13 January 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Decentralized Identity (DID) is emerging as a new digital identity management scheme that promises users complete control of their personal data and identification without central authority involvement. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has drafted the DID standard and provided reference implementations. We conduct a security analysis of the W3C DID standard and the reference universal resolver implementation, focusing on user privacy in the DID resolving process. The universal resolver is the key component in the architecture that processes DID requests and DID document retrievals. Our analysis demonstrates that privacy issues can arise due to the imprudent design of the universal resolver. Furthermore, we found that side-channels in the DID document caching schemes of real-world DID services can entail privacy concerns. Motivated by our security analysis, we present a novel DID resolving design, called Oblivira, to enable obliviously DID resolving. Oblivira is a secure resolving agent with a small footprint that enforces the universal resolver to resolve requests without knowing their content. We also propose a privacy-preserving DID document caching scheme that eliminates side-channels. Our evaluation results show that Oblivira only incurs approximately 2.6% of overhead on average with different resolver settings (3, 6, and 12 threads).
29 April 2022 in IEEE Access
Malware has plagued the internet and computing systems for decades. The war against malware has always been an arms race. Researchers and industry have constantly improved detection and prevention methodologies against increasingly more evasive malware. Keeping up with the constantly changing adversary tactics for evading defensive efforts and maintaining an efficient malware supply chain is imperative to stay ahead in the competition. In this paper, we present a large-scale and comprehensive analysis of the current state of malware distribution. For the analysis, we accumulated a dataset that contains 99,312 malware binary samples from 38,659 malware distribution sites over 287 days. Using our dataset, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the collected malware binaries and URLs to provide up-to-date statistics and insights into the adversary strategies. We analyze both malware distribution sites and malware binaries collected from them. Regarding binary analysis, we perform a multifaceted analysis on the characteristics on the collected binaries, including malware family label classification and file similarity-based clustering. With distribution site analysis, we analyze the IP addresses, domains, AS registration distribution and URL lexical distribution of malware distribution sites. We further discuss the statistical relationship between malware families and their distribution domains. Most importantly, we discuss the current trends in malware distribution today and reveal adversary strategies through our extensive amount of analysis results. Then, we suggest future directions for fight against malware distribution.
20 December 2021 in IEEE Access
As machine learning (ML) technologies and applications are rapidly changing many computing domains, security issues associated with ML are also emerging. In the domain of systems security, many endeavors have been made to ensure ML model and data confidentiality. ML computations are often inevitably performed in untrusted environments and entail complex multi-party security requirements. Hence, researchers have leveraged the Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to build confidential ML computation systems. We conduct a systematic and comprehensive survey by classifying attack vectors and mitigation in confidential ML computation in untrusted environments, analyzing the complex security requirements in multi-party scenarios, and summarizing engineering challenges in confidential ML implementation. Lastly, we suggest future research directions based on our study.
8 March 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
External hardware-based kernel integrity monitors have been proposed to mitigate kernel-level malwares. However, the existing external approaches have been limited to monitoring the static regions of kernel while the latest rootkits manipulate the dynamic kernel objects. To address the issue, we present KI-Mon, a hardware-based platform that introduces event-triggered monitoring techniques for kernel dynamic objects. KI-Mon advances the bus traffic snooping technique to not only detect memory write traffic on the host bus but also filter out all but meaningful traffic to generate events. We show how kernel invariant verification software can be developed around these events, and also provide a set of APIs for additional invariant verification development. We also report our findings and considerations on the unique challenges for external monitors – such as cache coherency, dynamic object tracing. We introduce host-side kernel changes that alleviate these issues that involve changes in kernel's object allocation and cache policy control. We have built a prototype of KI-Mon on the ARM architecture to demonstrate the efficacy of KI-Mon's event-triggered mechanism in terms of performance overhead for the monitored host system and the processor usage of the KI-Mon processor.
21 July 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Modern applications often involve the processing of sensitive information. However, the lack of privilege separation within the user space leaves sensitive application secrets such as cryptographic keys just as unprotected as a ”hello world” string. Cutting-edge hardware-supported security features are being introduced. However, the features are often vendor-specific or lack compatibility with older generations of the processors. The situation leaves developers with no portable solution to incorporate protection for the sensitive application component. We propose LOTRx86, a fundamental and portable approach for user-space privilege separation. Our approach creates a more privileged user execution layer called PrivUser by harnessing the underused intermediate privilege levels on the x86 architecture. The PrivUser memory space, a set of pages within process address space that are inaccessible to user mode, is a safe place for application secrets and routines that access them. We implement the LOTRx86 ABI that exports the privcall interface to users to invoke secret handling routines in PrivUser. This way, sensitive application operations that involve the secrets are performed in a strictly controlled manner. The memory access control in our architecture is privilege-based, accessing the protected application secret only requires a change in the privilege, eliminating the need for costly remote procedure calls or change in address space. We evaluated our platform by developing a proof-of-concept LOTRx86-enabled web server that employs our architecture to securely access its private key during an SSL connection. We conducted a set of experiments, including a performance measurement on the PoC on both Intel and AMD PCs, and confirmed that LOTRx86 incurs only a limited performance overhead.