Samuel Woo

Prof. Samuel Woo


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 June 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Yousik LeeYousik Lee
Yousik Lee
SWSamuel Woo
Samuel Woo
YSYunkeun Song
Yunkeun Song
JLJungho Lee
Jungho Lee
DLDongHoon Lee
DongHoon Lee
Emerging trends that are shaping the future of the automotive industry include electrification, autonomous driving, sharing, and connectivity, and these trends keep changing annually. Thus, the automotive industry is shifting from mechanical devices to electronic control devices, and is not moving to Internet of Things devices connected to 5G networks. Owing to the convergence of automobile-information and communication technology (ICT), the safety and convenience features of automobiles have improved significantly. However, cyberattacks that occur in the existing ICT environment and can occur in the upcoming 5G network are being replicated in the automobile environment. In a hyper-connected society where 5G networks are commercially available, automotive security is extremely important, as vehicles become the center of vehicle to everything (V2X) communication connected to everything around them. Designing, developing, and deploying information security techniques for vehicles require a systematic security-risk-assessment and management process throughout the vehicle's lifecycle. To do this, a security risk analysis (SRA) must be performed, which requires an analysis of cyber threats on automotive vehicles. In this study, we introduce a cyber kill chain-based cyberattack analysis method to create a formal vulnerability-analysis system. We can also analyze car-hacking studies that were conducted on real cars to identify the characteristics of the attack stages of existing car-hacking techniques and propose the minimum but essential measures for defense. Finally, we propose an automotive common-vulnerabilities-and-exposure system to manage and share evolving vehicle-related cyberattacks, threats, and vulnerabilities.

4 May 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Taek-Young YounTaek-Young Youn
Taek-Young Youn
YLYousik Lee
Yousik Lee
SWSamuel Woo
Samuel Woo
Recently, Various security techniques are developed to provide security for In-vehicle CAN, but the limited characteristics of CAN protocol make it hard to apply them to a real vehicle. In this paper, we propose a sender authentication and key management schemes considering the limitations of In-vehicle CAN. Our proposed security scheme is designed considering the computing power of automotive ECU and the limited-size CAN data frame. Further, we suggest an efficient key management scheme causing no communication overhead in a session key update process. The security scheme has a structure that may be implemented without change of CAN standards. To evaluate the performance and security of the proposed scheme, we conduct hardware and network simulator based evaluation. Finally, through the analysis on the security and performance, we prove that our proposed scheme is suitable for solving the problem of In-vehicle CAN authentication.

26 September 2022 in Security and Communication Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YLYousik Lee
Yousik Lee
SWSamuel Woo
Samuel Woo
As automobiles become more electrified, more and more Electronic Control Units (ECU) are installed in vehicles. ECUs communicate with each other through dedicated protocols such as a controller area network (CAN), but these protocols do not have their own security measures. Many cyberattacks have exploited this weakness, but an intrusion detection system (IDS) is emerging as an effective countermeasure. In this study, we introduce a new attack method that existing IDS cannot detect. CAN signal extinction-based DoS attack (CEDA) is a new attack method that uses a voltage drop to erase the CAN signal. When the target ECU transmits a signal, adding a resister that lowers the differential voltage to an undefined gray zone causes the other ECU to ignore the signal being sent from the target ECU. In cybersecurity, denial of service (DoS) is defined as restricting an authorized entity from accessing a resource or delaying a time-critical system. This attack is a kind of a DoS attack since the adversary can make the target ECU bus-off through a CEDA. CEDA could be a serious problem as it has not been detected by any known IDS to date. In this study, we use laboratory and vehicle tests to detail the attack methods and introduce appropriate security measures.

20 January 2022 in Security and Communication Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
WKWansoo Kim
Wansoo Kim
JLJungho Lee
Jungho Lee
YLYousik Lee
Yousik Lee
YKYoenjin Kim
Yoenjin Kim
JCJingyun Chung
Jingyun Chung
SWSamuel Woo
Samuel Woo
Modern vehicles are equipped with various types of electrical/electronic (E/E) systems. Electronic control units (ECUs) are used to control various E/E systems in the vehicle. For efficient information exchange between ECUs, most vehicle manufacturers use the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol. However, CAN has security vulnerabilities because it does not have an authentication or encryption method. Since attacks on in-vehicle networks affect the safety of drivers, it is essential to develop a technology to prevent attacks. The intrusion detection system (IDS) is one of the best ways to enhance network security. Unlike the traditional IDS for network security, IDS for the in-vehicle network requires a lightweight algorithm because of the limitation of the computing power of in-vehicle ECUs. In this paper, we propose a lightweight IDS algorithm for in-vehicle CAN based on the degree of change between successive data frames. In particular, the proposed method minimizes the load on the ECU by using the CAN data frame compression algorithm based on exclusive-OR operations as a tool for calculating the degree of change.

3 September 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YKYeon-Jin Kim
Yeon-Jin Kim
SWSamuel Woo
Samuel Woo
JCJingyun Chung
Jingyun Chung
The development of automotive-information & communication technology (ICT) convergence has resulted in various vehicle-based electrical/electronic (E/E) systems. An automotive E/E system consists of one or more electronic control units (ECUs), sensors and actuators. As ECUs are growing in popularity, it is necessary to have an efficient communication protocol for in-vehicle networks. Hence, a controller area network (CAN) protocol was developed by Bosch. CAN systems have been successfully applied in many areas, including the automotive industry, due to their high immunity to electrical interference and low cost. However, since the CAN protocol was designed without regard to information security functions, it has many vulnerabilities. With the commercialization of connected/autonomous cars, vehicle-based wireless communication systems have appeared, and are expected to grow in popularity. This increases the number of attack surfaces that can potentially threaten in-vehicle CAN. To combat the vulnerabilities of the CAN protocol, the CAN data field should be encrypted and transmitted with authentication codes. Recently, a method of transmitting authentication codes by modifying the CAN protocol was proposed. However, changing the original CAN protocol can cause serious problems in CAN systems. In this paper, to enhance CAN security, a data compression algorithm is used to reduce the data frame length so that there is space for a message authentication code (MAC) to be contained inside the data field. The proposed algorithm guarantees that all CAN frames are authenticated by a MAC of at least four bytes without any change of the original CAN protocol. Simulations using CAN data from Kia Sorento, Kia Soul, and LS Mtron vehicles show that the proposed algorithm works successfully with only a slight increase in the peak load.

14 July 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Yousik LeeYousik Lee
Yousik Lee
YKYong-Eun Kim
Yong-Eun Kim
JCJingyun Chung
Jingyun Chung
SWSamuel Woo
Samuel Woo
The vulnerabilities of controller area network (CAN) are often targeted by various types of vehicle hacking. To this end, conventional cyber attacks have used a frame injection and a dominant bit injection. However, these two techniques cannot modify data frames sent from an electronic control unit (ECU) in real time. Thus, the frame injection cannot perfectly control the target system. The dominant bit injection can only perform denial of service (DoS) attacks, which means that it cannot perfectly control the ECU. In this paper, we propose a new attack technique for modifying either dominant or recessive bits represented in a CAN bus as the attacker intends. This technique is called perfect bit modification (PBM). We introduce two attack models using the PBM technique, the bus possession attack (BPA) and the target ID attack (TIA). The BPA can perform an attack without breaking the communication pattern of the CAN bus, and the TIA can perfectly seize control of a specific ECU. In addition, we produce an attack tool with the PBM functionality using the SN65HVD230 (CAN transceiver) and the FDS8949 (MOSFET). Both SN65HVD230 and FDS8949 are components that are commonly used to build ECUs, which cost less than two dollars. This means that our attack models are likely to be utilized for supply chain attacks. To demonstrate the feasibility of BPA and TIA, we conduct attack experiments using two real vehicles. Finally, we analyze the characteristics of existing attack techniques including PBM and suggest countermeasures to construct a secure CAN environment.