Jinsoo jang

Prof. Jinsoo jang

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
27 October 2016 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JJJinsoo jang
Jinsoo jang
CCChangho Choi
Changho Choi
JLJaehyuk Lee
Jaehyuk Lee
NKNohyun Kwak
Nohyun Kwak
SLSeongman Lee
Seongman Lee
BKBrent Byunghoon Kang
Brent Byunghoon Kang
ARM TrustZone is widely used to provide a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for mobile devices. However, the use of TrustZone is limited because TrustZone resources are only available for some pre-authorized applications. In other words, only alliances of the TrustZone OS vendors and device manufacturers can use TrustZone to secure their services. To help overcome this problem, we designed the PrivateZone framework to enable individual developers to utilize TrustZone resources. Using PrivateZone, developers can run Security Critical Logics (SCL) in a Private Execution Environment (PrEE). The advantage of PrivateZone is its leveraging of TrustZone resources without undermining the security of existing services in the TEE. To guarantee this, PrivateZone creates a PrEE using a memory region that is isolated from both the Rich Execution Environment (REE) and TEE. In this paper, we describe the design and implementation of PrivateZone. The prototype of PrivateZone was implemented on an Arndale board with a Cortex-A15 dual-core processor. We built PrivateZone by exploring both security and virtualization extensions of the ARM architecture. To illustrate the usage and the efficacy of PrivateZone, we developed an Android application based on PrivateZone framework, and evaluated the performance overhead imposed on the OS in the REE and SCLs in the PrEE.

4 March 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SLSeongman Lee
Seongman Lee
HKHyeonwoo Kang
Hyeonwoo Kang
JJJinsoo jang
Jinsoo jang
BKBrent Byunghoon Kang
Brent Byunghoon Kang
Stack-based memory corruption vulnerabilities have been exploited, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code and read/write arbitrary memory. Although several solutions have been proposed to prevent memory errors on the stack, they are either limited to a specific type of attack (either spatial or temporal attacks) or cause significant performance degradation. In this article, we introduce SaVioR, an efficient and comprehensive stack protection mechanism. The key technique involves randomization of the stack layout to reduce its predictability and exploitability. SaVioR isolates an individual object from spatially and temporally adjacent vulnerable objects and randomizes each object's location, which prevents attackers from predicting the stack layout and thus reduces the likelihood of memory errors being exploited. We implemented SaVioR based on the LLVM compiler framework and applied it to the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks and real-world applications. Our security evaluation showed that SaVioR provides a high degree of randomness in the stack layout and thus reduces the likelihood of successful exploitation of spatial and temporal memory errors on the stack. Our performance evaluation also demonstrated that it incurs a modest performance overhead (14 percent) with the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite, which improves performance compared to the state-of-the-art stack protection while achieving a comparable security level.

1 June 2019 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JJJinsoo jang
Jinsoo jang
BKBrent Byunghoon Kang
Brent Byunghoon Kang

18 February 2022 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JJJinsoo jang
Jinsoo jang
BKBrent Byunghoon Kang
Brent Byunghoon Kang
Advancements in the Internet of Things (IoT) have resulted in the connection and deployment of numerous smart and embedded devices. Although such devices enable various services such as smart grids, they attract more attackers to the IoT world. A trusted execution environment (TEE), which can be created by using TrustZone technology, is a promising security artifact for protecting critical operations and sensitive data of IoT devices. Unfortunately, although TrustZone is available in most ARM architecture-based devices ranging from microcontrollers to high-end smart devices, it has not been widely adopted by third-party IoT service providers because of its limited access. That is, because the TEE is maintained by the TEE platform vendors to preserve its security. Therefore, third parties must adhere to strict policies and procedures to ensure the deployment of trusted services in the TEE. This aspect hinders the fast development and deployment of IoT services. In this work, we propose 3rdParTEE to address this problem by enabling third-party IoT service providers to readily run their trusted services, thereby minimizing their dependency on the TEE maintainers. Specifically, 3rdParTEE facilitates the secure running of the third-party’s native kernel driver in the TEE without hampering the security of the existing TEE components. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we ran three kernel drivers for maintaining the IoT services platform (e.g., kernel integrity check) in the TEE. Additionally, during the performance evaluation, we observed a reasonable performance overhead of up to 7% when running the kernel drivers in such a secure manner.

8 March 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HLHojoon Lee
Hojoon Lee
HMHyungon Moon
Hyungon Moon
IHIngoo Heo
Ingoo Heo
DJDaehee Jang
Daehee Jang
JJJinsoo jang
Jinsoo jang
BKBrent Byunghoon Kang
Brent Byunghoon Kang
External hardware-based kernel integrity monitors have been proposed to mitigate kernel-level malwares. However, the existing external approaches have been limited to monitoring the static regions of kernel while the latest rootkits manipulate the dynamic kernel objects. To address the issue, we present KI-Mon, a hardware-based platform that introduces event-triggered monitoring techniques for kernel dynamic objects. KI-Mon advances the bus traffic snooping technique to not only detect memory write traffic on the host bus but also filter out all but meaningful traffic to generate events. We show how kernel invariant verification software can be developed around these events, and also provide a set of APIs for additional invariant verification development. We also report our findings and considerations on the unique challenges for external monitors – such as cache coherency, dynamic object tracing. We introduce host-side kernel changes that alleviate these issues that involve changes in kernel's object allocation and cache policy control. We have built a prototype of KI-Mon on the ARM architecture to demonstrate the efficacy of KI-Mon's event-triggered mechanism in terms of performance overhead for the monitored host system and the processor usage of the KI-Mon processor.

1 September 2016 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YKYonggon Kim
Yonggon Kim
OKOhmin Kwon
Ohmin Kwon
JJJinsoo jang
Jinsoo jang
SJSeongwook Jin
Seongwook Jin
HBHyeongboo Baek
Hyeongboo Baek
HYHyunsoo Yoon
Hyunsoo Yoon