This paper investigates the physical-layer security of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) in the cellular Internet of Things (IoT) with invoking stochastic geometry. Poisson cluster process-based model is applied to characterize the NOMA uplink transmission scenario, where IoT terminals are located around the serving base station. Considering the severe interference brought by a large number of IoT terminals, inter-cell interference is also taken into account. To enhance the physical-layer security of uplink NOMA transmission with limited overhead increment at IoT terminals, the base stations not only receive the signals from IoT terminals but also keep emitting jamming signals all the time to degrade the performance of any potential eavesdroppers. In order to characterize the physical-layer security performances, we derive expressions of coverage probability and secrecy outage probability. To obtain further insights, network-wide secrecy throughput (NST) and network-wide secrecy energy efficiency (NSEE) are analyzed. It is demonstrated that the security performance can be improved by the proposed full-duplex base station jamming scheme at the cost of reliable performance. The analytical and simulation results show the effects of BS intensity and jamming power on network performances. We also verify that NST and NSEE can be significantly enhanced by our proposed scheme. Using these results, the security of confidential information transmitted by low-complexity IoT terminals can be protected from overhearing.
Delay and security are both highly concerned in massive internet of things (IoT) which is a promising application scenario in 5G wireless communication system. In this study, the authors develop an integrated framework to study delay performance and secrecy performance in massive IoT. First, stochastic geometry and queuing theory are applied to model the spatially location of IoT devices and the temporal arrival of packets. To enhance the physical layer security of massive IoT with limited overhead increment at IoT devices, a low‐complexity noise injection scheme is applied. Then, the packet delay and packet secrecy outage probability are derived to characterise delay performance and secrecy performance. It is demonstrated that the IoT device intensity and power allocation coefficient arouse a tradeoff between the delay and security. Furthermore, optimal power allocation coefficient that maximises secrecy transmission rate can be derived, which can improve the delay‐security tradeoff. The analytical and simulation results show the effects of power allocation coefficient and IoT device intensity on the tradeoff between delay performance and secrecy performance.
Edge computing, which achieves quick data processing by sinking data computing and storage to the network edge, has grown rapidly along with the Internet of things. The new network architecture of edge computing brings new security challenges. Based on this, this paper investigates the edge computing security literature published in recent years and summarizes and analyzes research work on edge computing security from different attack surfaces. We start with the definition and architecture of edge computing. From the attack surface between device and edge server, as well as on edge servers, the research describes the security threats and defense methods of edge computing. In addition, the cause of the attack and the pros and cons of defense methods is introduced. The challenges and future research directions of edge computing are given.
In the face of an increasingly intricate network structure and a multitude of security threats, cyber deception defenders often employ deception assets to safeguard critical real assets. However, when it comes to the intranet lateral movement attackers in the cyber kill chain, the deployment of deception assets confronts the challenges of lack of dynamics, inability to make real-time decisions, and not considering the dynamic change of an attacker’s strategy. To address these issues, this study introduces a novel maze pathfinding model tailored to the lateral movement context, in which we try to find out the attacker’s location to deploy deception assets accurately for interception. The attack–defense process is modeled as a multi-agent stochastic game, by comparing it with random action policy and Minimax-Q algorithm, we choose Nash Q-learning to solve the deception asset’s deployment strategy to achieve the optimal solution effect. Extensive simulation tests reveal that our proposed model exhibits good convergence properties. Moreover, the average defense success rate surpasses 70%, attesting to the model’s efficacy.
Malware remains a central tool in cyberattacks, and systematic research into adversarial attack techniques targeting malware is crucial in advancing detection and defense systems that can evolve over time. Although numerous review articles already exist in this area, there is still a lack of comprehensive exploration into emerging artificial intelligence technologies such as reinforcement learning from the attacker’s perspective. To address this gap, we propose a foundational reinforcement learning (RL)-based framework for adversarial malware generation and develop a systematic evaluation methodology to dissect the internal mechanisms of generative models across multiple key dimensions, including action space design, state space representation, and reward function construction. Drawing from a comprehensive review and synthesis of the existing literature, we identify several core findings. (1) The scale of the action space directly affects the model training efficiency. Meanwhile, factors such as the action diversity, operation determinism, execution order, and modification ratio indirectly influence the quality of the generated adversarial samples. (2) Comprehensive and sensitive state feature representations can compensate for the information loss caused by binary feedback from real-world detection engines, thereby enhancing both the effectiveness and stability of attacks. (3) A multi-dimensional reward signal effectively mitigates the policy fragility associated with single-metric rewards, improving the agent’s adaptability in complex environments. (4) While the current RL frameworks applied to malware generation exhibit diverse architectures, they share a common core: the modeling of discrete action spaces and continuous state spaces. In addition, this work explores future research directions in the area of adversarial malware generation and outlines the open challenges and critical issues faced by defenders in responding to such threats. Our goal is to provide both a theoretical foundation and practical guidance for building more robust and adaptive security detection mechanisms.
Serverless computing is a promising paradigm that greatly simplifies cloud programming. With serverless computing, developers simply provide event-driven functions to a serverless platform, and these functions can be orchestrated as serverless workflows to accomplish complex tasks. Due to the lightweight limitation of functions, serverless workflows not only suffer from existing vulnerability-based threats but also face new security threats from the function compiling phase. In this paper, we present SMWE, a secure and makespan-oriented workflow execution framework in serverless computing. SMWE enables all life cycle protection for functions by adopting compiler shifting and running environment replacement in the serverless workflow. Furthermore, SMWE balances the tradeoff between security and makespan by carefully scheduling functions to running environments and selectively applying the secure techniques to functions. Extensive evaluations show that SMWE significantly increases the security of serverless workflows with small makespan cost.