.Findings: The retail price first increases then declines over a single period. The green innovation diminishes in the same pricing decision model, while it first increases then declines in a distinct pricing decision model over a single planning horizon. The green innovation investment as well as the retail price are discouraged by an emission cap and recycling fraction. The distinct retail price fluctuates violently, and they are, in descending order of the highest peak price as follows: the newly manufactured product, the same pricing product and the repaired product. Carbon emission caps that are either too high or too low decrease the revenue of the manufacturer. A small emission constraint margin benefits the manufacturer. The recycling policy, as well as other parameters, affects whether the hybrid system attains the carbon emission constraint or not, which suggests that the recycling policy is complementary to the carbon emission constraint mechanism in the hybrid system.Practical implications: These results offer managerial implications to the hybrid system in terms of green innovation, pricing strategies and recycling policy.Originality/value: This paper is among the first papers to research the joint dynamic green innovation policy and pricing strategies with/without a carbon emission constraint in a hybrid manufacturing and remanufacturing system with a differential game. Moreover, this paper presents a potential way of investigating other common resource constraints by a differential game in a manufacturing/remanufacturing system or closed loop supply chain.

Although remanufacturing has great economic and environmental potential, internal cannibalization, and lack of consumer acceptance of remanufactured products prevent original equipment manufacturer (OEM) from realizing the full potential value through remanufacturing. Practices show that remanufactured products can realize their value by the donation, besides resale. Thus, this paper incorporates the donation of remanufactured products with government subsidy and presents an upgraded remanufacturing strategy to expand the demand for remanufactured products and weaken the internal cannibalization of remanufactured products. We respectively construct the two-period game model with and without upgraded remanufacturing and explore the effect of upgraded remanufacturing on production decision, economic and environmental benefits. The main conclusions are as follows. The donation subsidy is negatively related with the sale quantity of remanufactured products, but is positively related with the donation quantity of remanufactured products and the quantity of new products. The donation subsidy expands the demand for remanufactured products and weakens internal cannibalization of remanufactured products. Whether the upgraded remanufacturing strategy is profitable depends on the fixed cost of the remanufacturing. When consumers consider remanufactured products environmentally friendly, the government can realize an OEM’s win-win situation where the economic and environmental benefits get improved by adjusting the donation subsidy. Otherwise, introducing upgraded remanufacturing makes the environment worse. Comparatively speaking, a low-cost and environmentally friendly manufacturer is relatively easier to achieve the win-win situation through donation subsidy.