Currently, there are various problems in the field of network attack-defense analysis and deception asset deployment of game theory-based, such as difficulties in constructing attack and defense models and determining real-time attack and defense strategies. To address these problems, this study proposes a differential game deception asset selection algorithm based on multi-agent deep reinforcement learning. Specifically, by analyzing the attack and defense strategies, the infectious disease model is developed to conduct the evolution analysis of the network security state, and the differential equation of the node state in the deception defense system is derived. In addition, a differential game model for the cyber deception attack-defense process is constructed, and the reward functions of the attacker and defender are designed. A deception asset selection algorithm is established based on the deep Q network method to solve optimal deception assets. The effectiveness of the proposed model is validated through a microservices attack-defense example in a cloud-native environment. The results show that compared to the deception asset selection algorithms based on the Fictitious Self Play and Policy Space Response Oracles, the convergence speed of the proposed algorithm is improved by 77.8% and 95.6%, respectively.
Edge computing, which achieves quick data processing by sinking data computing and storage to the network edge, has grown rapidly along with the Internet of things. The new network architecture of edge computing brings new security challenges. Based on this, this paper investigates the edge computing security literature published in recent years and summarizes and analyzes research work on edge computing security from different attack surfaces. We start with the definition and architecture of edge computing. From the attack surface between device and edge server, as well as on edge servers, the research describes the security threats and defense methods of edge computing. In addition, the cause of the attack and the pros and cons of defense methods is introduced. The challenges and future research directions of edge computing are given.
In the face of an increasingly intricate network structure and a multitude of security threats, cyber deception defenders often employ deception assets to safeguard critical real assets. However, when it comes to the intranet lateral movement attackers in the cyber kill chain, the deployment of deception assets confronts the challenges of lack of dynamics, inability to make real-time decisions, and not considering the dynamic change of an attacker’s strategy. To address these issues, this study introduces a novel maze pathfinding model tailored to the lateral movement context, in which we try to find out the attacker’s location to deploy deception assets accurately for interception. The attack–defense process is modeled as a multi-agent stochastic game, by comparing it with random action policy and Minimax-Q algorithm, we choose Nash Q-learning to solve the deception asset’s deployment strategy to achieve the optimal solution effect. Extensive simulation tests reveal that our proposed model exhibits good convergence properties. Moreover, the average defense success rate surpasses 70%, attesting to the model’s efficacy.
1 January 2023 in International Journal of Intelligent Systems
The existing cyber deception decision‐making model based on game theory primarily focuses on the selection of spatial strategies, which ignores the optimal defense timing and can affect the execution of a defense strategy. Consequently, this paper presents a method for selecting deception strategies based on a multi‐stage Flipit game. Firstly, based on the analysis of cyber deception attack and defense, we propose a concept of moving deception attack surface and analyze the characteristics of deception attack and defense interaction behaviors based on the Flipit game model. The Flipit game model is then utilized to create a single‐stage deception spatial‐temporal decision‐making model. Additionally, we introduce the discount factor and transition probability based on a single‐stage game model and construct a multi‐stage cyber deception model. We provide the utility function of the multi‐stage game model, and design a Proximal Policy Optimization algorithm based on deep reinforcement learning to compute the defender’s optimal spatial‐temporal strategies. Finally, we utilize an application example to validate the effectiveness of the model and the advantages of the proposed algorithm in generating the multi‐stage cyber deception strategy.